<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 21:03:03 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-322427</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322427</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-322427</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322427</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-44985</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44985</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Dozzle is a realtime log viewer for docker containers. Prior to 10.5.2, he WebSocket upgrader for the /exec and /attach endpoints uses CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool { return true }, accepting upgrade requests from any origin. Combined with the JWT cookie using SameSite: Lax, this enables Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH). An attacker hosting a page on a same-site origin (e.g., a sibling subdomain, or another service on localhost) can initiate a WebSocket connection to the exec endpoint that carries the victim&amp;#39;s valid JWT cookie, gaining interactive shell access in any container the victim is authorized to access. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.5.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Dozzle is a realtime log viewer for docker containers. Prior to 10.5.2, he WebSocket upgrader for the /exec and /attach endpoints uses CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool { return true }, accepting upgrade requests from any origin. Combined with the JWT cookie using SameSite: Lax, this enables Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH). An attacker hosting a page on a same-site origin (e.g., a sibling subdomain, or another service on localhost) can initiate a WebSocket connection to the exec endpoint that carries the victim&amp;#39;s valid JWT cookie, gaining interactive shell access in any container the victim is authorized to access. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.5.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44985</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-j643-x8pv-8m67 — Dozzle's Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) on exec/attach endpointsbypasses authentication</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j643-x8pv-8m67</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/amir20/dozzle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The WebSocket upgrader for the `/exec` and `/attach` endpoints uses `CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool { return true }`, accepting upgrade requests from any origin. Combined with the JWT cookie using `SameSite: Lax`, this enables Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) — **even when authentication is properly configured**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker hosting a page on a same-site origin (e.g., a sibling subdomain, or another service on localhost) can initiate a WebSocket connection to the exec endpoint that carries the victim&amp;#39;s valid JWT cookie, gaining interactive shell access in any container the victim is authorized to access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. CheckOrigin bypassed (`internal/web/terminal.go:15-21`)**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
var upgrader = websocket.Upgrader{
    ReadBufferSize:  1024,
    WriteBufferSize: 1024,
    CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool {
        return true
    },
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The gorilla/websocket default CheckOrigin rejects cross-origin requests. Overriding it to return `true` removes the only server-side defense against CSWSH.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. JWT cookie with SameSite=Lax (`internal/web/auth.go:20-27`)**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
http.SetCookie(w, &amp;amp;http.Cookie{
    Name:     &amp;#34;jwt&amp;#34;,
    Value:    token,
    HttpOnly: true,
    Path:     &amp;#34;/&amp;#34;,
    SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
    Expires:  expires,
})
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`SameSite` operates at the **site** level (eTLD+1), not the origin level. A page on `evil.example.com` can make a WebSocket request to `dozzle.example.com` and the browser will attach the JWT c…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/amir20/dozzle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The WebSocket upgrader for the `/exec` and `/attach` endpoints uses `CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool { return true }`, accepting upgrade requests from any origin. Combined with the JWT cookie using `SameSite: Lax`, this enables Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) — **even when authentication is properly configured**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker hosting a page on a same-site origin (e.g., a sibling subdomain, or another service on localhost) can initiate a WebSocket connection to the exec endpoint that carries the victim&amp;#39;s valid JWT cookie, gaining interactive shell access in any container the victim is authorized to access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. CheckOrigin bypassed (`internal/web/terminal.go:15-21`)**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
var upgrader = websocket.Upgrader{
    ReadBufferSize:  1024,
    WriteBufferSize: 1024,
    CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool {
        return true
    },
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The gorilla/websocket default CheckOrigin rejects cross-origin requests. Overriding it to return `true` removes the only server-side defense against CSWSH.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. JWT cookie with SameSite=Lax (`internal/web/auth.go:20-27`)**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
http.SetCookie(w, &amp;amp;http.Cookie{
    Name:     &amp;#34;jwt&amp;#34;,
    Value:    token,
    HttpOnly: true,
    Path:     &amp;#34;/&amp;#34;,
    SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
    Expires:  expires,
})
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`SameSite` operates at the **site** level (eTLD+1), not the origin level. A page on `evil.example.com` can make a WebSocket request to `dozzle.example.com` and the browser will attach the JWT c…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j643-x8pv-8m67</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
