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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-338624</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338624</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-338624</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338624</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-45367</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45367</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;HAPI FHIR is a complete implementation of the HL7 FHIR standard for healthcare interoperability in Java. Prior to 6.9.7, the FHIRPathEngine implementation passes user-controlled regular expressions from matches(), matchesFull(), and replaceMatches() to Java regex operations without effective timeouts, allowing catastrophic backtracking and denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 6.9.7.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;HAPI FHIR is a complete implementation of the HL7 FHIR standard for healthcare interoperability in Java. Prior to 6.9.7, the FHIRPathEngine implementation passes user-controlled regular expressions from matches(), matchesFull(), and replaceMatches() to Java regex operations without effective timeouts, allowing catastrophic backtracking and denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 6.9.7.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45367</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3653-68v6-rq57 — HAPI FHIR: ReDoS via FHIRPath matches()/replaceMatches() in FHIR Validator HTTP Endpoint</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3653-68v6-rq57</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.dstu2, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.dstu2016may, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.dstu3, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.r4, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.r4b, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.r5, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.validation, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.validation.cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All implementations of FHIRPathEngine accept arbitrary FHIRPath expressions and evaluate them without input validation. The FHIRPath functions `matches()`, `matchesFull()`, and `replaceMatches()` pass user-controlled regular expressions directly to Java&amp;#39;s `Pattern.compile()` and `String.replaceAll()` without complexity checks or timeouts. An attacker can send a resource containing an evil regex pattern that causes catastrophic backtracking, exhausting system resources, and causing Denial-of-Service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability exists in regex execution in FHIRPathEngine implementations across multiple code modules. For example the org.hl7.fhir.r5 module:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Entry point 1 — `FHIRPathEngine.java:5929` (R5 `funcMatches`):**
```java
private List&amp;lt;Base&amp;gt; funcMatches(ExecutionContext context, List&amp;lt;Base&amp;gt; focus, ExpressionNode exp) {
    String sw = convertToString(swb); // attacker-controlled regex pattern
    // ...
    Pattern p = Pattern.compile(&amp;#34;(?s)&amp;#34; + sw); // VULNERABLE: no complexity check
    Matcher m = p.matcher(st);                // no timeout
    boolean ok = m.find();
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Entry point 2 — `FHIRPathEngine.java:5951` (R5 `funcMatchesFull`):**
```java
Pattern p = Pattern.compile(&amp;#34;(?s)&amp;#34; + sw); // VULNERABLE: same pattern
Matcher m = p.matcher(st);
boolean ok = m.matches();
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Entry point 3 — `FHIRPathEngine.java:5120` (R5 `funcReplaceMatches`):**
```java
result.add(new StringType(convertToString(focus.get(0))
    .replaceAll(regex, repl)).noExtensions(…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.dstu2, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.dstu2016may, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.dstu3, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.r4, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.r4b, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.r5, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.validation, Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.validation.cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All implementations of FHIRPathEngine accept arbitrary FHIRPath expressions and evaluate them without input validation. The FHIRPath functions `matches()`, `matchesFull()`, and `replaceMatches()` pass user-controlled regular expressions directly to Java&amp;#39;s `Pattern.compile()` and `String.replaceAll()` without complexity checks or timeouts. An attacker can send a resource containing an evil regex pattern that causes catastrophic backtracking, exhausting system resources, and causing Denial-of-Service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability exists in regex execution in FHIRPathEngine implementations across multiple code modules. For example the org.hl7.fhir.r5 module:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Entry point 1 — `FHIRPathEngine.java:5929` (R5 `funcMatches`):**
```java
private List&amp;lt;Base&amp;gt; funcMatches(ExecutionContext context, List&amp;lt;Base&amp;gt; focus, ExpressionNode exp) {
    String sw = convertToString(swb); // attacker-controlled regex pattern
    // ...
    Pattern p = Pattern.compile(&amp;#34;(?s)&amp;#34; + sw); // VULNERABLE: no complexity check
    Matcher m = p.matcher(st);                // no timeout
    boolean ok = m.find();
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Entry point 2 — `FHIRPathEngine.java:5951` (R5 `funcMatchesFull`):**
```java
Pattern p = Pattern.compile(&amp;#34;(?s)&amp;#34; + sw); // VULNERABLE: same pattern
Matcher m = p.matcher(st);
boolean ok = m.matches();
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Entry point 3 — `FHIRPathEngine.java:5120` (R5 `funcReplaceMatches`):**
```java
result.add(new StringType(convertToString(focus.get(0))
    .replaceAll(regex, repl)).noExtensions(…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3653-68v6-rq57</guid>
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