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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-362461</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-362461</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-362461</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-362461</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-47727</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47727</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Trilium is an open-source hierarchical note-taking application. In versions prior to 0.104.0, the default-on &amp;#34;Safe import&amp;#34; filter fails to neutralize the shareTemplate relation because that relation is not marked as dangerous, allowing an attacker-supplied import archive to plant a server-side template that leads to remote code execution. The relation is omitted from the built-in list of dangerous attributes, so unlike other code-loading relations it is not disabled on import, and when the victim later publishes the imported note the public share renderer feeds the linked EJS code note&amp;#39;s raw bytes into ejs.render, which compiles them in the server&amp;#39;s Node process. An unauthenticated request to the shared note then executes the attacker&amp;#39;s JavaScript with full access to require, process, the filesystem, and the network. This issue is fixed in version 0.104.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Trilium is an open-source hierarchical note-taking application. In versions prior to 0.104.0, the default-on &amp;#34;Safe import&amp;#34; filter fails to neutralize the shareTemplate relation because that relation is not marked as dangerous, allowing an attacker-supplied import archive to plant a server-side template that leads to remote code execution. The relation is omitted from the built-in list of dangerous attributes, so unlike other code-loading relations it is not disabled on import, and when the victim later publishes the imported note the public share renderer feeds the linked EJS code note&amp;#39;s raw bytes into ejs.render, which compiles them in the server&amp;#39;s Node process. An unauthenticated request to the shared note then executes the attacker&amp;#39;s JavaScript with full access to require, process, the filesystem, and the network. This issue is fixed in version 0.104.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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