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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 00:03:37 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-322099</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322099</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-322099</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322099</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-47070</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47070</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Sensitive Data Exposure vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data. The HTTP/3 redirect handler in src/hackney_h3.erl passes the original request headers unchanged to the redirect target without performing any cross-origin check. When a client issues an HTTP/3 request with follow_redirect enabled and includes Authorization or Cookie headers, a server responding with a 3xx redirect to a different host will cause the client to forward those credentials verbatim to the new origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The main hackney.erl module has maybe_strip_auth_on_redirect/2 (guarded by the location_trusted option) to address CVE-2018-1000007, but hackney_h3.erl is missing this protection entirely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects hackney: from 3.1.1 before 4.0.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Sensitive Data Exposure vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data. The HTTP/3 redirect handler in src/hackney_h3.erl passes the original request headers unchanged to the redirect target without performing any cross-origin check. When a client issues an HTTP/3 request with follow_redirect enabled and includes Authorization or Cookie headers, a server responding with a 3xx redirect to a different host will cause the client to forward those credentials verbatim to the new origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The main hackney.erl module has maybe_strip_auth_on_redirect/2 (guarded by the location_trusted option) to address CVE-2018-1000007, but hackney_h3.erl is missing this protection entirely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects hackney: from 3.1.1 before 4.0.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47070</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-h73q-4w9q-82h4 — Hackney: Cross-origin Redirect Leaks Authorization, Cookie, and Request Body</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h73q-4w9q-82h4</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Hex: hackney&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The HTTP/3 redirect handler in `src/hackney_h3.erl` forwards the original request headers (`Authorization`, `Cookie`, `Proxy-Authorization`) and, for 307/308 responses, the original request body to the redirect target without checking whether the target host matches the origin. When `follow_redirect` is enabled and a server responds with a cross-origin `Location`, hackney delivers the caller&amp;#39;s credentials verbatim to the attacker-controlled host. The main hackney HTTP/1 client has `maybe_strip_auth_on_redirect/2` (the fix for CVE-2018-1000007); the H3 client was added later without it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `src/hackney_h3.erl`, `handle_redirect/11` (line 165) extracts the redirect target from the server-controlled `Location` header via `get_redirect_location/1` and resolves it with `resolve_redirect_url/2`, which accepts any absolute `http://` or `https://` URL. It then calls `do_request_with_redirect/8` passing the original `Headers` list unchanged. For 307/308 responses, `redirect_method/2` preserves the original method and body, so the POST body is also forwarded.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No comparison is made between the original URL&amp;#39;s scheme, host, or port and the redirect target. The downstream `connect/3` opens a new QUIC connection to whatever the `Location` header named, and `build_request_headers/4` serializes the unmodified headers into the QPACK-encoded request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Issue an HTTP/3 POST to an attacker-controlled origin with `follow_redirect =&amp;gt; true` and an `Authorizati…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Hex: hackney&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The HTTP/3 redirect handler in `src/hackney_h3.erl` forwards the original request headers (`Authorization`, `Cookie`, `Proxy-Authorization`) and, for 307/308 responses, the original request body to the redirect target without checking whether the target host matches the origin. When `follow_redirect` is enabled and a server responds with a cross-origin `Location`, hackney delivers the caller&amp;#39;s credentials verbatim to the attacker-controlled host. The main hackney HTTP/1 client has `maybe_strip_auth_on_redirect/2` (the fix for CVE-2018-1000007); the H3 client was added later without it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `src/hackney_h3.erl`, `handle_redirect/11` (line 165) extracts the redirect target from the server-controlled `Location` header via `get_redirect_location/1` and resolves it with `resolve_redirect_url/2`, which accepts any absolute `http://` or `https://` URL. It then calls `do_request_with_redirect/8` passing the original `Headers` list unchanged. For 307/308 responses, `redirect_method/2` preserves the original method and body, so the POST body is also forwarded.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No comparison is made between the original URL&amp;#39;s scheme, host, or port and the redirect target. The downstream `connect/3` opens a new QUIC connection to whatever the `Location` header named, and `build_request_headers/4` serializes the unmodified headers into the QPACK-encoded request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Issue an HTTP/3 POST to an attacker-controlled origin with `follow_redirect =&amp;gt; true` and an `Authorizati…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h73q-4w9q-82h4</guid>
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