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      <title>EUVD-2026-322826</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322826</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-322826</description>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-45297</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45297</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;OpenReplay is a self-hosted session replay suite. Prior to 1.26.0, there is a cross-tenant IDOR on feature-flag and assist-stats routes via {project_id} case mismatch. ProjectAuthorizer.__call__ (OSS api/auth/auth_project.py:14-38 and EE ee/api/auth/auth_project.py:14-46) only runs projects.is_authorized(project_id, tenant_id, user_id) + projects.get_project(tenant_id, project_id) when self.project_identifier == &amp;#34;projectId&amp;#34; (camelCase). For EE multi-tenant, feature-flag queries only filter on project_id, never tenant_id. Any authenticated user in tenant A can read/update/delete feature-flag rows belonging to tenant B by iterating the sequential integer project_id + feature_flag_id. OSS is single-tenant by design ({&amp;#34;errors&amp;#34;:[&amp;#34;tenants already registered&amp;#34;]} on second signup) so there&amp;#39;s no cross-tenant impact This vulnerability is fixed in 1.26.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;OpenReplay is a self-hosted session replay suite. Prior to 1.26.0, there is a cross-tenant IDOR on feature-flag and assist-stats routes via {project_id} case mismatch. ProjectAuthorizer.__call__ (OSS api/auth/auth_project.py:14-38 and EE ee/api/auth/auth_project.py:14-46) only runs projects.is_authorized(project_id, tenant_id, user_id) + projects.get_project(tenant_id, project_id) when self.project_identifier == &amp;#34;projectId&amp;#34; (camelCase). For EE multi-tenant, feature-flag queries only filter on project_id, never tenant_id. Any authenticated user in tenant A can read/update/delete feature-flag rows belonging to tenant B by iterating the sequential integer project_id + feature_flag_id. OSS is single-tenant by design ({&amp;#34;errors&amp;#34;:[&amp;#34;tenants already registered&amp;#34;]} on second signup) so there&amp;#39;s no cross-tenant impact This vulnerability is fixed in 1.26.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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