<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 15:07:48 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-322096</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322096</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-322096</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322096</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-48593</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48593</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in oban-bg oban_web (&amp;#39;Elixir.Oban.Web.CronExpr&amp;#39; modules) allows memory exhaustion via unbounded cron range expansion.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker with access to schedule cron jobs can submit a malicious cron expression such as &amp;#34;0 0 1-100000000 * *&amp;#34;. When a user with dashboard access views the cron job list, &amp;#39;Elixir.Oban.Web.CronExpr&amp;#39;:describe/1 is called to render the expression. parse_range/1 parses both range endpoints via Integer.parse/1 with no bounds check, and the downstream helpers expand_dom_parts/1 and expand_dow_parts/1 materialise the range eagerly via Enum.to_list/1, causing allocation of ~2.4 GB and stalling or crashing the BEAM node. A sibling helper extract_dom_values already validates range bounds, but the expansion helpers do not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects oban_web: from 2.12.0 before 2.12.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in oban-bg oban_web (&amp;#39;Elixir.Oban.Web.CronExpr&amp;#39; modules) allows memory exhaustion via unbounded cron range expansion.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker with access to schedule cron jobs can submit a malicious cron expression such as &amp;#34;0 0 1-100000000 * *&amp;#34;. When a user with dashboard access views the cron job list, &amp;#39;Elixir.Oban.Web.CronExpr&amp;#39;:describe/1 is called to render the expression. parse_range/1 parses both range endpoints via Integer.parse/1 with no bounds check, and the downstream helpers expand_dom_parts/1 and expand_dow_parts/1 materialise the range eagerly via Enum.to_list/1, causing allocation of ~2.4 GB and stalling or crashing the BEAM node. A sibling helper extract_dom_values already validates range bounds, but the expansion helpers do not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects oban_web: from 2.12.0 before 2.12.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48593</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-6xh2-93p9-vqh4 — oban_web: Unbounded range expansion in cron describe causes memory exhaustion</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6xh2-93p9-vqh4</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Hex: oban_web&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`oban_web` 2.12.0 introduced a cron expression parser that expands `-`-separated ranges without validating the endpoints. An attacker with access to schedule cron jobs can submit a malicious expression; when any user with dashboard access views the cron job list, `Oban.Web.CronExpr.describe/1` is called to render it, triggering allocation of gigabytes of memory and stalling or crashing the BEAM node.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. Scheduling:** The attacker submits a cron job with a malicious expression such as `&amp;#34;0 0 1-100000000 * *&amp;#34;`. No special privilege is required beyond the ability to schedule cron jobs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. Parsing:** When the cron list is rendered in the dashboard, `describe/1` calls `parse_range/1` in `lib/oban/web/cron_expr.ex`, which calls `Integer.parse/1` on both endpoints of the range with no bounds check, returning `{:range, start_val, end_val}` for any integers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**3. Eager expansion:** `expand_dom_parts/1` and `expand_dow_parts/1` materialise the range via `Enum.to_list(start_val..end_val)`. The input above produces ~100 million integers (~2.4 GB). A sibling helper `extract_dom_values` already validates range bounds, but the expansion helpers do not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Schedule a cron job with expression `&amp;#34;0 0 1-100000000 * *&amp;#34;` (or any expression with an out-of-domain range).
2. Have any user with Oban.Web dashboard access navigate to the cron job list.
3. The dashboard calls `describe/1` to render the expression, exhausting BEAM memory and crashing the node.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Hex: oban_web&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`oban_web` 2.12.0 introduced a cron expression parser that expands `-`-separated ranges without validating the endpoints. An attacker with access to schedule cron jobs can submit a malicious expression; when any user with dashboard access views the cron job list, `Oban.Web.CronExpr.describe/1` is called to render it, triggering allocation of gigabytes of memory and stalling or crashing the BEAM node.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. Scheduling:** The attacker submits a cron job with a malicious expression such as `&amp;#34;0 0 1-100000000 * *&amp;#34;`. No special privilege is required beyond the ability to schedule cron jobs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. Parsing:** When the cron list is rendered in the dashboard, `describe/1` calls `parse_range/1` in `lib/oban/web/cron_expr.ex`, which calls `Integer.parse/1` on both endpoints of the range with no bounds check, returning `{:range, start_val, end_val}` for any integers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**3. Eager expansion:** `expand_dom_parts/1` and `expand_dow_parts/1` materialise the range via `Enum.to_list(start_val..end_val)`. The input above produces ~100 million integers (~2.4 GB). A sibling helper `extract_dom_values` already validates range bounds, but the expansion helpers do not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Schedule a cron job with expression `&amp;#34;0 0 1-100000000 * *&amp;#34;` (or any expression with an out-of-domain range).
2. Have any user with Oban.Web dashboard access navigate to the cron job list.
3. The dashboard calls `describe/1` to render the expression, exhausting BEAM memory and crashing the node.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6xh2-93p9-vqh4</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
