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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 21:27:21 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-331114</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-331114</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-331114</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-331114</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-46406</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46406</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Claude Code is an agentic coding tool.  From 2.1.59 until 2.1.128, the Claude Code /copy command wrote responses to a hardcoded, predictable path (/tmp/claude/response.md) without UID isolation, randomness, or symlink protection. The file was created world-readable (0644) in a world-traversable directory (0755), allowing any local user to read a privileged user&amp;#39;s Claude response, which could contain secrets or credentials. Additionally, because the path was static and predictable, a local attacker could pre-create the directory and plant a symlink at the expected file path, causing the privileged process to follow the symlink and overwrite an attacker-chosen file with the response text. Exploiting this required a local unprivileged user on the same system and a privileged user to run the /copy command. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.1.128.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Claude Code is an agentic coding tool.  From 2.1.59 until 2.1.128, the Claude Code /copy command wrote responses to a hardcoded, predictable path (/tmp/claude/response.md) without UID isolation, randomness, or symlink protection. The file was created world-readable (0644) in a world-traversable directory (0755), allowing any local user to read a privileged user&amp;#39;s Claude response, which could contain secrets or credentials. Additionally, because the path was static and predictable, a local attacker could pre-create the directory and plant a symlink at the expected file path, causing the privileged process to follow the symlink and overwrite an attacker-chosen file with the response text. Exploiting this required a local unprivileged user on the same system and a privileged user to run the /copy command. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.1.128.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46406</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-4vp2-6q8c-pvq2 — @anthropic-ai/claude-code has an Insecure Temporary File in /copy Command that Enables Response Disclosure and Symlink-…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4vp2-6q8c-pvq2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @anthropic-ai/claude-code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Claude Code `/copy` command wrote responses to a hardcoded, predictable path (`/tmp/claude/response.md`) without UID isolation, randomness, or symlink protection. The file was created world-readable (0644) in a world-traversable directory (0755), allowing any local user to read a privileged user&amp;#39;s Claude response, which could contain secrets or credentials. Additionally, because the path was static and predictable, a local attacker could pre-create the directory and plant a symlink at the expected file path, causing the privileged process to follow the symlink and overwrite an attacker-chosen file with the response text. Exploiting this required a local unprivileged user on the same system and a privileged user to run the `/copy` command.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Claude Code thanks hackerone.com/c_h4ck_0 for reporting this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @anthropic-ai/claude-code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Claude Code `/copy` command wrote responses to a hardcoded, predictable path (`/tmp/claude/response.md`) without UID isolation, randomness, or symlink protection. The file was created world-readable (0644) in a world-traversable directory (0755), allowing any local user to read a privileged user&amp;#39;s Claude response, which could contain secrets or credentials. Additionally, because the path was static and predictable, a local attacker could pre-create the directory and plant a symlink at the expected file path, causing the privileged process to follow the symlink and overwrite an attacker-chosen file with the response text. Exploiting this required a local unprivileged user on the same system and a privileged user to run the `/copy` command.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Claude Code thanks hackerone.com/c_h4ck_0 for reporting this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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