https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 09:37:01 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329857 EUVD-2026-329857 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329857 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47381 <p>NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.05.1, a user in one workspace could exercise another workspace&#39;s integration through the testConnection endpoint by supplying its ID, because the integration was fetched in a bypass scope and the caller&#39;s permission check matched any base in any workspace. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.05.1.</p> <p>NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.05.1, a user in one workspace could exercise another workspace&#39;s integration through the testConnection endpoint by supplying its ID, because the integration was fetched in a bypass scope and the caller&#39;s permission check matched any base in any workspace. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.05.1.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47381 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-96fh-m4r8-6v9v <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: nocodb</p> <p>### Summary A user in one workspace could exercise another workspace&#39;s integration through the `testConnection` endpoint by supplying its ID, because the integration was fetched in a bypass scope and the caller&#39;s permission check matched any base in any workspace.</p> <p>### Details The connection-test endpoint fetched the integration in `RootScopes.BYPASS` scope and checked only that the integration was non-private and that the caller held an owner/creator role on any base in any workspace. The permission lookup is now scoped to the integration&#39;s workspace by joining on `fk_workspace_id`, and the controller rejects requests where the integration&#39;s workspace differs from the request&#39;s workspace.</p> <p>### Impact Cross-tenant access to integration configuration through the connection-test endpoint, including the ability to drive the resolved database with the other workspace&#39;s credentials. Authentication with creator-or-owner role on any base in any workspace was sufficient.</p> <p>### Credit This issue was reported by [@DongyangLyu](https://github.com/DongyangLyu).</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: nocodb</p> <p>### Summary A user in one workspace could exercise another workspace&#39;s integration through the `testConnection` endpoint by supplying its ID, because the integration was fetched in a bypass scope and the caller&#39;s permission check matched any base in any workspace.</p> <p>### Details The connection-test endpoint fetched the integration in `RootScopes.BYPASS` scope and checked only that the integration was non-private and that the caller held an owner/creator role on any base in any workspace. The permission lookup is now scoped to the integration&#39;s workspace by joining on `fk_workspace_id`, and the controller rejects requests where the integration&#39;s workspace differs from the request&#39;s workspace.</p> <p>### Impact Cross-tenant access to integration configuration through the connection-test endpoint, including the ability to drive the resolved database with the other workspace&#39;s credentials. Authentication with creator-or-owner role on any base in any workspace was sufficient.</p> <p>### Credit This issue was reported by [@DongyangLyu](https://github.com/DongyangLyu).</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-96fh-m4r8-6v9v