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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-322757</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322757</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-322757</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322757</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-45578</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45578</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In 29.0 and earlier, there is a classic shell-metacharacter injection. The YPTSocket notification branch in plugin/Live/on_publish.php builds an execAsync() command line by string concatenation, single-quoting each argument but never calling escapeshellarg(). A &amp;#39; in any of the three interpolated values ($users_id, $m3u8, $obj-&amp;gt;liveTransmitionHistory_id) closes the quoted token and lets the attacker append arbitrary commands.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In 29.0 and earlier, there is a classic shell-metacharacter injection. The YPTSocket notification branch in plugin/Live/on_publish.php builds an execAsync() command line by string concatenation, single-quoting each argument but never calling escapeshellarg(). A &amp;#39; in any of the three interpolated values ($users_id, $m3u8, $obj-&amp;gt;liveTransmitionHistory_id) closes the quoted token and lets the attacker append arbitrary commands.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45578</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xw67-cg5f-4m2r — AVideo: OS command injection in on_publish.php execAsync via unescaped m3u8 URL</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xw67-cg5f-4m2r</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: WWBN/AVideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Type:** Classic shell-metacharacter injection. The YPTSocket notification branch in `plugin/Live/on_publish.php` builds an `execAsync()` command line by string concatenation, single-quoting each argument but never calling `escapeshellarg()`. A `&amp;#39;` in any of the three interpolated values (`$users_id`, `$m3u8`, `$obj-&amp;gt;liveTransmitionHistory_id`) closes the quoted token and lets the attacker append arbitrary commands.
**File:** `plugin/Live/on_publish.php`, line 267.
**Root cause:** the developer wrapped each variable in literal single quotes (`&amp;#39;$users_id&amp;#39;`, `&amp;#39;$m3u8&amp;#39;`, `&amp;#39;$obj-&amp;gt;liveTransmitionHistory_id&amp;#39;`) believing this provides shell-quoting. PHP single-quoted-into-shell is not safe quoting; it is just two literal quote characters that the shell pairs greedily. Any embedded `&amp;#39;` closes the outer string and resumes interpretation in the shell. The rest of the AVideo codebase already calls `escapeshellarg()` (137 call sites across the project) for ffmpeg invocations, so the safe primitive is well-known to the project; it was simply omitted from this branch. The endpoint is web-reachable (no `.htaccess` rule restricts `on_publish.php`, no `REMOTE_ADDR` check), so the trigger is a direct HTTP POST without going through nginx-rtmp.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**File:** `plugin/Live/on_publish.php`, lines 256-271.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
if (AVideoPlugin::isEnabledByName(&amp;#39;YPTSocket&amp;#39;)) {
    $array = setLiveKey($lth-&amp;gt;getKey(), $lth-&amp;gt;getLive_servers_id());
    @ob_clean();
    _ob_start();
    $l…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: WWBN/AVideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Type:** Classic shell-metacharacter injection. The YPTSocket notification branch in `plugin/Live/on_publish.php` builds an `execAsync()` command line by string concatenation, single-quoting each argument but never calling `escapeshellarg()`. A `&amp;#39;` in any of the three interpolated values (`$users_id`, `$m3u8`, `$obj-&amp;gt;liveTransmitionHistory_id`) closes the quoted token and lets the attacker append arbitrary commands.
**File:** `plugin/Live/on_publish.php`, line 267.
**Root cause:** the developer wrapped each variable in literal single quotes (`&amp;#39;$users_id&amp;#39;`, `&amp;#39;$m3u8&amp;#39;`, `&amp;#39;$obj-&amp;gt;liveTransmitionHistory_id&amp;#39;`) believing this provides shell-quoting. PHP single-quoted-into-shell is not safe quoting; it is just two literal quote characters that the shell pairs greedily. Any embedded `&amp;#39;` closes the outer string and resumes interpretation in the shell. The rest of the AVideo codebase already calls `escapeshellarg()` (137 call sites across the project) for ffmpeg invocations, so the safe primitive is well-known to the project; it was simply omitted from this branch. The endpoint is web-reachable (no `.htaccess` rule restricts `on_publish.php`, no `REMOTE_ADDR` check), so the trigger is a direct HTTP POST without going through nginx-rtmp.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**File:** `plugin/Live/on_publish.php`, lines 256-271.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
if (AVideoPlugin::isEnabledByName(&amp;#39;YPTSocket&amp;#39;)) {
    $array = setLiveKey($lth-&amp;gt;getKey(), $lth-&amp;gt;getLive_servers_id());
    @ob_clean();
    _ob_start();
    $l…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xw67-cg5f-4m2r</guid>
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