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    <item>
      <title>BIT-proxysql-2026-48774 — ProxySQL MCP run_sql_readonly executes side-effecting MySQL multi-statements despite read-only contract</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-proxysql-2026-48774</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: proxysql&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ProxySQL is a proxy for MySQL and its forks, as well as PostgreSQL. In versions 3.0.0 through 3.0.8, ProxySQL&amp;#39;s GenAI/MCP `run_sql_readonly` tool violates its documented read-only contract for MySQL targets. The tool validates only the full input string with a substring blacklist and first-keyword allowlist, but then executes the entire SQL string on a backend connection created with `CLIENT_MULTI_STATEMENTS`. As a result, a caller can submit a read-only first statement followed by a side-effecting second statement, such as `SELECT 1; RENAME TABLE ...`. The validator accepts the payload because it starts with `SELECT` and because side-effecting MySQL statements such as `RENAME TABLE`, `SET`, `RESET`, `LOCK TABLES`, and `KILL` are not rejected by the blacklist. In a live MCP runtime test, the `/mcp/query` endpoint accepted a `run_sql_readonly` request. The MCP response reported success for the first `SELECT`, and direct backend verification showed that the table had actually been renamed. This violates the endpoint&amp;#39;s read-only security contract and lets an MCP caller perform backend writes or administrative SQL, limited by the configured MCP target account&amp;#39;s database privileges. Version 3.0.9 contains a fix. Other operator mitigations include: keeping MCP disabled unless required; setting a non-empty `mcp-query_endpoint_auth` token before exposing `/mcp/query`; restricting MCP listener network exposure; configuring MCP backend target credentials as database-level read-only us…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: proxysql&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ProxySQL is a proxy for MySQL and its forks, as well as PostgreSQL. In versions 3.0.0 through 3.0.8, ProxySQL&amp;#39;s GenAI/MCP `run_sql_readonly` tool violates its documented read-only contract for MySQL targets. The tool validates only the full input string with a substring blacklist and first-keyword allowlist, but then executes the entire SQL string on a backend connection created with `CLIENT_MULTI_STATEMENTS`. As a result, a caller can submit a read-only first statement followed by a side-effecting second statement, such as `SELECT 1; RENAME TABLE ...`. The validator accepts the payload because it starts with `SELECT` and because side-effecting MySQL statements such as `RENAME TABLE`, `SET`, `RESET`, `LOCK TABLES`, and `KILL` are not rejected by the blacklist. In a live MCP runtime test, the `/mcp/query` endpoint accepted a `run_sql_readonly` request. The MCP response reported success for the first `SELECT`, and direct backend verification showed that the table had actually been renamed. This violates the endpoint&amp;#39;s read-only security contract and lets an MCP caller perform backend writes or administrative SQL, limited by the configured MCP target account&amp;#39;s database privileges. Version 3.0.9 contains a fix. Other operator mitigations include: keeping MCP disabled unless required; setting a non-empty `mcp-query_endpoint_auth` token before exposing `/mcp/query`; restricting MCP listener network exposure; configuring MCP backend target credentials as database-level read-only us…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-proxysql-2026-48774</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-329136</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329136</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-329136</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329136</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-48774</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48774</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ProxySQL is a proxy for MySQL and its forks, as well as PostgreSQL. In versions 3.0.0 through 3.0.8, ProxySQL&amp;#39;s GenAI/MCP `run_sql_readonly` tool violates its documented read-only contract for MySQL targets. The tool validates only the full input string with a substring blacklist and first-keyword allowlist, but then executes the entire SQL string on a backend connection created with `CLIENT_MULTI_STATEMENTS`. As a result, a caller can submit a read-only first statement followed by a side-effecting second statement, such as `SELECT 1; RENAME TABLE ...`. The validator accepts the payload because it starts with `SELECT` and because side-effecting MySQL statements such as `RENAME TABLE`, `SET`, `RESET`, `LOCK TABLES`, and `KILL` are not rejected by the blacklist. In a live MCP runtime test, the `/mcp/query` endpoint accepted a `run_sql_readonly` request. The MCP response reported success for the first `SELECT`, and direct backend verification showed that the table had actually been renamed. This violates the endpoint&amp;#39;s read-only security contract and lets an MCP caller perform backend writes or administrative SQL, limited by the configured MCP target account&amp;#39;s database privileges. Version 3.0.9 contains a fix. Other operator mitigations include: keeping MCP disabled unless required; setting a non-empty `mcp-query_endpoint_auth` token before exposing `/mcp/query`; restricting MCP listener network exposure; configuring MCP backend target credentials as database-level read-only us…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ProxySQL is a proxy for MySQL and its forks, as well as PostgreSQL. In versions 3.0.0 through 3.0.8, ProxySQL&amp;#39;s GenAI/MCP `run_sql_readonly` tool violates its documented read-only contract for MySQL targets. The tool validates only the full input string with a substring blacklist and first-keyword allowlist, but then executes the entire SQL string on a backend connection created with `CLIENT_MULTI_STATEMENTS`. As a result, a caller can submit a read-only first statement followed by a side-effecting second statement, such as `SELECT 1; RENAME TABLE ...`. The validator accepts the payload because it starts with `SELECT` and because side-effecting MySQL statements such as `RENAME TABLE`, `SET`, `RESET`, `LOCK TABLES`, and `KILL` are not rejected by the blacklist. In a live MCP runtime test, the `/mcp/query` endpoint accepted a `run_sql_readonly` request. The MCP response reported success for the first `SELECT`, and direct backend verification showed that the table had actually been renamed. This violates the endpoint&amp;#39;s read-only security contract and lets an MCP caller perform backend writes or administrative SQL, limited by the configured MCP target account&amp;#39;s database privileges. Version 3.0.9 contains a fix. Other operator mitigations include: keeping MCP disabled unless required; setting a non-empty `mcp-query_endpoint_auth` token before exposing `/mcp/query`; restricting MCP listener network exposure; configuring MCP backend target credentials as database-level read-only us…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48774</guid>
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