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EUVD-2026-322670

fkie_cve-2026-47074

Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in ex-aws ex_aws_sns (ExAws.SNS, ExAws.SNS.PublicKeyCache modules) allows Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation.

This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/ex_aws/sns.ex, lib/ex_aws/sns/public_key_cache.ex and program routines 'Elixir.ExAws.SNS':verify_message/1, 'Elixir.ExAws.SNS.PublicKeyCache':get/1.

'Elixir.ExAws.SNS':verify_message/1 fetches the signing certificate from the SigningCertURL field of the incoming SNS message without validating that the URL uses HTTPS or that the host matches an AWS-owned SNS certificate domain. An unauthenticated attacker who can POST to an endpoint that calls verify_message/1 can supply an attacker-controlled SigningCertURL, sign a forged SNS message with their own key, and cause the function to return :ok, completely bypassing SNS signature verification.

This issue affects ex_aws_sns: from 2.0.1 before 2.3.5.

GHSA-8jgf-23q5-x7xx — ex_aws_sns: Trusted-attacker `SigningCertURL` permits complete SNS signature bypass

Affected: Hex: ex_aws_sns

### Summary

`ExAws.SNS.verify_message/1` fetches the signing certificate from the `SigningCertURL` field of the incoming SNS message without validating that the URL uses HTTPS or that its host is an AWS-owned SNS certificate domain. An unauthenticated attacker who can POST to any endpoint that calls `verify_message/1` can supply an attacker-controlled `SigningCertURL`, sign a forged SNS message with their own RSA key, and cause the function to return `:ok`, completely bypassing SNS signature verification.

### Details

In `lib/ex_aws/sns.ex` (lines 475–483), `verify_message/1` performs three checks: `validate_message_params/1` (confirms required fields are present), `validate_signature_version/1` (confirms `SignatureVersion == "1"`), then signature verification. The signature step calls `ExAws.SNS.PublicKeyCache.get(message["SigningCertURL"])` and passes the result to `:public_key.verify/4`.

Neither `validate_message_params/1` nor any other step checks that `SigningCertURL` is an HTTPS URL or that the hostname matches the expected pattern (e.g. `sns.<region>.amazonaws.com`). `PublicKeyCache.get/1` in `lib/ex_aws/sns/public_key_cache.ex` fetches whatever URL is provided and caches the certificate. The RSA signature then verifies against the attacker's own public key, and `verify_message/1` returns `:ok`.

### PoC

1. Generate an RSA keypair and host the DER/PEM public certificate at any URL reachable from the target server (e.g. `http://attacker.example/cert.pem`). 2. Build…