<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 08:48:10 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-323412</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-323412</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-323412</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-323412</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-47125</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47125</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 1.19.2, the PUT /api/environments/{id}/templates/variables endpoint, which writes the system-wide .env.global file used for variable substitution in every project&amp;#39;s compose file, is missing an admin authorization check. Any authenticated non-admin user can call this endpoint with their bearer token or API key and overwrite the global environment variables that are merged into every project deployment. By overriding values like REGISTRY, IMAGE, DATABASE_URL, or SECRET_KEY that other users reference via ${VAR} in compose files, an attacker can redirect image pulls to attacker-controlled registries (supply-chain RCE on the Docker host), exfiltrate database credentials, or disrupt all projects. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.19.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 1.19.2, the PUT /api/environments/{id}/templates/variables endpoint, which writes the system-wide .env.global file used for variable substitution in every project&amp;#39;s compose file, is missing an admin authorization check. Any authenticated non-admin user can call this endpoint with their bearer token or API key and overwrite the global environment variables that are merged into every project deployment. By overriding values like REGISTRY, IMAGE, DATABASE_URL, or SECRET_KEY that other users reference via ${VAR} in compose files, an attacker can redirect image pulls to attacker-controlled registries (supply-chain RCE on the Docker host), exfiltrate database credentials, or disrupt all projects. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.19.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47125</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-jpjh-jm2p-39hh — Arcane: Missing admin authorization on global variables endpoint</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jpjh-jm2p-39hh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `PUT /api/environments/{id}/templates/variables` endpoint, which writes the system-wide `.env.global` file used for variable substitution in every project&amp;#39;s compose file, is missing an admin authorization check. Any authenticated non-admin user can call this endpoint with their bearer token or API key and overwrite the global environment variables that are merged into every project deployment. By overriding values like `REGISTRY`, `IMAGE`, `DATABASE_URL`, or `SECRET_KEY` that other users reference via `${VAR}` in compose files, an attacker can redirect image pulls to attacker-controlled registries (supply-chain RCE on the Docker host), exfiltrate database credentials, or disrupt all projects.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The endpoint is registered at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/templates.go:374`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{
    OperationID: &amp;#34;updateGlobalVariables&amp;#34;,
    Method:      &amp;#34;PUT&amp;#34;,
    Path:        &amp;#34;/environments/{id}/templates/variables&amp;#34;,
    ...
    Security: []map[string][]string{
        {&amp;#34;BearerAuth&amp;#34;: {}},
        {&amp;#34;ApiKeyAuth&amp;#34;: {}},
    },
}, h.UpdateGlobalVariables)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The handler at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/templates.go:889` performs no role check:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
func (h *TemplateHandler) UpdateGlobalVariables(ctx context.Context, input *UpdateGlobalVariablesInput) (*UpdateGlobalVariablesOutput, error) {
    if h.templateService == nil {
        return nil, huma.Error500InternalServerError(&amp;#34;service not available&amp;#34;)
    }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if input.Environ…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `PUT /api/environments/{id}/templates/variables` endpoint, which writes the system-wide `.env.global` file used for variable substitution in every project&amp;#39;s compose file, is missing an admin authorization check. Any authenticated non-admin user can call this endpoint with their bearer token or API key and overwrite the global environment variables that are merged into every project deployment. By overriding values like `REGISTRY`, `IMAGE`, `DATABASE_URL`, or `SECRET_KEY` that other users reference via `${VAR}` in compose files, an attacker can redirect image pulls to attacker-controlled registries (supply-chain RCE on the Docker host), exfiltrate database credentials, or disrupt all projects.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The endpoint is registered at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/templates.go:374`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{
    OperationID: &amp;#34;updateGlobalVariables&amp;#34;,
    Method:      &amp;#34;PUT&amp;#34;,
    Path:        &amp;#34;/environments/{id}/templates/variables&amp;#34;,
    ...
    Security: []map[string][]string{
        {&amp;#34;BearerAuth&amp;#34;: {}},
        {&amp;#34;ApiKeyAuth&amp;#34;: {}},
    },
}, h.UpdateGlobalVariables)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The handler at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/templates.go:889` performs no role check:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
func (h *TemplateHandler) UpdateGlobalVariables(ctx context.Context, input *UpdateGlobalVariablesInput) (*UpdateGlobalVariablesOutput, error) {
    if h.templateService == nil {
        return nil, huma.Error500InternalServerError(&amp;#34;service not available&amp;#34;)
    }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if input.Environ…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jpjh-jm2p-39hh</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
