https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 10 Oct 2026 18:07:14 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322262 EUVD-2026-322262 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322262 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45548 <p>Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.34.8, the processUrlFile function in packages/server/src/automations/steps/ai/extract.ts uses fetch(fileUrl) directly without the IP blacklist validation that is consistently applied to all other automation steps. This allows an authenticated user to trigger server-side requests to internal network addresses. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.34.8.</p> <p>Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.34.8, the processUrlFile function in packages/server/src/automations/steps/ai/extract.ts uses fetch(fileUrl) directly without the IP blacklist validation that is consistently applied to all other automation steps. This allows an authenticated user to trigger server-side requests to internal network addresses. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.34.8.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45548 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rpj4-7x2v-wjrf <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @budibase/server</p> <p>## Vulnerability Details</p> <p>**CWE-918**: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)</p> <p>The `processUrlFile` function in `packages/server/src/automations/steps/ai/extract.ts` uses `fetch(fileUrl)` directly **without the IP blacklist validation** that is consistently applied to all other automation steps. This allows an authenticated user to trigger server-side requests to internal network addresses.</p> <p>### Vulnerable Code</p> <p>**`packages/server/src/automations/steps/ai/extract.ts` (lines 116, 139)**:</p> <p>```typescript async function processUrlFile(fileUrl: string, ...): Promise&lt;ExtractInput&gt; { const response = await fetch(fileUrl) // NO blacklist check! // ... const fallbackResponse = await fetch(fileUrl) // Also NO blacklist check! } ```</p> <p>### Contrast with All Other Automation Steps (Same Codebase)</p> <p>Every other automation step that makes outbound HTTP requests properly uses `fetchWithBlacklist`:</p> <p>- `steps/slack.ts:19`: `response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, {...})` - `steps/discord.ts:28`: `response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, {...})` - `steps/zapier.ts:33`: `response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, {...})` - `steps/n8n.ts:53`: `response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, request)` - `steps/outgoingWebhook.ts`: `response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, {...})` - `steps/make.ts`: `response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, {...})`</p> <p>The `fetchWithBlacklist` function (`steps/utils.ts:100`) validates URLs against the IP blacklist which blocks: - `127.0.0.0/8` (loopback) - `10.0.0.0/8`, `1…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @budibase/server</p> <p>## Vulnerability Details</p> <p>**CWE-918**: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)</p> <p>The `processUrlFile` function in `packages/server/src/automations/steps/ai/extract.ts` uses `fetch(fileUrl)` directly **without the IP blacklist validation** that is consistently applied to all other automation steps. This allows an authenticated user to trigger server-side requests to internal network addresses.</p> <p>### Vulnerable Code</p> <p>**`packages/server/src/automations/steps/ai/extract.ts` (lines 116, 139)**:</p> <p>```typescript async function processUrlFile(fileUrl: string, ...): Promise&lt;ExtractInput&gt; { const response = await fetch(fileUrl) // NO blacklist check! // ... const fallbackResponse = await fetch(fileUrl) // Also NO blacklist check! } ```</p> <p>### Contrast with All Other Automation Steps (Same Codebase)</p> <p>Every other automation step that makes outbound HTTP requests properly uses `fetchWithBlacklist`:</p> <p>- `steps/slack.ts:19`: `response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, {...})` - `steps/discord.ts:28`: `response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, {...})` - `steps/zapier.ts:33`: `response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, {...})` - `steps/n8n.ts:53`: `response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, request)` - `steps/outgoingWebhook.ts`: `response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, {...})` - `steps/make.ts`: `response = await fetchWithBlacklist(url, {...})`</p> <p>The `fetchWithBlacklist` function (`steps/utils.ts:100`) validates URLs against the IP blacklist which blocks: - `127.0.0.0/8` (loopback) - `10.0.0.0/8`, `1…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rpj4-7x2v-wjrf https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1455 <p>Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Budibase ausnutzen, um Informationen offenzulegen.</p> <p>Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in Budibase ausnutzen, um Informationen offenzulegen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1455