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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 02:56:52 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-ansible-CVE-2026-49264 — Oauthlib : Unsafe JSONP callback injection in RevocationEndpoint allows arbitrary JavaScript response generation</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-ansible-cve-2026-49264</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: ansible&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `enable_jsonp=True`, oauthlib&amp;#39;s `RevocationEndpoint` reflects the user-supplied `callback` parameter directly into JavaScript response bodies on both success and error paths without validating that it is a legal JSONP callback name. This allows arbitrary JavaScript response generation instead of a restricted function call, making the documented JSONP revocation feature unsafe for browser-based JSONP consumption when attackers can influence `callback`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is in `oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/revocation.py`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `enable_jsonp=True` is passed to the `RevocationEndpoint` constructor, two code paths wrap the response body using the user-supplied `request.callback` parameter:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# Error response path (line 72-73):
if self.enable_jsonp and request.callback:
    response_body = &amp;#39;{}({});&amp;#39;.format(request.callback, response_body)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Success response path (line 81-82):
if self.enable_jsonp and request.callback:
    response_body = request.callback + &amp;#39;();&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `request.callback` value comes from HTTP request parameters, either the query string or POST body, via the `Request` class in `oauthlib/common.py` (lines 394-395), which merges query and body parameters into `_params`. Any value the client sends as `callback` is used verbatim.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no validation of any kind on the callback parameter:
- No check that it is a valid JavaScript identifier
- No whitelist of allowed characters
- No escaping or sanitization&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A safe JSONP imple…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: ansible&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `enable_jsonp=True`, oauthlib&amp;#39;s `RevocationEndpoint` reflects the user-supplied `callback` parameter directly into JavaScript response bodies on both success and error paths without validating that it is a legal JSONP callback name. This allows arbitrary JavaScript response generation instead of a restricted function call, making the documented JSONP revocation feature unsafe for browser-based JSONP consumption when attackers can influence `callback`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is in `oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/revocation.py`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `enable_jsonp=True` is passed to the `RevocationEndpoint` constructor, two code paths wrap the response body using the user-supplied `request.callback` parameter:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# Error response path (line 72-73):
if self.enable_jsonp and request.callback:
    response_body = &amp;#39;{}({});&amp;#39;.format(request.callback, response_body)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Success response path (line 81-82):
if self.enable_jsonp and request.callback:
    response_body = request.callback + &amp;#39;();&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `request.callback` value comes from HTTP request parameters, either the query string or POST body, via the `Request` class in `oauthlib/common.py` (lines 394-395), which merges query and body parameters into `_params`. Any value the client sends as `callback` is used verbatim.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no validation of any kind on the callback parameter:
- No check that it is a valid JavaScript identifier
- No whitelist of allowed characters
- No escaping or sanitization&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A safe JSONP imple…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-ansible-cve-2026-49264</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1385 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans les produits VMware. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provoquer…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1385</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1385</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1385</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CLEANSTART-2026-ID11627 — Security fix for CVE-2026-49264 applied in: airflow-3 3.3.2-r1</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-id11627</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: airflow-3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security vulnerability affects the airflow-3 package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: airflow-3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security vulnerability affects the airflow-3 package. This issue is resolved in later releases. See references for vulnerability details.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-id11627</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-388536</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-388536</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-388536</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-388536</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-49264</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49264</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;OAuthLib is an implementation of the OAuth request-signing logic for Python 3.6+. From 0.6.1 until 4.0.0, OAuthLib&amp;#39;s RevocationEndpoint in oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/revocation.py reflects an unvalidated callback request parameter into success and error response bodies when enable_jsonp=True. The callback can come from the query string or request body and is used without restricting it to a legal JavaScript function name. A browser application that loads the revocation response as trusted