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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 22:21:20 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-338940</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338940</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-338940</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338940</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-48819</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48819</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Hey API is an ecosystem for turning API specifications into production-ready code. Prior to 0.97.3, dist/clients/core/params.ts ships a runtime template copied into generated SDKs as params.gen.ts, and buildClientParams writes unknown slot-prefixed keys such as $body_, $headers_, $path_, and $query_ directly to the corresponding slot, allowing $query___proto__ alongside a legitimate q field to set params.query through params[&amp;#34;query&amp;#34;][&amp;#34;__proto__&amp;#34;] = value, call Object.setPrototypeOf(params.query, value), and expose inherited attacker-controlled keys during for..in iteration. This issue is fixed in version 0.97.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Hey API is an ecosystem for turning API specifications into production-ready code. Prior to 0.97.3, dist/clients/core/params.ts ships a runtime template copied into generated SDKs as params.gen.ts, and buildClientParams writes unknown slot-prefixed keys such as $body_, $headers_, $path_, and $query_ directly to the corresponding slot, allowing $query___proto__ alongside a legitimate q field to set params.query through params[&amp;#34;query&amp;#34;][&amp;#34;__proto__&amp;#34;] = value, call Object.setPrototypeOf(params.query, value), and expose inherited attacker-controlled keys during for..in iteration. This issue is fixed in version 0.97.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48819</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hhx9-57xq-r5rw — @hey-api/openapi-ts's `buildClientParams` template: prototype chain substitution via unknown `$&lt;slot&gt;___proto__` key</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hhx9-57xq-r5rw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @hey-api/openapi-ts&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`dist/clients/core/params.ts` in `@hey-api/openapi-ts` ships a runtime template that is copied verbatim into every generated SDK as `params.gen.ts`. When a caller passes an object argument containing an unknown key starting with a slot prefix (`$body_`, `$headers_`, `$path_`, `$query_`), the function strips the prefix and writes the remainder directly to that slot without validation. The key `&amp;#34;$query___proto__&amp;#34;` causes the returned `params.query` object to have its prototype chain substituted with attacker-controlled data. The issue is present in all versions through at least `0.97.2`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable branch in `dist/clients/core/params.ts`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
const extra = extraPrefixes.find(([prefix]) =&amp;gt; key.startsWith(prefix))
if (extra) {
  const [prefix, slot] = extra
  ;(params[slot] as Record&amp;lt;string, unknown&amp;gt;)[key.slice(prefix.length)] = value
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This branch runs for any key that (1) is not registered in the field map and (2) starts with one of the four slot prefixes. When a caller passes `&amp;#34;$query___proto__&amp;#34;` as an extra key alongside a legitimate field, the key is not in the field map, `key.startsWith(&amp;#34;$query_&amp;#34;)` is true, and `key.slice(7)` produces `&amp;#34;__proto__&amp;#34;`. The bracket-write `params[&amp;#34;query&amp;#34;][&amp;#34;__proto__&amp;#34;] = value` invokes the `__proto__` setter, which calls `Object.setPrototypeOf(params.query, value)`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Reachability.** Every generated endpoint method that accepts an object argument passes it through `buildClientParams`. If the applic…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @hey-api/openapi-ts&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`dist/clients/core/params.ts` in `@hey-api/openapi-ts` ships a runtime template that is copied verbatim into every generated SDK as `params.gen.ts`. When a caller passes an object argument containing an unknown key starting with a slot prefix (`$body_`, `$headers_`, `$path_`, `$query_`), the function strips the prefix and writes the remainder directly to that slot without validation. The key `&amp;#34;$query___proto__&amp;#34;` causes the returned `params.query` object to have its prototype chain substituted with attacker-controlled data. The issue is present in all versions through at least `0.97.2`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable branch in `dist/clients/core/params.ts`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
const extra = extraPrefixes.find(([prefix]) =&amp;gt; key.startsWith(prefix))
if (extra) {
  const [prefix, slot] = extra
  ;(params[slot] as Record&amp;lt;string, unknown&amp;gt;)[key.slice(prefix.length)] = value
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This branch runs for any key that (1) is not registered in the field map and (2) starts with one of the four slot prefixes. When a caller passes `&amp;#34;$query___proto__&amp;#34;` as an extra key alongside a legitimate field, the key is not in the field map, `key.startsWith(&amp;#34;$query_&amp;#34;)` is true, and `key.slice(7)` produces `&amp;#34;__proto__&amp;#34;`. The bracket-write `params[&amp;#34;query&amp;#34;][&amp;#34;__proto__&amp;#34;] = value` invokes the `__proto__` setter, which calls `Object.setPrototypeOf(params.query, value)`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Reachability.** Every generated endpoint method that accepts an object argument passes it through `buildClientParams`. If the applic…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hhx9-57xq-r5rw</guid>
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