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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 13:05:45 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-323994</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-323994</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-323994</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-323994</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-47179</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47179</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 1.19.4, ProjectService.GetProjectFileContent returns the contents of any Docker Compose include directive declared in a project&amp;#39;s compose file before any path-traversal validation runs. Because ProjectService.CreateProject writes attacker-supplied compose content to disk without validating include paths, an authenticated user can create a project whose compose file declares include: [&amp;#39;../../../../etc/passwd&amp;#39;], then read the include via the project file API. The result is arbitrary read of any file readable by the Arcane backend process, including /app/data/arcane.db (the SQLite database containing every user&amp;#39;s password hash and API key), enabling escalation to admin and, via Arcane&amp;#39;s Docker control plane, RCE on the host. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.19.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 1.19.4, ProjectService.GetProjectFileContent returns the contents of any Docker Compose include directive declared in a project&amp;#39;s compose file before any path-traversal validation runs. Because ProjectService.CreateProject writes attacker-supplied compose content to disk without validating include paths, an authenticated user can create a project whose compose file declares include: [&amp;#39;../../../../etc/passwd&amp;#39;], then read the include via the project file API. The result is arbitrary read of any file readable by the Arcane backend process, including /app/data/arcane.db (the SQLite database containing every user&amp;#39;s password hash and API key), enabling escalation to admin and, via Arcane&amp;#39;s Docker control plane, RCE on the host. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.19.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47179</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-c3px-h233-h6fq — Arcane Has an Authenticated Arbitrary Host File Read via Docker Compose Include Directives</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c3px-h233-h6fq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ProjectService.GetProjectFileContent` returns the contents of any Docker Compose include directive declared in a project&amp;#39;s compose file before any path-traversal validation runs. Because `ProjectService.CreateProject` writes attacker-supplied compose content to disk without validating include paths, an authenticated user can create a project whose compose file declares `include: [&amp;#39;../../../../etc/passwd&amp;#39;]`, then read the include via the project file API. The result is arbitrary read of any file readable by the Arcane backend process, including `/app/data/arcane.db` (the SQLite database containing every user&amp;#39;s password hash and API key), enabling escalation to admin and, via Arcane&amp;#39;s Docker control plane, RCE on the host.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Root cause #1 — `CreateProject` writes compose content without validation** (`backend/internal/services/project_service.go:1605-1644`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
func (s *ProjectService) CreateProject(ctx context.Context, name, composeContent string, envContent *string, user models.User) (*models.Project, error) {
    // ... directory setup ...
    if err := projects.SaveOrUpdateProjectFiles(projectsDirectory, projectPath, composeContent, envContent); err != nil {
        _ = s.db.WithContext(ctx).Delete(proj).Error
        return nil, fmt.Errorf(&amp;#34;failed to save project files: %w&amp;#34;, err)
    }
    // ...
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Compare with `UpdateProject` (project_service.go:2494, :2577), which calls `validateComposeContentForUpdate`. That validator (line 2599) load…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ProjectService.GetProjectFileContent` returns the contents of any Docker Compose include directive declared in a project&amp;#39;s compose file before any path-traversal validation runs. Because `ProjectService.CreateProject` writes attacker-supplied compose content to disk without validating include paths, an authenticated user can create a project whose compose file declares `include: [&amp;#39;../../../../etc/passwd&amp;#39;]`, then read the include via the project file API. The result is arbitrary read of any file readable by the Arcane backend process, including `/app/data/arcane.db` (the SQLite database containing every user&amp;#39;s password hash and API key), enabling escalation to admin and, via Arcane&amp;#39;s Docker control plane, RCE on the host.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Root cause #1 — `CreateProject` writes compose content without validation** (`backend/internal/services/project_service.go:1605-1644`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
func (s *ProjectService) CreateProject(ctx context.Context, name, composeContent string, envContent *string, user models.User) (*models.Project, error) {
    // ... directory setup ...
    if err := projects.SaveOrUpdateProjectFiles(projectsDirectory, projectPath, composeContent, envContent); err != nil {
        _ = s.db.WithContext(ctx).Delete(proj).Error
        return nil, fmt.Errorf(&amp;#34;failed to save project files: %w&amp;#34;, err)
    }
    // ...
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Compare with `UpdateProject` (project_service.go:2494, :2577), which calls `validateComposeContentForUpdate`. That validator (line 2599) load…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c3px-h233-h6fq</guid>
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