https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 10 Oct 2026 02:12:13 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-339406 EUVD-2026-339406 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-339406 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47416 <p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 are vulnerable to vertical privilege escalation. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)`, which defaults to `min_role=&#34;member&#34;` and is never overridden by the route. The handler then calls `MemberService.update_role(workspace_id, user_id, body.role)` which sets the target member&#39;s role to whatever the request body specifies, with no check that the caller has owner-or-admin privilege, no check that the new role is not higher than the caller&#39;s own, and no check that the caller is not silently promoting themselves. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.</p> <p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 are vulnerable to vertical privilege escalation. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)`, which defaults to `min_role=&#34;member&#34;` and is never overridden by the route. The handler then calls `MemberService.update_role(workspace_id, user_id, body.role)` which sets the target member&#39;s role to whatever the request body specifies, with no check that the caller has owner-or-admin privilege, no check that the new role is not higher than the caller&#39;s own, and no check that the caller is not silently promoting themselves. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47416 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c2m8-4gcg-v22g <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Vertical privilege escalation. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)`, which defaults to `min_role=&#34;member&#34;` and is never overridden by the route. The handler then calls `MemberService.update_role(workspace_id, user_id, body.role)` which sets the target member&#39;s role to whatever the request body specifies, with no check that the caller has owner-or-admin privilege, no check that the new role is not higher than the caller&#39;s own, and no check that the caller is not silently promoting themselves. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 115-127; `services/member_service.py`, lines 55-69; `api/deps.py`, lines 54-73. **Root cause:** `require_workspace_member` exists with a `min_role` parameter (deps.py:58) but FastAPI&#39;s `Depends(require_workspace_member)` cannot pass arguments, so every route uses the default `&#34;member&#34;`. The route then passes the URL-supplied `user_id` and the body-supplied `role` directly to `MemberService.update_role`, which contains zero permission checks: it loads the member by composite key and assigns `member.role = new_role`. A user with the lowest possible privilege (&#34;member&#34;) thus sets their own role to &#34;owner&#34; with one HTTP PATCH, completing a member-to-owner privilege escalation in a single request.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 115…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Vertical privilege escalation. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)`, which defaults to `min_role=&#34;member&#34;` and is never overridden by the route. The handler then calls `MemberService.update_role(workspace_id, user_id, body.role)` which sets the target member&#39;s role to whatever the request body specifies, with no check that the caller has owner-or-admin privilege, no check that the new role is not higher than the caller&#39;s own, and no check that the caller is not silently promoting themselves. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 115-127; `services/member_service.py`, lines 55-69; `api/deps.py`, lines 54-73. **Root cause:** `require_workspace_member` exists with a `min_role` parameter (deps.py:58) but FastAPI&#39;s `Depends(require_workspace_member)` cannot pass arguments, so every route uses the default `&#34;member&#34;`. The route then passes the URL-supplied `user_id` and the body-supplied `role` directly to `MemberService.update_role`, which contains zero permission checks: it loads the member by composite key and assigns `member.role = new_role`. A user with the lowest possible privilege (&#34;member&#34;) thus sets their own role to &#34;owner&#34; with one HTTP PATCH, completing a member-to-owner privilege escalation in a single request.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 115…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c2m8-4gcg-v22g https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-481 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Vertical privilege escalation. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)`, which defaults to `min_role=&#34;member&#34;` and is never overridden by the route. The handler then calls `MemberService.update_role(workspace_id, user_id, body.role)` which sets the target member&#39;s role to whatever the request body specifies, with no check that the caller has owner-or-admin privilege, no check that the new role is not higher than the caller&#39;s own, and no check that the caller is not silently promoting themselves. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 115-127; `services/member_service.py`, lines 55-69; `api/deps.py`, lines 54-73. **Root cause:** `require_workspace_member` exists with a `min_role` parameter (deps.py:58) but FastAPI&#39;s `Depends(require_workspace_member)` cannot pass arguments, so every route uses the default `&#34;member&#34;`. The route then passes the URL-supplied `user_id` and the body-supplied `role` directly to `MemberService.update_role`, which contains zero permission checks: it loads the member by composite key and assigns `member.role = new_role`. A user with the lowest possible privilege (&#34;member&#34;) thus sets their own role to &#34;owner&#34; with one HTTP PATCH, completing a member-to-owner privilege escalation in a single request.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 1…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Vertical privilege escalation. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)`, which defaults to `min_role=&#34;member&#34;` and is never overridden by the route. The handler then calls `MemberService.update_role(workspace_id, user_id, body.role)` which sets the target member&#39;s role to whatever the request body specifies, with no check that the caller has owner-or-admin privilege, no check that the new role is not higher than the caller&#39;s own, and no check that the caller is not silently promoting themselves. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 115-127; `services/member_service.py`, lines 55-69; `api/deps.py`, lines 54-73. **Root cause:** `require_workspace_member` exists with a `min_role` parameter (deps.py:58) but FastAPI&#39;s `Depends(require_workspace_member)` cannot pass arguments, so every route uses the default `&#34;member&#34;`. The route then passes the URL-supplied `user_id` and the body-supplied `role` directly to `MemberService.update_role`, which contains zero permission checks: it loads the member by composite key and assigns `member.role = new_role`. A user with the lowest possible privilege (&#34;member&#34;) thus sets their own role to &#34;owner&#34; with one HTTP PATCH, completing a member-to-owner privilege escalation in a single request.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 1…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-481