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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 15:57:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-326619</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326619</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-326619</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-326619</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-45062</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45062</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;FrankenPHP is a modern application server for PHP. From version 1.11.2 to before version 1.12.3, the splitPos() function in cgi.go misuses golang.org/x/text/search with search.IgnoreCase when the request path contains a non-ASCII byte. Two distinct flaws in that fallback let an attacker mislead FrankenPHP into treating a non-.php file as a .php script. In any deployment where the attacker can place content into a file served by FrankenPHP (uploads, file storage, etc.), this can be escalated to remote code execution by crafting a URL whose path triggers either flaw. This issue has been patched in version 1.12.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;FrankenPHP is a modern application server for PHP. From version 1.11.2 to before version 1.12.3, the splitPos() function in cgi.go misuses golang.org/x/text/search with search.IgnoreCase when the request path contains a non-ASCII byte. Two distinct flaws in that fallback let an attacker mislead FrankenPHP into treating a non-.php file as a .php script. In any deployment where the attacker can place content into a file served by FrankenPHP (uploads, file storage, etc.), this can be escalated to remote code execution by crafting a URL whose path triggers either flaw. This issue has been patched in version 1.12.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45062</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3g8v-8r37-cgjm — FrankenPHP: Unsafe Unicode Handling in CGI Path Splitting Allows Execution of Non-PHP Files</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3g8v-8r37-cgjm</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/dunglas/frankenphp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `splitPos()` function in [`cgi.go`](https://github.com/php/frankenphp/blob/main/cgi.go) misuses `golang.org/x/text/search` with `search.IgnoreCase` when the request path contains a non-ASCII byte. Two distinct flaws in that fallback let an attacker mislead FrankenPHP into treating a non-`.php` file as a `.php` script. In any deployment where the attacker can place content into a file served by FrankenPHP (uploads, file storage, etc.), this can be escalated to remote code execution by crafting a URL whose path triggers either flaw.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This advisory consolidates two independent reports against the same function (the duplicate, GHSA-v4h7-cj44-8fc8, has been closed). Both were reported by @KC1zs4.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
var splitSearchNonASCII = search.New(language.Und, search.IgnoreCase)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;func splitPos(path string, splitPath []string) int {
	if len(splitPath) == 0 {
		return 0
	}
	pathLen := len(path)
	for _, split := range splitPath {
		splitLen := len(split)
		for i := 0; i &amp;lt; pathLen; i++ {
			if path[i] &amp;gt;= utf8.RuneSelf {
				if _, end := splitSearchNonASCII.IndexString(path, split); end &amp;gt; -1 {
					return end
				}
				break
			}
			if i+splitLen &amp;gt; pathLen {
				continue
			}
			match := true
			for j := 0; j &amp;lt; splitLen; j++ {
				c := path[i+j]
				if c &amp;gt;= utf8.RuneSelf {
					if _, end := splitSearchNonASCII.IndexString(path, split); end &amp;gt; -1 {
						return end
					}
					break // &amp;lt;-- flaw 1: &amp;#39;match&amp;#39; is still true
				}
				if &amp;#39;A&amp;#39; &amp;lt;= c &amp;amp;&amp;amp; c &amp;lt;= &amp;#39;Z&amp;#39; {
					c +=…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/dunglas/frankenphp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `splitPos()` function in [`cgi.go`](https://github.com/php/frankenphp/blob/main/cgi.go) misuses `golang.org/x/text/search` with `search.IgnoreCase` when the request path contains a non-ASCII byte. Two distinct flaws in that fallback let an attacker mislead FrankenPHP into treating a non-`.php` file as a `.php` script. In any deployment where the attacker can place content into a file served by FrankenPHP (uploads, file storage, etc.), this can be escalated to remote code execution by crafting a URL whose path triggers either flaw.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This advisory consolidates two independent reports against the same function (the duplicate, GHSA-v4h7-cj44-8fc8, has been closed). Both were reported by @KC1zs4.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
var splitSearchNonASCII = search.New(language.Und, search.IgnoreCase)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;func splitPos(path string, splitPath []string) int {
	if len(splitPath) == 0 {
		return 0
	}
	pathLen := len(path)
	for _, split := range splitPath {
		splitLen := len(split)
		for i := 0; i &amp;lt; pathLen; i++ {
			if path[i] &amp;gt;= utf8.RuneSelf {
				if _, end := splitSearchNonASCII.IndexString(path, split); end &amp;gt; -1 {
					return end
				}
				break
			}
			if i+splitLen &amp;gt; pathLen {
				continue
			}
			match := true
			for j := 0; j &amp;lt; splitLen; j++ {
				c := path[i+j]
				if c &amp;gt;= utf8.RuneSelf {
					if _, end := splitSearchNonASCII.IndexString(path, split); end &amp;gt; -1 {
						return end
					}
					break // &amp;lt;-- flaw 1: &amp;#39;match&amp;#39; is still true
				}
				if &amp;#39;A&amp;#39; &amp;lt;= c &amp;amp;&amp;amp; c &amp;lt;= &amp;#39;Z&amp;#39; {
					c +=…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3g8v-8r37-cgjm</guid>
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