EUVD-2026-321458

fkie_cve-2026-48126

Algernon is a small self-contained pure-Go web server. Prior to 1.17.8, when algernon is started with --domain (or --letsencrypt, which silently turns on --domain at engine/flags.go:372), the request handler resolves the served directory by joining the configured --dir with the value of the client-supplied Host header. The join is performed by filepath.Join with no validation, so a Host: .. header walks one level above the document root. Subsequent file resolution then exposes everything in that parent directory — arbitrary file read, full directory listing, and, if any .lua file is present, server-side Lua execution. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.17.8.

GHSA-jc3j-x6pg-4hmv — Algernon: Host header path traversal in --domain mode reads files and runs Lua from parent dir

Affected: Go: github.com/xyproto/algernon

### Summary

When algernon is started with `--domain` (or `--letsencrypt`, which silently turns on `--domain` at `engine/flags.go:372`), the request handler resolves the served directory by joining the configured `--dir` with the value of the client-supplied `Host` header. The join is performed by `filepath.Join` with no validation, so a `Host: ..` header walks one level above the document root. Subsequent file resolution then exposes everything in that parent directory — arbitrary file read, full directory listing, and, if any `.lua` file is present, server-side Lua execution. Algernon 1.17.7 and earlier are affected.

### Details

`engine/handlers.go` (function `RegisterHandlers`, around line 510):

```go allRequests := func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { ... servedir := servedir if addDomain { servedir = filepath.Join(servedir, utils.GetDomain(req)) // <— line 531 } ... filename := utils.URL2filename(servedir, urlpath) ```

`utils/web.go` (`GetDomain`):

```go func GetDomain(req *http.Request) string { host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(req.Host) if err != nil { return req.Host // <— Host header returned verbatim } return host } ```

`utils/files.go` (`URL2filename`) only sanitises the URL path — it never inspects `dirname`:

```go func URL2filename(dirname, urlpath string) string { if strings.Contains(urlpath, "..") { return dirname + Pathsep // dirname is trusted here…

Most recent entries from all

EUVD-2026-321458

fkie_cve-2026-48126

GHSA-jc3j-x6pg-4hmv — Algernon: Host header path traversal in --domain mode reads files and runs Lua from parent dir