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EUVD-2026-322224

fkie_cve-2026-45089

Dalfox is a powerful open-source XSS scanner and utility focused on automation. Prior to 2.13.0, when dalfox is run in REST API server mode, the output, output-all, and debug fields in model.Options are JSON-tagged and deserialized directly from the attacker's request body, then propagated unchanged through dalfox.Initialize into the scan engine's logging path. The logger opens the attacker-supplied path with os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY and writes scan log lines to it. Critically, this file write block lives outside the IsLibrary guard in DalLog, so it executes even in server/library mode where file output was never intended to operate. Because no API key is required in the default configuration, an unauthenticated network caller can create or append to any file writable by the dalfox process on the host filesystem. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.13.0.

GHSA-8hf9-3q64-q2qf — Dalfox Server Mode has an Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Create/Append via `output` Option

Affected: Go: github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2

## Summary

When dalfox is run in REST API server mode, the `output`, `output-all`, and `debug` fields in `model.Options` are JSON-tagged and deserialized directly from the attacker's request body, then propagated unchanged through `dalfox.Initialize` into the scan engine's logging path. The logger opens the attacker-supplied path with `os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY` and writes scan log lines to it. Critically, this file write block lives outside the `IsLibrary` guard in `DalLog`, so it executes even in server/library mode where file output was never intended to operate. Because no API key is required in the default configuration, an unauthenticated network caller can create or append to any file writable by the dalfox process on the host filesystem.

## Severity

**High** (CVSS 3.1: 8.2)

`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L`

- **Attack Vector:** Network — server binds to `0.0.0.0:6664` by default. - **Attack Complexity:** Low — no preconditions; all trigger options (`output`, `output-all`, `debug`) are fully attacker-supplied in the JSON body. - **Privileges Required:** None — `--api-key` defaults to `""`, so the auth middleware is never registered. - **User Interaction:** None. - **Scope:** Unchanged — the file write stays within the dalfox process's OS authority. - **Confidentiality Impact:** None — this is a write-only primitive; no data is returned to the caller. - **Integrity Impact:** High — the attacker has full control over which file path is opened…