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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-326865</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326865</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-326865</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326865</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-45669</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45669</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Nuxt is an open-source web development framework for Vue.js. From versions 3.4.3 to before 3.21.6 and 4.0.0-alpha.1 to before 4.4.6, navigateTo() with external: true generates a server-side HTML redirect body containing a &amp;lt;meta http-equiv=&amp;#34;refresh&amp;#34;&amp;gt; tag. The destination URL is only sanitized by replacing &amp;#34; with %22, leaving &amp;lt;, &amp;gt;, &amp;amp;, and &amp;#39; unencoded. An attacker who can influence the URL passed to navigateTo(url, { external: true }) can break out of the content=&amp;#34;…&amp;#34; attribute and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes under the application&amp;#39;s origin. This issue has been patched in versions 3.21.6 and 4.4.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Nuxt is an open-source web development framework for Vue.js. From versions 3.4.3 to before 3.21.6 and 4.0.0-alpha.1 to before 4.4.6, navigateTo() with external: true generates a server-side HTML redirect body containing a &amp;lt;meta http-equiv=&amp;#34;refresh&amp;#34;&amp;gt; tag. The destination URL is only sanitized by replacing &amp;#34; with %22, leaving &amp;lt;, &amp;gt;, &amp;amp;, and &amp;#39; unencoded. An attacker who can influence the URL passed to navigateTo(url, { external: true }) can break out of the content=&amp;#34;…&amp;#34; attribute and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes under the application&amp;#39;s origin. This issue has been patched in versions 3.21.6 and 4.4.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45669</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-fx6j-w5w5-h468 — Nuxt: Reflected XSS in `navigateTo()` external redirect</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fx6j-w5w5-h468</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: nuxt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
`navigateTo()` with `external: true` generates a server-side HTML redirect body containing a `&amp;lt;meta http-equiv=&amp;#34;refresh&amp;#34;&amp;gt;` tag. The destination URL is only sanitized by replacing `&amp;#34;` with `%22`, leaving `&amp;lt;`, `&amp;gt;`, `&amp;amp;`, and `&amp;#39;` unencoded. An attacker who can influence the URL passed to `navigateTo(url, { external: true })` can break out of the `content=&amp;#34;…&amp;#34;` attribute and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes under the application&amp;#39;s origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a different root cause from CVE-2024-34343 (GHSA-vf6r-87q4-2vjf), which addressed `javascript:` protocol bypass. The issue here is triggered by any valid URL containing `&amp;gt;`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Applications that pass user-controlled input to `navigateTo(url, { external: true })` — typically via a `?next=` / `?redirect=` query parameter used for post-login or &amp;#34;return to&amp;#34; flows — are vulnerable to reflected cross-site scripting. The injected script runs in the context of the application&amp;#39;s origin during the server-rendered redirect response, before the meta-refresh fires.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
In `packages/nuxt/src/app/composables/router.ts`, the SSR redirect path builds an HTML response body with only `&amp;#34;` percent-encoded in the destination URL:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
const encodedLoc = location.replace(/&amp;#34;/g, &amp;#39;%22&amp;#39;)
nuxtApp.ssrContext![&amp;#39;~renderResponse&amp;#39;] = {
status: sanitizeStatusCode(options?.redirectCode || 302, 302),
body: `&amp;lt;!DOCTYPE html&amp;gt;&amp;lt;html&amp;gt;&amp;lt;head&amp;gt;&amp;lt;meta http-equiv=&amp;#34;refresh&amp;#34; content=&amp;#34;0; url=${encodedLoc}&amp;#34;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/head&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/html&amp;gt;`,
headers: { location:…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: nuxt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
`navigateTo()` with `external: true` generates a server-side HTML redirect body containing a `&amp;lt;meta http-equiv=&amp;#34;refresh&amp;#34;&amp;gt;` tag. The destination URL is only sanitized by replacing `&amp;#34;` with `%22`, leaving `&amp;lt;`, `&amp;gt;`, `&amp;amp;`, and `&amp;#39;` unencoded. An attacker who can influence the URL passed to `navigateTo(url, { external: true })` can break out of the `content=&amp;#34;…&amp;#34;` attribute and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes under the application&amp;#39;s origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a different root cause from CVE-2024-34343 (GHSA-vf6r-87q4-2vjf), which addressed `javascript:` protocol bypass. The issue here is triggered by any valid URL containing `&amp;gt;`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Applications that pass user-controlled input to `navigateTo(url, { external: true })` — typically via a `?next=` / `?redirect=` query parameter used for post-login or &amp;#34;return to&amp;#34; flows — are vulnerable to reflected cross-site scripting. The injected script runs in the context of the application&amp;#39;s origin during the server-rendered redirect response, before the meta-refresh fires.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
In `packages/nuxt/src/app/composables/router.ts`, the SSR redirect path builds an HTML response body with only `&amp;#34;` percent-encoded in the destination URL:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
const encodedLoc = location.replace(/&amp;#34;/g, &amp;#39;%22&amp;#39;)
nuxtApp.ssrContext![&amp;#39;~renderResponse&amp;#39;] = {
status: sanitizeStatusCode(options?.redirectCode || 302, 302),
body: `&amp;lt;!DOCTYPE html&amp;gt;&amp;lt;html&amp;gt;&amp;lt;head&amp;gt;&amp;lt;meta http-equiv=&amp;#34;refresh&amp;#34; content=&amp;#34;0; url=${encodedLoc}&amp;#34;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/head&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/html&amp;gt;`,
headers: { location:…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fx6j-w5w5-h468</guid>
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