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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 02:52:34 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-329804</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329804</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-329804</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329804</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-47385</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47385</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.05.1, an authenticated user with base-create permission can attach a SQLite source pointing at an arbitrary file on the NocoDB host, including NocoDB&amp;#39;s own internal databases. The SQLite client and the base/integration create services accepted a caller-supplied filename and passed it to fs.exists and fs.open(&amp;#39;w&amp;#39;) without restricting the location. A user could point a source at noco.db, at a tenant database under nc_minimal_dbs/, or at any writable path the NocoDB process can reach, and then read or overwrite its contents through the regular table APIs.This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.05.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.05.1, an authenticated user with base-create permission can attach a SQLite source pointing at an arbitrary file on the NocoDB host, including NocoDB&amp;#39;s own internal databases. The SQLite client and the base/integration create services accepted a caller-supplied filename and passed it to fs.exists and fs.open(&amp;#39;w&amp;#39;) without restricting the location. A user could point a source at noco.db, at a tenant database under nc_minimal_dbs/, or at any writable path the NocoDB process can reach, and then read or overwrite its contents through the regular table APIs.This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.05.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47385</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-wvqj-9wv4-7ff5 — NocoDB: Path Traversal via SQLite Source Filename</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wvqj-9wv4-7ff5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: nocodb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
An authenticated user with base-create permission can attach a SQLite source pointing at
an arbitrary file on the NocoDB host, including NocoDB&amp;#39;s own internal databases.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The SQLite client and the base/integration create services accepted a caller-supplied
filename and passed it to `fs.exists` and `fs.open(&amp;#39;w&amp;#39;)` without restricting the location.
A user could point a source at `noco.db`, at a tenant database under `nc_minimal_dbs/`,
or at any writable path the NocoDB process can reach, and then read or overwrite its
contents through the regular table APIs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Disclosure and modification of NocoDB internal state, of other tenants&amp;#39; databases, and
of any file the NocoDB process can read or write. Authentication and base-create
permission are required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Credit
This issue was reported by [@Mouhebbenelwafi](https://github.com/Mouhebbenelwafi).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: nocodb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
An authenticated user with base-create permission can attach a SQLite source pointing at
an arbitrary file on the NocoDB host, including NocoDB&amp;#39;s own internal databases.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The SQLite client and the base/integration create services accepted a caller-supplied
filename and passed it to `fs.exists` and `fs.open(&amp;#39;w&amp;#39;)` without restricting the location.
A user could point a source at `noco.db`, at a tenant database under `nc_minimal_dbs/`,
or at any writable path the NocoDB process can reach, and then read or overwrite its
contents through the regular table APIs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Disclosure and modification of NocoDB internal state, of other tenants&amp;#39; databases, and
of any file the NocoDB process can read or write. Authentication and base-create
permission are required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Credit
This issue was reported by [@Mouhebbenelwafi](https://github.com/Mouhebbenelwafi).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wvqj-9wv4-7ff5</guid>
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