https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 20:22:58 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1094 certfr-2026-avi-1094 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1094 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-327577 EUVD-2026-327577 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-327577 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48713 <p>Versions prior to 2.6.6 are vulnerable to prototype pollution via crafted missing-key strings when used to persist missing translation keys (e.g. via i18next-http-middleware&#39;s missingKeyHandler exposed to untrusted input). Backend.writeFile() splits each queued missing-key string on the configured keySeparator (default .) before calling the internal setPath() walker. The walker (getLastOfPath in lib/utils.js) did not guard against unsafe segments, so a key like &#34;__proto__.polluted&#34; was split into [&#34;__proto__&#34;, &#34;polluted&#34;] and walked straight into Object.prototype, allowing an attacker to write arbitrary properties onto the global object prototype. Depending on the host application, polluted prototype properties may cause crashes, corrupted translation behaviour, configuration poisoning, or bypasses of property-based security checks. Applications are affected only if the missingKeyHandler (or another route that forwards untrusted request bodies to i18next.t(..., { ... }) with saveMissing: true) is reachable by untrusted users and the default behaviour of splitting missing-key strings on keySeparator is in use (i.e. keySeparator is not false). Apps that do not expose missing-key persistence to untrusted input are not directly affected through this attack path. This issue has been fixed in version 2.6.6. If developers using the library are unable to upgrade immediately, they should take the following precautions: do not expose i18next-http-middleware&#39;s missingKeyHandler to untr…</p> <p>Versions prior to 2.6.6 are vulnerable to prototype pollution via crafted missing-key strings when used to persist missing translation keys (e.g. via i18next-http-middleware&#39;s missingKeyHandler exposed to untrusted input). Backend.writeFile() splits each queued missing-key string on the configured keySeparator (default .) before calling the internal setPath() walker. The walker (getLastOfPath in lib/utils.js) did not guard against unsafe segments, so a key like &#34;__proto__.polluted&#34; was split into [&#34;__proto__&#34;, &#34;polluted&#34;] and walked straight into Object.prototype, allowing an attacker to write arbitrary properties onto the global object prototype. Depending on the host application, polluted prototype properties may cause crashes, corrupted translation behaviour, configuration poisoning, or bypasses of property-based security checks. Applications are affected only if the missingKeyHandler (or another route that forwards untrusted request bodies to i18next.t(..., { ... }) with saveMissing: true) is reachable by untrusted users and the default behaviour of splitting missing-key strings on keySeparator is in use (i.e. keySeparator is not false). Apps that do not expose missing-key persistence to untrusted input are not directly affected through this attack path. This issue has been fixed in version 2.6.6. If developers using the library are unable to upgrade immediately, they should take the following precautions: do not expose i18next-http-middleware&#39;s missingKeyHandler to untr…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48713 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2933-q333-qg83 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: i18next-fs-backend</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>`i18next-fs-backend` ≤ 2.6.5, when used to persist missing translation keys (e.g. via `i18next-http-middleware`&#39;s `missingKeyHandler` exposed to untrusted input), is vulnerable to prototype pollution via crafted missing-key strings.</p> <p>`Backend.writeFile()` splits each queued missing-key string on the configured `keySeparator` (default `.`) before calling the internal `setPath()` walker. The walker (`getLastOfPath` in `lib/utils.js`) did not guard against unsafe segments, so a key like `&#34;__proto__.polluted&#34;` was split into `[&#34;__proto__&#34;, &#34;polluted&#34;]` and walked straight into `Object.prototype`, allowing an attacker to write arbitrary properties onto the global object prototype.</p> <p>Depending on the host application, polluted prototype properties may cause crashes, corrupted translation behaviour, configuration poisoning, or bypasses of property-based security checks.</p> <p>### Affected configuration</p> <p>Applications are directly affected only if **all** of the following hold:</p> <p>- `i18next-fs-backend` ≤ 2.6.5 is configured as the backend. - `i18next-http-middleware`&#39;s `missingKeyHandler` (or another route that forwards untrusted request bodies to `i18next.t(..., { ... })` with `saveMissing: true`) is reachable by untrusted users. - The default behaviour of splitting missing-key strings on `keySeparator` is in use (i.e. `keySeparator` is not `false`).</p> <p>Apps that do not expose missing-key persistence to untrusted input are not directly affected through this attack path.</p> <p>### Patc…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: i18next-fs-backend</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>`i18next-fs-backend` ≤ 2.6.5, when used to persist missing translation keys (e.g. via `i18next-http-middleware`&#39;s `missingKeyHandler` exposed to untrusted input), is vulnerable to prototype pollution via crafted missing-key strings.</p> <p>`Backend.writeFile()` splits each queued missing-key string on the configured `keySeparator` (default `.`) before calling the internal `setPath()` walker. The walker (`getLastOfPath` in `lib/utils.js`) did not guard against unsafe segments, so a key like `&#34;__proto__.polluted&#34;` was split into `[&#34;__proto__&#34;, &#34;polluted&#34;]` and walked straight into `Object.prototype`, allowing an attacker to write arbitrary properties onto the global object prototype.</p> <p>Depending on the host application, polluted prototype properties may cause crashes, corrupted translation behaviour, configuration poisoning, or bypasses of property-based security checks.</p> <p>### Affected configuration</p> <p>Applications are directly affected only if **all** of the following hold:</p> <p>- `i18next-fs-backend` ≤ 2.6.5 is configured as the backend. - `i18next-http-middleware`&#39;s `missingKeyHandler` (or another route that forwards untrusted request bodies to `i18next.t(..., { ... })` with `saveMissing: true`) is reachable by untrusted users. - The default behaviour of splitting missing-key strings on `keySeparator` is in use (i.e. `keySeparator` is not `false`).</p> <p>Apps that do not expose missing-key persistence to untrusted input are not directly affected through this attack path.</p> <p>### Patc…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2933-q333-qg83