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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 22:05:35 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-352609</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-352609</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-352609</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-352609</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-49144</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49144</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;BrowserStack Runner through 0.9.5 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the _default HTTP handler in lib/server.js that allows unauthenticated network-adjacent attackers to read arbitrary files. Attackers can exploit the unauthenticated HTTP server bound on all interfaces to traverse outside the project root and access sensitive files.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;BrowserStack Runner through 0.9.5 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the _default HTTP handler in lib/server.js that allows unauthenticated network-adjacent attackers to read arbitrary files. Attackers can exploit the unauthenticated HTTP server bound on all interfaces to traverse outside the project root and access sensitive files.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-49144</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8rpw-6cqh-2v9h — browserstack-runner has an unauthenticated arbitrary file read via path traversal in HTTP server</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8rpw-6cqh-2v9h</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: browserstack-runner&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The HTTP server in browserstack-runner serves files from the project directory via the `_default` handler. This handler uses `path.join(process.cwd(), uri)` to resolve file paths but does not validate that the resulting path stays within the project root. Combined with the server binding on `0.0.0.0` (all interfaces) and the absence of any authentication, this allows an unauthenticated network-adjacent attacker to read arbitrary files from the host filesystem.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**lib/server.js, lines 530–534 : `_default` handler:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```javascript
&amp;#39;_default&amp;#39;: function defaultHandler(uri, body, request, response) {
    var filePath = path.join(process.cwd(), uri);
    handleFile(filePath, request, response);
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`uri` comes from `url.parse(request.url).pathname` (line 540), which preserves `../` sequences. `path.join` resolves them, producing absolute paths outside the project directory. No boundary check is performed before serving the file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**bin/cli.js, line 131 : server binding:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```javascript
server.listen(parseInt(config.test_server_port, 10));
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No hostname is specified, so Node.js binds on `0.0.0.0` (all interfaces).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**No authentication:** The `_default` handler does not call `getWorkerUuid()` or perform any authentication check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Steps to Reproduce&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Step 1 : Start the server (Terminal 1)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
cd browserstack-runner
echo &amp;#39;&amp;lt;html&amp;gt;&amp;lt;body&amp;gt;test&amp;lt;/body&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/html&amp;gt;&amp;#39; &amp;gt; _poc_test.html
echo &amp;#39;{&amp;#34;username&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;X&amp;#34;,&amp;#34;key&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;X&amp;#34;,&amp;#34;test_path&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;_poc_test.html&amp;#34;,&amp;#34;test_fr…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: browserstack-runner&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The HTTP server in browserstack-runner serves files from the project directory via the `_default` handler. This handler uses `path.join(process.cwd(), uri)` to resolve file paths but does not validate that the resulting path stays within the project root. Combined with the server binding on `0.0.0.0` (all interfaces) and the absence of any authentication, this allows an unauthenticated network-adjacent attacker to read arbitrary files from the host filesystem.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**lib/server.js, lines 530–534 : `_default` handler:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```javascript
&amp;#39;_default&amp;#39;: function defaultHandler(uri, body, request, response) {
    var filePath = path.join(process.cwd(), uri);
    handleFile(filePath, request, response);
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`uri` comes from `url.parse(request.url).pathname` (line 540), which preserves `../` sequences. `path.join` resolves them, producing absolute paths outside the project directory. No boundary check is performed before serving the file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**bin/cli.js, line 131 : server binding:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```javascript
server.listen(parseInt(config.test_server_port, 10));
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No hostname is specified, so Node.js binds on `0.0.0.0` (all interfaces).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**No authentication:** The `_default` handler does not call `getWorkerUuid()` or perform any authentication check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Steps to Reproduce&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Step 1 : Start the server (Terminal 1)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
cd browserstack-runner
echo &amp;#39;&amp;lt;html&amp;gt;&amp;lt;body&amp;gt;test&amp;lt;/body&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/html&amp;gt;&amp;#39; &amp;gt; _poc_test.html
echo &amp;#39;{&amp;#34;username&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;X&amp;#34;,&amp;#34;key&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;X&amp;#34;,&amp;#34;test_path&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;_poc_test.html&amp;#34;,&amp;#34;test_fr…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8rpw-6cqh-2v9h</guid>
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