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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-351760</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-351760</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-351760</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-351760</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-47230</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47230</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.10, `modules/documents-files.php` mode `file_rename_save` shares the same root-cause shape as the cross-folder move bug (`05-documents-cross-folder-move-idor.md`): the top-level rights check at lines 79-89 validates `hasUploadRight()` on the URL parameter `folder_uuid`, but the rename operation acts on `file_uuid` — a separate URL parameter — without re-checking the folder that actually contains the file. `DocumentsService::renameFile()` resolves the target file via `getFileForDownload()` (which permits view-readable files) but does not require upload right on the file&amp;#39;s source folder. Result: a user with upload right on any folder A can rename a file in folder B as long as they can view it. They can also overwrite the file&amp;#39;s description. Version 5.0.10 contains a fix.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.10, `modules/documents-files.php` mode `file_rename_save` shares the same root-cause shape as the cross-folder move bug (`05-documents-cross-folder-move-idor.md`): the top-level rights check at lines 79-89 validates `hasUploadRight()` on the URL parameter `folder_uuid`, but the rename operation acts on `file_uuid` — a separate URL parameter — without re-checking the folder that actually contains the file. `DocumentsService::renameFile()` resolves the target file via `getFileForDownload()` (which permits view-readable files) but does not require upload right on the file&amp;#39;s source folder. Result: a user with upload right on any folder A can rename a file in folder B as long as they can view it. They can also overwrite the file&amp;#39;s description. Version 5.0.10 contains a fix.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47230</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-q6w3-hpfv-rg36 — Admidio: IDOR in documents-files.php allows cross-folder file rename and description changes by unauthorized uploaders</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q6w3-hpfv-rg36</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: admidio/admidio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`modules/documents-files.php` mode `file_rename_save` shares the same root-cause shape as the cross-folder move bug (`05-documents-cross-folder-move-idor.md`): the top-level rights check at lines 79-89 validates `hasUploadRight()` on the URL parameter `folder_uuid`, but the rename operation acts on `file_uuid` — a separate URL parameter — without re-checking the folder that actually contains the file. `DocumentsService::renameFile()` resolves the target file via `getFileForDownload()` (which permits view-readable files) but does not require upload right on the file&amp;#39;s source folder. Result: a user with upload right on any folder A can rename a file in folder B as long as they can view it. They can also overwrite the file&amp;#39;s description.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Vulnerable Code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`modules/documents-files.php:79-89` — top-level check binds to URL `folder_uuid`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
if ($getMode != &amp;#39;list&amp;#39; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; $getMode != &amp;#39;download&amp;#39;) {
    $folder = new Folder($gDb);
    $folder-&amp;gt;getFolderForDownload($getFolderUUID);
    if (!$folder-&amp;gt;hasUploadRight()) {
        $gMessage-&amp;gt;show($gL10n-&amp;gt;get(&amp;#39;SYS_NO_RIGHTS&amp;#39;));
    }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/Documents/Service/DocumentsService.php:272-315` — `renameFile()` resolves the file via `getFileForDownload()` (view-only) and never re-verifies upload right on the file&amp;#39;s parent:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
public function renameFile(string $fileUUID, string $newName, string $newDescription): array
{
    $file = new File($this-&amp;gt;db);
    $file-&amp;gt;getFileForDownload($fileUUID);…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: admidio/admidio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`modules/documents-files.php` mode `file_rename_save` shares the same root-cause shape as the cross-folder move bug (`05-documents-cross-folder-move-idor.md`): the top-level rights check at lines 79-89 validates `hasUploadRight()` on the URL parameter `folder_uuid`, but the rename operation acts on `file_uuid` — a separate URL parameter — without re-checking the folder that actually contains the file. `DocumentsService::renameFile()` resolves the target file via `getFileForDownload()` (which permits view-readable files) but does not require upload right on the file&amp;#39;s source folder. Result: a user with upload right on any folder A can rename a file in folder B as long as they can view it. They can also overwrite the file&amp;#39;s description.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Vulnerable Code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`modules/documents-files.php:79-89` — top-level check binds to URL `folder_uuid`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
if ($getMode != &amp;#39;list&amp;#39; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; $getMode != &amp;#39;download&amp;#39;) {
    $folder = new Folder($gDb);
    $folder-&amp;gt;getFolderForDownload($getFolderUUID);
    if (!$folder-&amp;gt;hasUploadRight()) {
        $gMessage-&amp;gt;show($gL10n-&amp;gt;get(&amp;#39;SYS_NO_RIGHTS&amp;#39;));
    }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/Documents/Service/DocumentsService.php:272-315` — `renameFile()` resolves the file via `getFileForDownload()` (view-only) and never re-verifies upload right on the file&amp;#39;s parent:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
public function renameFile(string $fileUUID, string $newName, string $newDescription): array
{
    $file = new File($this-&amp;gt;db);
    $file-&amp;gt;getFileForDownload($fileUUID);…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q6w3-hpfv-rg36</guid>
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