JSONP and permits attacker influence over callback can therefore execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the including application&amp;#39;s origin, with access to its DOM and script-accessible data. The feature is disabled by default, so only deployments that explicitly enable JSONP are affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;OAuthLib is an implementation of the OAuth request-signing logic for Python 3.6+. From 0.6.1 until 4.0.0, OAuthLib&amp;#39;s RevocationEndpoint in oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/revocation.py reflects an unvalidated callback request parameter into success and error response bodies when enable_jsonp=True. The callback can come from the query string or request body and is used without restricting it to a legal JavaScript function name. A browser application that loads the revocation response as trusted JSONP and permits attacker influence over callback can therefore execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the including application&amp;#39;s origin, with access to its DOM and script-accessible data. The feature is disabled by default, so only deployments that explicitly enable JSONP are affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49264</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hj66-6f7g-4r5v — Oauthlib : Unsafe JSONP callback injection in RevocationEndpoint allows arbitrary JavaScript response generation</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hj66-6f7g-4r5v</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: oauthlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `enable_jsonp=True`, oauthlib&amp;#39;s `RevocationEndpoint` reflects the user-supplied `callback` parameter directly into JavaScript response bodies on both success and error paths without validating that it is a legal JSONP callback name. This allows arbitrary JavaScript response generation instead of a restricted function call, making the documented JSONP revocation feature unsafe for browser-based JSONP consumption when attackers can influence `callback`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is in `oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/revocation.py`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `enable_jsonp=True` is passed to the `RevocationEndpoint` constructor, two code paths wrap the response body using the user-supplied `request.callback` parameter:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# Error response path (line 72-73):
if self.enable_jsonp and request.callback:
    response_body = &amp;#39;{}({});&amp;#39;.format(request.callback, response_body)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Success response path (line 81-82):
if self.enable_jsonp and request.callback:
    response_body = request.callback + &amp;#39;();&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `request.callback` value comes from HTTP request parameters, either the query string or POST body, via the `Request` class in `oauthlib/common.py` (lines 394-395), which merges query and body parameters into `_params`. Any value the client sends as `callback` is used verbatim.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no validation of any kind on the callback parameter:
- No check that it is a valid JavaScript identifier
- No whitelist of allowed characters
- No escaping or sanitization&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A safe JSONP imple…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: oauthlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `enable_jsonp=True`, oauthlib&amp;#39;s `RevocationEndpoint` reflects the user-supplied `callback` parameter directly into JavaScript response bodies on both success and error paths without validating that it is a legal JSONP callback name. This allows arbitrary JavaScript response generation instead of a restricted function call, making the documented JSONP revocation feature unsafe for browser-based JSONP consumption when attackers can influence `callback`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is in `oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/revocation.py`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `enable_jsonp=True` is passed to the `RevocationEndpoint` constructor, two code paths wrap the response body using the user-supplied `request.callback` parameter:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# Error response path (line 72-73):
if self.enable_jsonp and request.callback:
    response_body = &amp;#39;{}({});&amp;#39;.format(request.callback, response_body)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Success response path (line 81-82):
if self.enable_jsonp and request.callback:
    response_body = request.callback + &amp;#39;();&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `request.callback` value comes from HTTP request parameters, either the query string or POST body, via the `Request` class in `oauthlib/common.py` (lines 394-395), which merges query and body parameters into `_params`. Any value the client sends as `callback` is used verbatim.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no validation of any kind on the callback parameter:
- No check that it is a valid JavaScript identifier
- No whitelist of allowed characters
- No escaping or sanitization&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A safe JSONP imple…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hj66-6f7g-4r5v</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-49264 — OAuthLib: Unsafe JSONP callback injection in RevocationEndpoint allows arbitrary JavaScript response generation</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-49264</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-49264</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-49264</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-4497 — python-oauthlib security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-4497</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: python-oauthlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AuthLib is a framework which implements the logic of OAuth1 or OAuth2  without assuming a specific HTTP request object or web framework. Use  it to graft OAuth client support onto your favorite HTTP library, or  provide support onto your favourite web framework. If you&amp;amp;amp;apos;re a  maintainer of such a library, write a thin veneer on top of OAuthLib  and get OAuth support for very little effort.