https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 07 Oct 2026 13:09:40 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-317333 EUVD-2026-317333 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-317333 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45091 <p>sealed-env is a cross-stack, zero-trust secret management library for Node.js and Java/Spring Boot. In sealed-env enterprise mode, versions 0.1.0-alpha.1 through 0.1.0-alpha.3 embedded the operator&#39;s literal TOTP secret in the JWS payload of every minted unseal token. JWS payload is base64-encoded JSON, NOT encrypted. Any party who could observe a minted token (CI build logs, container env dumps, kubectl describe pod, Sentry/Rollbar stack traces, log aggregators) could decode the payload and extract the TOTP secret in plaintext. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.1.0-alpha.4.</p> <p>sealed-env is a cross-stack, zero-trust secret management library for Node.js and Java/Spring Boot. In sealed-env enterprise mode, versions 0.1.0-alpha.1 through 0.1.0-alpha.3 embedded the operator&#39;s literal TOTP secret in the JWS payload of every minted unseal token. JWS payload is base64-encoded JSON, NOT encrypted. Any party who could observe a minted token (CI build logs, container env dumps, kubectl describe pod, Sentry/Rollbar stack traces, log aggregators) could decode the payload and extract the TOTP secret in plaintext. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.1.0-alpha.4.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45091 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-x3r2-fj3r-g5mv <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: sealed-env, Maven: io.github.davidalmeidac:sealed-env-core</p> <p>In sealed-env enterprise mode, versions 0.1.0-alpha.1 through 0.1.0-alpha.3 embedded the operator&#39;s literal TOTP secret in the JWS payload of every minted unseal token. JWS payload is base64-encoded JSON, NOT encrypted. Any party who could observe a minted token (CI build logs, container env dumps, kubectl describe pod, Sentry/Rollbar stack traces, log aggregators) could decode the payload and extract the TOTP secret in plaintext.</p> <p>An attacker with (a) the master key (e.g. from a separate compromise such as a leaked CI secret) and (b) any single leaked unseal token can use the extracted TOTP secret to mint new valid unseal tokens for any future deploy indefinitely, breaking the second-factor property the library claimed.</p> <p>Patched in 0.1.0-alpha.4 by replacing the embedded secret with a salt-bound HMAC derivative (`enterprise_epoch = HMAC(totpSecret, salt || &#34;epoch-v1&#34;)`). The TOTP secret never leaves the operator&#39;s machine in the new design. The wire format change is incompatible — files sealed by affected versions must be re-sealed and the TOTP secret rotated. Full migration playbook in CHANGELOG.md.</p> <p>Reported by an external reviewer who decoded the payload of a real minted token and confirmed bit-for-bit equality with the operator&#39;s .env.local TOTP secret.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: sealed-env, Maven: io.github.davidalmeidac:sealed-env-core</p> <p>In sealed-env enterprise mode, versions 0.1.0-alpha.1 through 0.1.0-alpha.3 embedded the operator&#39;s literal TOTP secret in the JWS payload of every minted unseal token. JWS payload is base64-encoded JSON, NOT encrypted. Any party who could observe a minted token (CI build logs, container env dumps, kubectl describe pod, Sentry/Rollbar stack traces, log aggregators) could decode the payload and extract the TOTP secret in plaintext.</p> <p>An attacker with (a) the master key (e.g. from a separate compromise such as a leaked CI secret) and (b) any single leaked unseal token can use the extracted TOTP secret to mint new valid unseal tokens for any future deploy indefinitely, breaking the second-factor property the library claimed.</p> <p>Patched in 0.1.0-alpha.4 by replacing the embedded secret with a salt-bound HMAC derivative (`enterprise_epoch = HMAC(totpSecret, salt || &#34;epoch-v1&#34;)`). The TOTP secret never leaves the operator&#39;s machine in the new design. The wire format change is incompatible — files sealed by affected versions must be re-sealed and the TOTP secret rotated. Full migration playbook in CHANGELOG.md.</p> <p>Reported by an external reviewer who decoded the payload of a real minted token and confirmed bit-for-bit equality with the operator&#39;s .env.local TOTP secret.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-x3r2-fj3r-g5mv