https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 07 Oct 2026 01:20:58 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329765 EUVD-2026-329765 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-329765 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46548 <p>NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, the request-filtering-agent SSRF protection was non-functional in the four notification webhook plugins (Slack, Discord, Mattermost, Teams) because httpAgent / httpsAgent were passed as part of the request body rather than the axios config. An authenticated user with hook-creation permission could direct outbound POST requests to arbitrary internal hosts. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.</p> <p>NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to 2026.04.1, the request-filtering-agent SSRF protection was non-functional in the four notification webhook plugins (Slack, Discord, Mattermost, Teams) because httpAgent / httpsAgent were passed as part of the request body rather than the axios config. An authenticated user with hook-creation permission could direct outbound POST requests to arbitrary internal hosts. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.04.1.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46548 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2c5x-4jgf-88mj <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: nocodb</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>The `request-filtering-agent` SSRF protection was non-functional in the four notification webhook plugins (Slack, Discord, Mattermost, Teams) because `httpAgent` / `httpsAgent` were passed as part of the request **body** rather than the axios **config**. An authenticated user with hook-creation permission could direct outbound POST requests to arbitrary internal hosts.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>`axios.post(url, data, config)` expects connection agents in the third (config) argument. In all four plugins, the agents were placed in the second (data) argument and serialised as JSON body content:</p> <p>```ts // packages/nocodb/src/plugins/slack/Slack.ts (and Discord / Mattermost / Teams — identical pattern) return await axios.post(webhook_url, { text, httpAgent: useAgent(webhook_url), // wrong position — serialised, not used httpsAgent: useAgent(webhook_url), }); ```</p> <p>The webhook flow: an Editor+ user creates a webhook with `notification.payload.channels[].webhook_url` pointing to an internal host; on trigger, `WebhookInvoker.invoke()` calls the plugin&#39;s `sendMessage()` which performs the outbound `axios.post` with no SSRF filtering applied.</p> <p>This is distinct from GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9, which covers a blind SSRF via HEAD in the upload-by-URL path.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>- Authenticated user (Editor+) can reach cloud-metadata endpoints (`169.254.169.254`) and internal services. - Combined with verbose hook logging (`NC_AUTOMATION_LOG_LEVEL=ALL`), response bodies may be exfiltrated.</p> <p>### C…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: nocodb</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>The `request-filtering-agent` SSRF protection was non-functional in the four notification webhook plugins (Slack, Discord, Mattermost, Teams) because `httpAgent` / `httpsAgent` were passed as part of the request **body** rather than the axios **config**. An authenticated user with hook-creation permission could direct outbound POST requests to arbitrary internal hosts.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>`axios.post(url, data, config)` expects connection agents in the third (config) argument. In all four plugins, the agents were placed in the second (data) argument and serialised as JSON body content:</p> <p>```ts // packages/nocodb/src/plugins/slack/Slack.ts (and Discord / Mattermost / Teams — identical pattern) return await axios.post(webhook_url, { text, httpAgent: useAgent(webhook_url), // wrong position — serialised, not used httpsAgent: useAgent(webhook_url), }); ```</p> <p>The webhook flow: an Editor+ user creates a webhook with `notification.payload.channels[].webhook_url` pointing to an internal host; on trigger, `WebhookInvoker.invoke()` calls the plugin&#39;s `sendMessage()` which performs the outbound `axios.post` with no SSRF filtering applied.</p> <p>This is distinct from GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9, which covers a blind SSRF via HEAD in the upload-by-URL path.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>- Authenticated user (Editor+) can reach cloud-metadata endpoints (`169.254.169.254`) and internal services. - Combined with verbose hook logging (`NC_AUTOMATION_LOG_LEVEL=ALL`), response bodies may be exfiltrated.</p> <p>### C…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2c5x-4jgf-88mj