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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 10:19:07 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-329859</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329859</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-329859</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329859</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-46552</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46552</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, shared-base sessions were granted the same base-member capabilities as authenticated viewers. Using only the shared-base UUID (xc-shared-base-id), an attacker could enumerate base members and invite an arbitrary email into the base as a real member. The invited user could then redeem the invite via the normal signup flow and retain authenticated access even after the owner revoked the shared link. Shared-base sessions were mapped to ProjectRoles.VIEWER in packages/nocodb/src/strategies/base-view.strategy/base-view.strategy.ts, and packages/nocodb/src/utils/acl.ts granted baseUserList and userInvite to that role. The shared frontend (packages/nc-gui/composables/useApi/interceptors.ts) deliberately removed auth headers in favour of the shared-base header, but the ACL middleware did not distinguish shared sessions from genuine viewers. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, shared-base sessions were granted the same base-member capabilities as authenticated viewers. Using only the shared-base UUID (xc-shared-base-id), an attacker could enumerate base members and invite an arbitrary email into the base as a real member. The invited user could then redeem the invite via the normal signup flow and retain authenticated access even after the owner revoked the shared link. Shared-base sessions were mapped to ProjectRoles.VIEWER in packages/nocodb/src/strategies/base-view.strategy/base-view.strategy.ts, and packages/nocodb/src/utils/acl.ts granted baseUserList and userInvite to that role. The shared frontend (packages/nc-gui/composables/useApi/interceptors.ts) deliberately removed auth headers in favour of the shared-base header, but the ACL middleware did not distinguish shared sessions from genuine viewers. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46552</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-chqv-vrj7-qffp — NocoDB: Shared-base link access can invite arbitrary users as persistent base members</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-chqv-vrj7-qffp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: nocodb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Shared-base sessions were granted the same base-member capabilities as authenticated viewers. Using only the shared-base UUID (`xc-shared-base-id`), an attacker could enumerate base members and invite an arbitrary email into the base as a real member. The invited user could then redeem the invite via the normal signup flow and retain authenticated access even after the owner revoked the shared link.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Shared-base sessions were mapped to `ProjectRoles.VIEWER` in `packages/nocodb/src/strategies/base-view.strategy/base-view.strategy.ts`, and `packages/nocodb/src/utils/acl.ts` granted `baseUserList` and `userInvite` to that role. The shared frontend (`packages/nc-gui/composables/useApi/interceptors.ts`) deliberately removed auth headers in favour of the shared-base header, but the ACL middleware did not distinguish shared sessions from genuine viewers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The end-to-end chain:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `GET /api/v2/meta/bases/:baseId/users` returned the member list to shared-base callers (`@Acl(&amp;#39;baseUserList&amp;#39;)`).
- `POST /api/v2/meta/bases/:baseId/users` accepted an invite from shared-base callers (`@Acl(&amp;#39;userInvite&amp;#39;)`); `base-users.service.ts` inserted a real `nc_users_v2` row with `invite_token` and a `nc_base_users_v2` row for the target base, with `invited_by = null`.
- The invited account redeemed the invite through the normal signup path (`users.service.ts`), gaining a persistent JWT scoped to the base.
- Revoking the shared link did not affect the redeemed account.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### I…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: nocodb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Shared-base sessions were granted the same base-member capabilities as authenticated viewers. Using only the shared-base UUID (`xc-shared-base-id`), an attacker could enumerate base members and invite an arbitrary email into the base as a real member. The invited user could then redeem the invite via the normal signup flow and retain authenticated access even after the owner revoked the shared link.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Shared-base sessions were mapped to `ProjectRoles.VIEWER` in `packages/nocodb/src/strategies/base-view.strategy/base-view.strategy.ts`, and `packages/nocodb/src/utils/acl.ts` granted `baseUserList` and `userInvite` to that role. The shared frontend (`packages/nc-gui/composables/useApi/interceptors.ts`) deliberately removed auth headers in favour of the shared-base header, but the ACL middleware did not distinguish shared sessions from genuine viewers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The end-to-end chain:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `GET /api/v2/meta/bases/:baseId/users` returned the member list to shared-base callers (`@Acl(&amp;#39;baseUserList&amp;#39;)`).
- `POST /api/v2/meta/bases/:baseId/users` accepted an invite from shared-base callers (`@Acl(&amp;#39;userInvite&amp;#39;)`); `base-users.service.ts` inserted a real `nc_users_v2` row with `invite_token` and a `nc_base_users_v2` row for the target base, with `invited_by = null`.
- The invited account redeemed the invite through the normal signup path (`users.service.ts`), gaining a persistent JWT scoped to the base.
- Revoking the shared link did not affect the redeemed account.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### I…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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