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OAuthLib is an implementation of the OAuth request-signing logic for Python 3.6+. From 0.6.1 until 4.0.0, OAuthLib&amp;amp;apos;s RevocationEndpoint in oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/revocation.py reflects an unvalidated callback request parameter into success and error response bodies when enable_jsonp=True. The callback can come from the query string or request body and is used without restricting it to a legal JavaScript function name. A browser application that loads the revocation response as trusted JSONP and permits attacker influence over callback can therefore execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the including application&amp;amp;apos;s origin, with access to its DOM and script-accessible data. The feature is disabled by default, so only deployments that explicitly enable JSONP are affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.0.(CVE-2026-49264)&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: python-oauthlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AuthLib is a framework which implements the logic of OAuth1 or OAuth2  without assuming a specific HTTP request object or web framework. Use  it to graft OAuth client support onto your favorite HTTP library, or  provide support onto your favourite web framework. If you&amp;amp;amp;apos;re a  maintainer of such a library, write a thin veneer on top of OAuthLib  and get OAuth support for very little effort.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OAuthLib is an implementation of the OAuth request-signing logic for Python 3.6+. From 0.6.1 until 4.0.0, OAuthLib&amp;amp;apos;s RevocationEndpoint in oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/revocation.py reflects an unvalidated callback request parameter into success and error response bodies when enable_jsonp=True. The callback can come from the query string or request body and is used without restricting it to a legal JavaScript function name. A browser application that loads the revocation response as trusted JSONP and permits attacker influence over callback can therefore execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the including application&amp;amp;apos;s origin, with access to its DOM and script-accessible data. The feature is disabled by default, so only deployments that explicitly enable JSONP are affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.0.(CVE-2026-49264)&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-4497</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11973-1 — python313-oauthlib-4.0.0-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11973-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;python313-oauthlib-4.0.0-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;python313-oauthlib-4.0.0-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11973-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-4113 — Oauthlib : Unsafe JSONP callback injection in RevocationEndpoint allows arbitrary JavaScript response generation</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-4113</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: oauthlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `enable_jsonp=True`, oauthlib&amp;#39;s `RevocationEndpoint` reflects the user-supplied `callback` parameter directly into JavaScript response bodies on both success and error paths without validating that it is a legal JSONP callback name. This allows arbitrary JavaScript response generation instead of a restricted function call, making the documented JSONP revocation feature unsafe for browser-based JSONP consumption when attackers can influence `callback`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is in `oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/revocation.py`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `enable_jsonp=True` is passed to the `RevocationEndpoint` constructor, two code paths wrap the response body using the user-supplied `request.callback` parameter:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# Error response path (line 72-73):
if self.enable_jsonp and request.callback:
    response_body = &amp;#39;{}({});&amp;#39;.format(request.callback, response_body)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Success response path (line 81-82):
if self.enable_jsonp and request.callback:
    response_body = request.callback + &amp;#39;();&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `request.callback` value comes from HTTP request parameters, either the query string or POST body, via the `Request` class in `oauthlib/common.py` (lines 394-395), which merges query and body parameters into `_params`. Any value the client sends as `callback` is used verbatim.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no validation of any kind on the callback parameter:
- No check that it is a valid JavaScript identifier
- No whitelist of allowed characters
- No escaping or sanitization&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A safe JSONP imple…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: oauthlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `enable_jsonp=True`, oauthlib&amp;#39;s `RevocationEndpoint` reflects the user-supplied `callback` parameter directly into JavaScript response bodies on both success and error paths without validating that it is a legal JSONP callback name. This allows arbitrary JavaScript response generation instead of a restricted function call, making the documented JSONP revocation feature unsafe for browser-based JSONP consumption when attackers can influence `callback`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is in `oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/revocation.py`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `enable_jsonp=True` is passed to the `RevocationEndpoint` constructor, two code paths wrap the response body using the user-supplied `request.callback` parameter:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# Error response path (line 72-73):
if self.enable_jsonp and request.callback:
    response_body = &amp;#39;{}({});&amp;#39;.format(request.callback, response_body)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Success response path (line 81-82):
