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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 17:24:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-407048</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407048</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-407048</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407048</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-45016</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45016</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;EGroupware is a web-based groupware server written in PHP. Prior to 23.1.20260601 and 26.5.20260507, the processURL2InlineImages logic in api/src/Mail.php treats non-HTTP image sources in an HTML mail body as local paths and passes a decoded attacker-controlled file:// URI to file_get_contents. Any authenticated user with mail access can cause files readable by the web server process to be embedded as inline MIME attachments in outgoing email, exposing local configuration, credentials, private keys, or other server files. This issue is fixed in versions 23.1.20260601 and 26.5.20260507.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;EGroupware is a web-based groupware server written in PHP. Prior to 23.1.20260601 and 26.5.20260507, the processURL2InlineImages logic in api/src/Mail.php treats non-HTTP image sources in an HTML mail body as local paths and passes a decoded attacker-controlled file:// URI to file_get_contents. Any authenticated user with mail access can cause files readable by the web server process to be embedded as inline MIME attachments in outgoing email, exposing local configuration, credentials, private keys, or other server files. This issue is fixed in versions 23.1.20260601 and 26.5.20260507.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45016</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-c8m7-r2jv-rw63 — EGroupware Vulnerable to Local File Inclusion via file:// URI in Mail Compose</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c8m7-r2jv-rw63</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: egroupware/egroupware&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The function processes image URLs embedded in an HTML email body without validating or restricting URI schemes. The check `!str_starts_with($myUrl, &amp;#39;http&amp;#39;)` evaluates to true for `file://` URIs, causing `file_get_contents($basedir . urldecode($myUrl))` to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and embed them as inline MIME attachments in outgoing email.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;str_starts_with(&amp;#39;file:///etc/passwd&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;http&amp;#39;) → **false**
!false → **true**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// api/src/Mail.php  
foreach($images[2] as $i =&amp;gt; $url)
			{
				//$isData = false;
				$basedir = $data = &amp;#39;&amp;#39;;
				$needTempFile = true;
				$attachmentData = [&amp;#39;name&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;type&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;file&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;tmp_name&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; &amp;#39;&amp;#39;];
				try
				{
					// do not change urls for absolute images (thanks to corvuscorax)
					if (!str_starts_with($url, &amp;#39;data:&amp;#39;))
					{
						$attachmentData[&amp;#39;name&amp;#39;] = basename($url); // need to resolve all sort of url
						if (($directory = dirname($url)) == &amp;#39;.&amp;#39;) $directory = &amp;#39;&amp;#39;;
						$ext = pathinfo($attachmentData[&amp;#39;name&amp;#39;], PATHINFO_EXTENSION);
						$attachmentData[&amp;#39;type&amp;#39;] = MimeMagic::ext2mime($ext);
						if ( strlen($directory) &amp;gt; 1 &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !str_ends_with($directory, &amp;#39;/&amp;#39;)) { $directory .= &amp;#39;/&amp;#39;; }
..
...
....
// processURL2InlineImages function
if ( $myUrl[0]!=&amp;#39;/&amp;#39; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; strlen($basedir) &amp;gt; 1 &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !str_ends_with($basedir, &amp;#39;/&amp;#39;)) { $basedir .= &amp;#39;/&amp;#39;; }
						if ($needTempFile &amp;amp;&amp;amp; empty($attachment) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !str_starts_with($myUrl, &amp;#34;http&amp;#34;))
						{
							try {
								$data = file_get_contents($basedir.urldecode($myUrl));…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: egroupware/egroupware&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The function processes image URLs embedded in an HTML email body without validating or restricting URI schemes. The check `!str_starts_with($myUrl, &amp;#39;http&amp;#39;)` evaluates to true for `file://` URIs, causing `file_get_contents($basedir . urldecode($myUrl))` to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and embed them as inline MIME attachments in outgoing email.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;str_starts_with(&amp;#39;file:///etc/passwd&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;http&amp;#39;) → **false**
!false → **true**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// api/src/Mail.php  
foreach($images[2] as $i =&amp;gt; $url)
			{
				//$isData = false;
				$basedir = $data = &amp;#39;&amp;#39;;
				$needTempFile = true;
				$attachmentData = [&amp;#39;name&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;type&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;file&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;tmp_name&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; &amp;#39;&amp;#39;];
				try
				{
					// do not change urls for absolute images (thanks to corvuscorax)
					if (!str_starts_with($url, &amp;#39;data:&amp;#39;))
					{
						$attachmentData[&amp;#39;name&amp;#39;] = basename($url); // need to resolve all sort of url
						if (($directory = dirname($url)) == &amp;#39;.&amp;#39;) $directory = &amp;#39;&amp;#39;;
						$ext = pathinfo($attachmentData[&amp;#39;name&amp;#39;], PATHINFO_EXTENSION);
						$attachmentData[&amp;#39;type&amp;#39;] = MimeMagic::ext2mime($ext);
						if ( strlen($directory) &amp;gt; 1 &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !str_ends_with($directory, &amp;#39;/&amp;#39;)) { $directory .= &amp;#39;/&amp;#39;; }
..
...
....
// processURL2InlineImages function
if ( $myUrl[0]!=&amp;#39;/&amp;#39; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; strlen($basedir) &amp;gt; 1 &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !str_ends_with($basedir, &amp;#39;/&amp;#39;)) { $basedir .= &amp;#39;/&amp;#39;; }
						if ($needTempFile &amp;amp;&amp;amp; empty($attachment) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !str_starts_with($myUrl, &amp;#34;http&amp;#34;))
						{
							try {
								$data = file_get_contents($basedir.urldecode($myUrl));…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c8m7-r2jv-rw63</guid>
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