https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 07:53:33 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329856 EUVD-2026-329856 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329856 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47388 <p>NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.05.1, a low-privilege MCP token holder with knowledge of an attachment path could read any file in shared storage, including attachments belonging to other bases and workspaces, because the MCP readAttachment tool did not verify the file&#39;s ownership. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.05.1.</p> <p>NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.05.1, a low-privilege MCP token holder with knowledge of an attachment path could read any file in shared storage, including attachments belonging to other bases and workspaces, because the MCP readAttachment tool did not verify the file&#39;s ownership. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.05.1.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47388 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xxpj-q764-9r6q <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: nocodb</p> <p>### Summary A low-privilege MCP token holder with knowledge of an attachment path could read any file in shared storage, including attachments belonging to other bases and workspaces, because the MCP `readAttachment` tool did not verify the file&#39;s ownership.</p> <p>### Details The MCP `readAttachment` tool accepts caller-supplied `path`/`url` values and streams the file via the storage adapter. The handler now looks up the path in `nc_file_references` and requires a non-deleted row whose `base_id` matches the caller&#39;s MCP context before streaming; otherwise it returns `Attachment is not accessible from this MCP context`. The lookup tolerates both `download/uploads/...` and `uploads/...` styles.</p> <p>### Impact Arbitrary read against shared storage scoped to attachments the caller&#39;s MCP context should not see. Exploitation requires an MCP token and a known attachment path.</p> <p>### Credit This issue was reported by [@helwor-01](https://github.com/helwor-01).</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: nocodb</p> <p>### Summary A low-privilege MCP token holder with knowledge of an attachment path could read any file in shared storage, including attachments belonging to other bases and workspaces, because the MCP `readAttachment` tool did not verify the file&#39;s ownership.</p> <p>### Details The MCP `readAttachment` tool accepts caller-supplied `path`/`url` values and streams the file via the storage adapter. The handler now looks up the path in `nc_file_references` and requires a non-deleted row whose `base_id` matches the caller&#39;s MCP context before streaming; otherwise it returns `Attachment is not accessible from this MCP context`. The lookup tolerates both `download/uploads/...` and `uploads/...` styles.</p> <p>### Impact Arbitrary read against shared storage scoped to attachments the caller&#39;s MCP context should not see. Exploitation requires an MCP token and a known attachment path.</p> <p>### Credit This issue was reported by [@helwor-01](https://github.com/helwor-01).</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xxpj-q764-9r6q