if self.enable_jsonp and request.callback:
    response_body = request.callback + &amp;#39;();&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `request.callback` value comes from HTTP request parameters, either the query string or POST body, via the `Request` class in `oauthlib/common.py` (lines 394-395), which merges query and body parameters into `_params`. Any value the client sends as `callback` is used verbatim.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no validation of any kind on the callback parameter:
- No check that it is a valid JavaScript identifier
- No whitelist of allowed characters
- No escaping or sanitization&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A safe JSONP imple…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-4113</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:82368 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat AI Inference 3.5.2 (cuda)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:82368</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;libxml2: Stack Buffer Overflow in xmllint Interactive Shell Command Handling sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 python: cpython: CPython: tarfile extraction filter bypass allows escaping the destination directory pip: pip: Arbitrary file installation via malicious package indexes GDBusServer: glib2: GDBusServer pre-authentication DoS via unbounded SASL line buffering xdgmime: heap-based buffer overflow in _xdg_mime_magic_parse_magic_line() in xdgmimemagic.c urllib3: urllib3: Information disclosure via cross-origin redirects forwarding sensitive headers urllib3: urllib3: Denial of Service due to excessive HTTP response decompression vim: Vim: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted directory names vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted step-definition patterns oauthlib: oauthlib: Unsafe JSONP callback injection in RevocationEndpoint allows arbitrary JavaScript response generation oauthlib: oauthlib: Timing attack vulnerability in PKCE code_verifier/code_challenge comparison allows authorization code recovery vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via Python omni-completion acl: Symlink traversal privilege escalation via libacl functions linux-pam: Plaintext password recovery via timing discrepancy in pam_userdb module vim: Vim: Out-of-bounds Write in Spell File Word Count vim: Vim: Denial of Service via stack out-of-bounds write in spell_soun…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;libxml2: Stack Buffer Overflow in xmllint Interactive Shell Command Handling sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 python: cpython: CPython: tarfile extraction filter bypass allows escaping the destination directory pip: pip: Arbitrary file installation via malicious package indexes GDBusServer: glib2: GDBusServer pre-authentication DoS via unbounded SASL line buffering xdgmime: heap-based buffer overflow in _xdg_mime_magic_parse_magic_line() in xdgmimemagic.c urllib3: urllib3: Information disclosure via cross-origin redirects forwarding sensitive headers urllib3: urllib3: Denial of Service due to excessive HTTP response decompression vim: Vim: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted directory names vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted step-definition patterns oauthlib: oauthlib: Unsafe JSONP callback injection in RevocationEndpoint allows arbitrary JavaScript response generation oauthlib: oauthlib: Timing attack vulnerability in PKCE code_verifier/code_challenge comparison allows authorization code recovery vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via Python omni-completion acl: Symlink traversal privilege escalation via libacl functions linux-pam: Plaintext password recovery via timing discrepancy in pam_userdb module vim: Vim: Out-of-bounds Write in Spell File Word Count vim: Vim: Denial of Service via stack out-of-bounds write in spell_soun…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:82368</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-49264</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-49264</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:26.10: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: python-oauthlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OAuthLib is an implementation of the OAuth request-signing logic for Python 3.6+. From 0.6.1 until 4.0.0, OAuthLib&amp;#39;s RevocationEndpoint in oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/revocation.py reflects an unvalidated callback request parameter into success and error response bodies when enable_jsonp=True. The callback can come from the query string or request body and is used without restricting it to a legal JavaScript function name. A browser application that loads the revocation response as trusted JSONP and permits attacker influence over callback can therefore execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the including application&amp;#39;s origin, with access to its DOM and script-accessible data. The feature is disabled by default, so only deployments that explicitly enable JSONP are affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:26.10: python-oauthlib, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: python-oauthlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OAuthLib is an implementation of the OAuth request-signing logic for Python 3.6+. From 0.6.1 until 4.0.0, OAuthLib&amp;#39;s RevocationEndpoint in oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/revocation.py reflects an unvalidated callback request parameter into success and error response bodies when enable_jsonp=True. The callback can come from the query string or request body and is used without restricting it to a legal JavaScript function name. A browser application that loads the revocation response as trusted JSONP and permits attacker influence over callback can therefore execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the including application&amp;#39;s origin, with access to its DOM and script-accessible data. The feature is disabled by default, so only deployments that explicitly enable JSONP are affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-49264</guid>
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