https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 10 Oct 2026 09:26:56 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-339248 EUVD-2026-339248 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-339248 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47411 <p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling workspace metadata + settings tampering. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`). Any member can rewrite the workspace&#39;s `name`, `description`, and the `settings` JSON blob. The settings field is a free-form JSON object — depending on which downstream code reads it, this becomes a configuration-injection primitive for any setting the platform exposes there. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.</p> <p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling workspace metadata + settings tampering. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`). Any member can rewrite the workspace&#39;s `name`, `description`, and the `settings` JSON blob. The settings field is a free-form JSON object — depending on which downstream code reads it, this becomes a configuration-injection primitive for any setting the platform exposes there. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47411 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rcmc-q9rj-4wmq <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Authorization bypass enabling workspace metadata + settings tampering. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`). Any member can rewrite the workspace&#39;s `name`, `description`, and the `settings` JSON blob. The settings field is a free-form JSON object — depending on which downstream code reads it, this becomes a configuration-injection primitive for any setting the platform exposes there. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 63-74; `services/workspace_service.py`&#39;s `update()` method. **Root cause:** `Depends(require_workspace_member)` resolves to default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`. `WorkspaceService.update(workspace_id, name, description, settings)` writes the new fields to the workspace row without any caller-permission check. The role hierarchy (`MemberService.has_role`) is never consulted.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 63-74.</p> <p>```python @router.patch(&#34;/{workspace_id}&#34;, response_model=WorkspaceResponse) async def update_workspace( workspace_id: str, body: WorkspaceUpdate, user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member), # &lt;-- BUG: defaults to min_role=&#34;member&#34; session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ): ws_svc = WorkspaceService(session) ws = await ws_svc.update(workspace_id, body.name, body.description, b…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Authorization bypass enabling workspace metadata + settings tampering. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`). Any member can rewrite the workspace&#39;s `name`, `description`, and the `settings` JSON blob. The settings field is a free-form JSON object — depending on which downstream code reads it, this becomes a configuration-injection primitive for any setting the platform exposes there. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 63-74; `services/workspace_service.py`&#39;s `update()` method. **Root cause:** `Depends(require_workspace_member)` resolves to default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`. `WorkspaceService.update(workspace_id, name, description, settings)` writes the new fields to the workspace row without any caller-permission check. The role hierarchy (`MemberService.has_role`) is never consulted.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 63-74.</p> <p>```python @router.patch(&#34;/{workspace_id}&#34;, response_model=WorkspaceResponse) async def update_workspace( workspace_id: str, body: WorkspaceUpdate, user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member), # &lt;-- BUG: defaults to min_role=&#34;member&#34; session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ): ws_svc = WorkspaceService(session) ws = await ws_svc.update(workspace_id, body.name, body.description, b…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rcmc-q9rj-4wmq https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2937 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Authorization bypass enabling workspace metadata + settings tampering. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`). Any member can rewrite the workspace&#39;s `name`, `description`, and the `settings` JSON blob. The settings field is a free-form JSON object — depending on which downstream code reads it, this becomes a configuration-injection primitive for any setting the platform exposes there. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 63-74; `services/workspace_service.py`&#39;s `update()` method. **Root cause:** `Depends(require_workspace_member)` resolves to default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`. `WorkspaceService.update(workspace_id, name, description, settings)` writes the new fields to the workspace row without any caller-permission check. The role hierarchy (`MemberService.has_role`) is never consulted.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 63-74.</p> <p>```python @router.patch(&#34;/{workspace_id}&#34;, response_model=WorkspaceResponse) async def update_workspace( workspace_id: str, body: WorkspaceUpdate, user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member), # &lt;-- BUG: defaults to min_role=&#34;member&#34; session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ): ws_svc = WorkspaceService(session) ws = await ws_svc.update(workspace_id, body.name, body.description, b…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Authorization bypass enabling workspace metadata + settings tampering. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`). Any member can rewrite the workspace&#39;s `name`, `description`, and the `settings` JSON blob. The settings field is a free-form JSON object — depending on which downstream code reads it, this becomes a configuration-injection primitive for any setting the platform exposes there. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 63-74; `services/workspace_service.py`&#39;s `update()` method. **Root cause:** `Depends(require_workspace_member)` resolves to default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`. `WorkspaceService.update(workspace_id, name, description, settings)` writes the new fields to the workspace row without any caller-permission check. The role hierarchy (`MemberService.has_role`) is never consulted.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 63-74.</p> <p>```python @router.patch(&#34;/{workspace_id}&#34;, response_model=WorkspaceResponse) async def update_workspace( workspace_id: str, body: WorkspaceUpdate, user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member), # &lt;-- BUG: defaults to min_role=&#34;member&#34; session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ): ws_svc = WorkspaceService(session) ws = await ws_svc.update(workspace_id, body.name, body.description, b…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2937