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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-322760</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322760</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-322760</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322760</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-45731</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45731</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In 29.0 and earlier, view/update.php reads $_POST[&amp;#39;updateFile&amp;#39;] as a relative path under updatedb/ and passes it to PHP&amp;#39;s file() for line-by-line execution as part of a database migration. An authenticated administrator can abuse this to read arbitrary text files reachable from the web-server process.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In 29.0 and earlier, view/update.php reads $_POST[&amp;#39;updateFile&amp;#39;] as a relative path under updatedb/ and passes it to PHP&amp;#39;s file() for line-by-line execution as part of a database migration. An authenticated administrator can abuse this to read arbitrary text files reachable from the web-server process.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45731</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3mjv-375j-6h92 — AVideo: Authenticated Arbitrary File Read in view/update.php</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3mjv-375j-6h92</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: WWBN/AVideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
view/update.php reads $_POST[&amp;#39;updateFile&amp;#39;] as a relative path under updatedb/ and passes it to PHP&amp;#39;s file() for line-by-line execution as part of a database migration. An authenticated administrator can abuse this to read arbitrary text files reachable from the web-server process — especially valuable on misconfigured deployments where /etc/passwd, .env, or other sibling-app configs are reachable relative to the AVideo directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
view/update.php, lines 134-145 (excerpt):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (!empty($_POST[&amp;#39;updateFile&amp;#39;])) {
    $dir = Video::getStoragePath() . &amp;#34;cache&amp;#34;;
    rrmdir($dir);
    /* …unrelated cache-clear… */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (file_exists($logfile . &amp;#34;log&amp;#34;)) {
        unlink($logfile . &amp;#34;log&amp;#34;);
        // ...
    }
    $lines = file(&amp;#34;{$global[&amp;#39;systemRootPath&amp;#39;]}updatedb/{$_POST[&amp;#39;updateFile&amp;#39;]}&amp;#34;);
The User::isAdmin() and adminSecurityCheck(true) guards at lines 12-15 enforce admin auth, but $_POST[&amp;#39;updateFile&amp;#39;] is concatenated into a path without any sanitization. file() returns the file&amp;#39;s contents as an array of lines; the script subsequently iterates them and echoes the SQL it would run.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
POST /view/update.php
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;updateFile=../../../../etc/passwd
Result: the script attempts to load /etc/passwd (relative to {systemRootPath}updatedb/), echoing each line in the migration-runner HTML output. $_POST[&amp;#39;updateFile&amp;#39;] traversal accepted, no extension guard, no in-array whitelist.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Attempting ../../../../proc/self/environ sim…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: WWBN/AVideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
view/update.php reads $_POST[&amp;#39;updateFile&amp;#39;] as a relative path under updatedb/ and passes it to PHP&amp;#39;s file() for line-by-line execution as part of a database migration. An authenticated administrator can abuse this to read arbitrary text files reachable from the web-server process — especially valuable on misconfigured deployments where /etc/passwd, .env, or other sibling-app configs are reachable relative to the AVideo directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
view/update.php, lines 134-145 (excerpt):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (!empty($_POST[&amp;#39;updateFile&amp;#39;])) {
    $dir = Video::getStoragePath() . &amp;#34;cache&amp;#34;;
    rrmdir($dir);
    /* …unrelated cache-clear… */&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (file_exists($logfile . &amp;#34;log&amp;#34;)) {
        unlink($logfile . &amp;#34;log&amp;#34;);
        // ...
    }
    $lines = file(&amp;#34;{$global[&amp;#39;systemRootPath&amp;#39;]}updatedb/{$_POST[&amp;#39;updateFile&amp;#39;]}&amp;#34;);
The User::isAdmin() and adminSecurityCheck(true) guards at lines 12-15 enforce admin auth, but $_POST[&amp;#39;updateFile&amp;#39;] is concatenated into a path without any sanitization. file() returns the file&amp;#39;s contents as an array of lines; the script subsequently iterates them and echoes the SQL it would run.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
POST /view/update.php
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;updateFile=../../../../etc/passwd
Result: the script attempts to load /etc/passwd (relative to {systemRootPath}updatedb/), echoing each line in the migration-runner HTML output. $_POST[&amp;#39;updateFile&amp;#39;] traversal accepted, no extension guard, no in-array whitelist.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Attempting ../../../../proc/self/environ sim…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3mjv-375j-6h92</guid>
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