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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-329858</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329858</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-329858</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329858</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-47377</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47377</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, the client-side hashRedirect plugin called window.location.replace() on a path extracted from the URL hash fragment after only checking hashPath.startsWith(&amp;#39;/&amp;#39;). Protocol-relative URLs (//attacker.com/…) also satisfy that check, so a crafted link silently redirected visitors to an attacker-controlled origin. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, the client-side hashRedirect plugin called window.location.replace() on a path extracted from the URL hash fragment after only checking hashPath.startsWith(&amp;#39;/&amp;#39;). Protocol-relative URLs (//attacker.com/…) also satisfy that check, so a crafted link silently redirected visitors to an attacker-controlled origin. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47377</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-rvp5-9p55-f5rp — NocoDB: Open Redirect via Hash Fragment in hashRedirect Plugin</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rvp5-9p55-f5rp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: nocodb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The client-side `hashRedirect` plugin called `window.location.replace()` on a path extracted from the URL hash fragment after only checking `hashPath.startsWith(&amp;#39;/&amp;#39;)`. Protocol-relative URLs (`//attacker.com/…`) also satisfy that check, so a crafted link such as `https://nocodb.example/#//attacker.com/phishing` silently redirected visitors to an attacker-controlled origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `packages/nc-gui/plugins/hashRedirect.client.ts`, the plugin extracted the hash content and normalised it into `cleanUrl`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
let cleanUrl = hashPath.startsWith(&amp;#39;/&amp;#39;) ? hashPath : `/${hashPath}`
if (hashQuery) cleanUrl += `?${hashQuery}`
window.location.replace(cleanUrl)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`startsWith(&amp;#39;/&amp;#39;)` returns true for `//attacker.com/...`, which browsers interpret as a protocol-relative absolute URL. No hostname check was performed before the redirect. The fix adds an early `if (/^\/[/\\]/.test(hashPath)) return` to reject protocol-relative paths.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Open redirect from any NocoDB origin to an attacker-controlled domain.
- No authentication required; the attack lands the victim on an attacker-controlled page that may impersonate a NocoDB login.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Credit&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue was reported by [@fg0x0](https://github.com/fg0x0).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: nocodb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The client-side `hashRedirect` plugin called `window.location.replace()` on a path extracted from the URL hash fragment after only checking `hashPath.startsWith(&amp;#39;/&amp;#39;)`. Protocol-relative URLs (`//attacker.com/…`) also satisfy that check, so a crafted link such as `https://nocodb.example/#//attacker.com/phishing` silently redirected visitors to an attacker-controlled origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `packages/nc-gui/plugins/hashRedirect.client.ts`, the plugin extracted the hash content and normalised it into `cleanUrl`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
let cleanUrl = hashPath.startsWith(&amp;#39;/&amp;#39;) ? hashPath : `/${hashPath}`
if (hashQuery) cleanUrl += `?${hashQuery}`
window.location.replace(cleanUrl)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`startsWith(&amp;#39;/&amp;#39;)` returns true for `//attacker.com/...`, which browsers interpret as a protocol-relative absolute URL. No hostname check was performed before the redirect. The fix adds an early `if (/^\/[/\\]/.test(hashPath)) return` to reject protocol-relative paths.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Open redirect from any NocoDB origin to an attacker-controlled domain.
- No authentication required; the attack lands the victim on an attacker-controlled page that may impersonate a NocoDB login.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Credit&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue was reported by [@fg0x0](https://github.com/fg0x0).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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