https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 11:01:12 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349475 EUVD-2026-349475 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349475 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47362 <p>In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v554-5.9.4, two Room-backed SQLite databases store sensitive content in plaintext: LocalNotificationDatabase (notification title, message, recipient, service, tags, and on-call/incident deep links) and SearchRecentDatabase (the user&#39;s full in-app search history). Impact: Any actor able to bypass the app sandbox can read these databases in plaintext.</p> <p>In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v554-5.9.4, two Room-backed SQLite databases store sensitive content in plaintext: LocalNotificationDatabase (notification title, message, recipient, service, tags, and on-call/incident deep links) and SearchRecentDatabase (the user&#39;s full in-app search history). Impact: Any actor able to bypass the app sandbox can read these databases in plaintext.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47362 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-98h7-6m49-37qg <p>The Datadog Android application stores operationally sensitive content in plaintext SQLite databases via Room. Two databases were reviewed: LocalNotificationDatabase (table local_notifications, columns including title, message, recipient, service, tags, and on-call/incident deeplinks) and SearchRecentDatabase (table search_recents, storing every in-app search query the user typed). A repository-wide search for SQLCipher, SupportFactory, openHelperFactory, or any Room encryption configuration returns no matches. Databases are stored as cleartext SQLite files in /data/data/com.datadog.app/databases/. At-rest protection therefore depends solely on the Android application sandbox — the standard Android baseline, adequate for many applications but flagged here as a hardening recommendation because the stored content is operationally sensitive (customer infrastructure monitoring metadata, incident notification recipients, and free-text search queries that may reveal service names, dashboards, and queries of interest). Exploitation paths include rooted or jailbroken devices, adb backup if android:allowBackup is misconfigured for any build flavor, physical-device handover scenarios, and forensic acquisition.</p> <p>The Datadog Android application stores operationally sensitive content in plaintext SQLite databases via Room. Two databases were reviewed: LocalNotificationDatabase (table local_notifications, columns including title, message, recipient, service, tags, and on-call/incident deeplinks) and SearchRecentDatabase (table search_recents, storing every in-app search query the user typed). A repository-wide search for SQLCipher, SupportFactory, openHelperFactory, or any Room encryption configuration returns no matches. Databases are stored as cleartext SQLite files in /data/data/com.datadog.app/databases/. At-rest protection therefore depends solely on the Android application sandbox — the standard Android baseline, adequate for many applications but flagged here as a hardening recommendation because the stored content is operationally sensitive (customer infrastructure monitoring metadata, incident notification recipients, and free-text search queries that may reveal service names, dashboards, and queries of interest). Exploitation paths include rooted or jailbroken devices, adb backup if android:allowBackup is misconfigured for any build flavor, physical-device handover scenarios, and forensic acquisition.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-98h7-6m49-37qg