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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 04:35:32 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-338279</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338279</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-338279</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338279</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-49353</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49353</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;9Router is an AI router &amp;amp; token saver. In 0.4.45 and earlier, 9Router&amp;#39;s src/dashboardGuard.js local-only access gate used Host and Origin headers in isLocalRequest() to protect /api/mcp/*, /api/tunnel/*, and /api/cli-tools/*, allowing header spoofing in reverse proxy or tunnel deployments to reach MCP child process stdin paths.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;9Router is an AI router &amp;amp; token saver. In 0.4.45 and earlier, 9Router&amp;#39;s src/dashboardGuard.js local-only access gate used Host and Origin headers in isLocalRequest() to protect /api/mcp/*, /api/tunnel/*, and /api/cli-tools/*, allowing header spoofing in reverse proxy or tunnel deployments to reach MCP child process stdin paths.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49353</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-6g2f-w7g3-77vf — 9router has an Incomplete Fix: Local-Only Access Gate Bypass in 9router via Host Header SpoofING</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6g2f-w7g3-77vf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: 9router&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for CVE-2026-46339 (unauthenticated RCE via unprotected MCP plugin routes) introduced a local-only access gate in `src/dashboardGuard.js` that restricts spawn-capable routes (`/api/mcp/*`, `/api/tunnel/*`, `/api/cli-tools/*`) to loopback requests. The gate determines &amp;#34;local&amp;#34; by inspecting the `Host` and `Origin` HTTP headers rather than the TCP source address. When 9router is deployed behind a reverse proxy, tunnel (Cloudflare Tunnel, Tailscale — both natively supported), or is subject to DNS rebinding, these headers are attacker-controlled, allowing the local-only gate to be bypassed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A second factor (CLI token or JWT cookie) is required by `canAccessLocalOnlyRoute()`, but the CLI token is a deterministic HMAC of the machine ID (`getConsistentMachineId`), which is stable and predictable on cloud VMs. If the attacker can obtain or guess the machine ID (e.g., via another information disclosure, or on shared-tenant infrastructure), the full chain to MCP child process stdin injection is reachable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a variant / incomplete fix of CVE-2026-46339 — the same attack surface (remote → MCP child process stdin) remains reachable under specific but realistic deployment configurations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`isLocalRequest()` at `src/dashboardGuard.js:93-101`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```javascript
function isLocalRequest(request) {
  if (!isLoopbackHostname(request.headers.get(&amp;#34;host&amp;#34;))) return false;
  const origin = request.headers.get(&amp;#34;origin&amp;#34;);
  if (origin) {
    try {
      if (!isLo…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: 9router&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for CVE-2026-46339 (unauthenticated RCE via unprotected MCP plugin routes) introduced a local-only access gate in `src/dashboardGuard.js` that restricts spawn-capable routes (`/api/mcp/*`, `/api/tunnel/*`, `/api/cli-tools/*`) to loopback requests. The gate determines &amp;#34;local&amp;#34; by inspecting the `Host` and `Origin` HTTP headers rather than the TCP source address. When 9router is deployed behind a reverse proxy, tunnel (Cloudflare Tunnel, Tailscale — both natively supported), or is subject to DNS rebinding, these headers are attacker-controlled, allowing the local-only gate to be bypassed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A second factor (CLI token or JWT cookie) is required by `canAccessLocalOnlyRoute()`, but the CLI token is a deterministic HMAC of the machine ID (`getConsistentMachineId`), which is stable and predictable on cloud VMs. If the attacker can obtain or guess the machine ID (e.g., via another information disclosure, or on shared-tenant infrastructure), the full chain to MCP child process stdin injection is reachable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a variant / incomplete fix of CVE-2026-46339 — the same attack surface (remote → MCP child process stdin) remains reachable under specific but realistic deployment configurations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`isLocalRequest()` at `src/dashboardGuard.js:93-101`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```javascript
function isLocalRequest(request) {
  if (!isLoopbackHostname(request.headers.get(&amp;#34;host&amp;#34;))) return false;
  const origin = request.headers.get(&amp;#34;origin&amp;#34;);
  if (origin) {
    try {
      if (!isLo…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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