EUVD-2026-322432

fkie_cve-2026-46359

phpMyFAQ before 4.1.2 contains a sql injection vulnerability in CurrentUser::setTokenData that allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary SQL by injecting malicious OAuth token claims. Attackers with Azure AD accounts containing SQL metacharacters in display names or JWT claims can break out of string literals and execute arbitrary database queries.

GHSA-pm8c-3qq3-72w7 — phpMyFAQ has SQL Injection in CurrentUser::setTokenData through unescaped OAuth token fields

Affected: Packagist: thorsten/phpmyfaq, Packagist: phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq

## Summary

`CurrentUser::setTokenData()` in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/User/CurrentUser.php` at lines 515-534 builds a SQL UPDATE statement with `sprintf` and interpolates OAuth token fields (`refresh_token`, `access_token`, `code_verifier`, and `json_encode($token['jwt'])`) without calling `$db->escape()`. Sibling methods `setAuthSource()` and `setRememberMe()` in the same file do call `$db->escape()` on user-controlled values, so the omission is local to this method. An attacker (Bob) whose Azure AD display name contains a single quote (for example `O'Brien`, or a deliberate SQL payload) breaks out of the string literal and injects arbitrary SQL against the phpMyFAQ database.

## Details

**Vulnerable code** (`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/User/CurrentUser.php`, lines 513-534):

```php public function setTokenData(#[\SensitiveParameter] array $token): bool { $update = sprintf( " UPDATE %sfaquser SET refresh_token = '%s', access_token = '%s', code_verifier = '%s', jwt = '%s' WHERE user_id = %d", Database::getTablePrefix(), $token['refresh_token'], $token['access_token'], $token['code_verifier'], json_encode($token['jwt'], JSON_THROW_ON_ERROR), $this->getUserId(), );

return (bool) $this->configuration->getDb()->query($update); } ```

`json_encode()` does NOT escape single quotes. A JWT claim such as `{"preferred_username":…

Most recent entries from all

EUVD-2026-322432

fkie_cve-2026-46359

GHSA-pm8c-3qq3-72w7 — phpMyFAQ has SQL Injection in CurrentUser::setTokenData through unescaped OAuth token fields