<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 17:51:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-330225</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330225</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-330225</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330225</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-45677</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45677</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11, Rocket.Chat&amp;#39;s SAML integration does not verify the signature on inbound LogoutRequest messages. An unauthenticated remote attacker who knows a target user&amp;#39;s SAML NameID - which major identity providers (Okta, Google Workspace, Microsoft Entra ID, JumpCloud) expose as the user&amp;#39;s email address - can craft a valid-looking unsigned LogoutRequest and submit it to the SP logout endpoint. The server processes it as legitimate, immediately destroying the victim&amp;#39;s session. Because the attack requires no authentication and no interaction from the victim, it can be repeated in a loop against individual users or scripted across many accounts, effectively rendering the Rocket.Chat instance unusable for SAML-authenticated users. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11, Rocket.Chat&amp;#39;s SAML integration does not verify the signature on inbound LogoutRequest messages. An unauthenticated remote attacker who knows a target user&amp;#39;s SAML NameID - which major identity providers (Okta, Google Workspace, Microsoft Entra ID, JumpCloud) expose as the user&amp;#39;s email address - can craft a valid-looking unsigned LogoutRequest and submit it to the SP logout endpoint. The server processes it as legitimate, immediately destroying the victim&amp;#39;s session. Because the attack requires no authentication and no interaction from the victim, it can be repeated in a loop against individual users or scripted across many accounts, effectively rendering the Rocket.Chat instance unusable for SAML-authenticated users. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45677</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
