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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 18 Oct 2026 04:10:56 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-07192</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-07192</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-07192</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-07192</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-319065</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-319065</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-319065</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-319065</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-45399</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45399</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, any authenticated user with low privileges can enumerate active background tasks across the system and stop tasks belonging to other users via the GET /api/tasks and POST /api/tasks/stop/{task_id} methods. This allows a casual user to disrupt system-wide chat usage by continuously canceling other users&amp;#39; active tasks. This is a real authorization vulnerability affecting integrity and usability in multi-user deployments. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, any authenticated user with low privileges can enumerate active background tasks across the system and stop tasks belonging to other users via the GET /api/tasks and POST /api/tasks/stop/{task_id} methods. This allows a casual user to disrupt system-wide chat usage by continuously canceling other users&amp;#39; active tasks. This is a real authorization vulnerability affecting integrity and usability in multi-user deployments. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45399</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8jjp-r2w2-4v22 — Open WebUI: Low-privilege authenticated users can enumerate and stop global background tasks, causing system-wide chat…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8jjp-r2w2-4v22</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Any authenticated user with low privileges can enumerate active background tasks across the system and stop tasks belonging to other users via the GET /api/tasks and POST /api/tasks/stop/{task_id} methods. This allows a casual user to disrupt system-wide chat usage by continuously canceling other users&amp;#39; active tasks. This is a real authorization vulnerability affecting integrity and usability in multi-user deployments.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
Open WebUI exposes `GET /api/tasks` and `POST /api/tasks/stop/{task_id}` to any verified user. These endpoints operate on a global task namespace and accept raw `task_id` values without checking whether the task belongs to the current caller.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, a normal authenticated user can enumerate active global task IDs and stop tasks belonging to other users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Root cause:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Route authorization is too weak.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `backend/open_webui/main.py`, both endpoints only require `get_verified_user`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
@app.post(&amp;#39;/api/tasks/stop/{task_id}&amp;#39;)
async def stop_task_endpoint(request: Request, task_id: str, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):
    result = await stop_task(request.app.state.redis, task_id)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;@app.get(&amp;#39;/api/tasks&amp;#39;)
async def list_tasks_endpoint(request: Request, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):
    return {&amp;#39;tasks&amp;#39;: await list_tasks(request.app.state.redis)}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`get_verified_user` accepts both `user` and `admin` roles in `backend/open_webui/utils/auth.py`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. The helper operates on a global namespace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `backend/open_webui/tas…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Any authenticated user with low privileges can enumerate active background tasks across the system and stop tasks belonging to other users via the GET /api/tasks and POST /api/tasks/stop/{task_id} methods. This allows a casual user to disrupt system-wide chat usage by continuously canceling other users&amp;#39; active tasks. This is a real authorization vulnerability affecting integrity and usability in multi-user deployments.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
Open WebUI exposes `GET /api/tasks` and `POST /api/tasks/stop/{task_id}` to any verified user. These endpoints operate on a global task namespace and accept raw `task_id` values without checking whether the task belongs to the current caller.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, a normal authenticated user can enumerate active global task IDs and stop tasks belonging to other users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Root cause:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Route authorization is too weak.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `backend/open_webui/main.py`, both endpoints only require `get_verified_user`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
@app.post(&amp;#39;/api/tasks/stop/{task_id}&amp;#39;)
async def stop_task_endpoint(request: Request, task_id: str, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):
    result = await stop_task(request.app.state.redis, task_id)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;@app.get(&amp;#39;/api/tasks&amp;#39;)
async def list_tasks_endpoint(request: Request, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):
    return {&amp;#39;tasks&amp;#39;: await list_tasks(request.app.state.redis)}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`get_verified_user` accepts both `user` and `admin` roles in `backend/open_webui/utils/auth.py`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. The helper operates on a global namespace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `backend/open_webui/tas…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8jjp-r2w2-4v22</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2714 — Open WebUI: Low-privilege authenticated users can enumerate and stop global background tasks, causing system-wide chat…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2714</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Any authenticated user with low privileges can enumerate active background tasks across the system and stop tasks belonging to other users via the GET /api/tasks and POST /api/tasks/stop/{task_id} methods. This allows a casual user to disrupt system-wide chat usage by continuously canceling other users&amp;#39; active tasks. This is a real authorization vulnerability affecting integrity and usability in multi-user deployments.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
Open WebUI exposes `GET /api/tasks` and `POST /api/tasks/stop/{task_id}` to any verified user. These endpoints operate on a global task namespace and accept raw `task_id` values without checking whether the task belongs to the current caller.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, a normal authenticated user can enumerate active global task IDs and stop tasks belonging to other users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Root cause:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Route authorization is too weak.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `backend/open_webui/main.py`, both endpoints only require `get_verified_user`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
@app.post(&amp;#39;/api/tasks/stop/{task_id}&amp;#39;)
async def stop_task_endpoint(request: Request, task_id: str, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):
    result = await stop_task(request.app.state.redis, task_id)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;@app.get(&amp;#39;/api/tasks&amp;#39;)
async def list_tasks_endpoint(request: Request, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):
    return {&amp;#39;tasks&amp;#39;: await list_tasks(request.app.state.redis)}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`get_verified_user` accepts both `user` and `admin` roles in `backend/open_webui/utils/auth.py`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. The helper operates on a global namespace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `backend/open_webui/tas…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Any authenticated user with low privileges can enumerate active background tasks across the system and stop tasks belonging to other users via the GET /api/tasks and POST /api/tasks/stop/{task_id} methods. This allows a casual user to disrupt system-wide chat usage by continuously canceling other users&amp;#39; active tasks. This is a real authorization vulnerability affecting integrity and usability in multi-user deployments.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
Open WebUI exposes `GET /api/tasks` and `POST /api/tasks/stop/{task_id}` to any verified user. These endpoints operate on a global task namespace and accept raw `task_id` values without checking whether the task belongs to the current caller.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, a normal authenticated user can enumerate active global task IDs and stop tasks belonging to other users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Root cause:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Route authorization is too weak.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `backend/open_webui/main.py`, both endpoints only require `get_verified_user`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
@app.post(&amp;#39;/api/tasks/stop/{task_id}&amp;#39;)
async def stop_task_endpoint(request: Request, task_id: str, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):
    result = await stop_task(request.app.state.redis, task_id)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;@app.get(&amp;#39;/api/tasks&amp;#39;)
async def list_tasks_endpoint(request: Request, user=Depends(get_verified_user)):
    return {&amp;#39;tasks&amp;#39;: await list_tasks(request.app.state.redis)}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`get_verified_user` accepts both `user` and `admin` roles in `backend/open_webui/utils/auth.py`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. The helper operates on a global namespace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `backend/open_webui/tas…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2714</guid>
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