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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-349480</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349480</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-349480</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349480</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-44964</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44964</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, OnCallNotificationActivity is declared exported with no permission guard. A co-installed application can launch it with attacker-controlled Intent extras, including a full-screen lock-screen message, an arbitrary on-call page ID, and an arbitrary Intent to run inside the Datadog process.&#13;
This requires:&#13;
A malicious application co-installed on the victim&amp;#39;s device.&#13;
An active Datadog session in the Android app.&#13;
Impact: After a single tap on the Acknowledge button, the app sends a forged on-call acknowledgement to the backend under the victim&amp;#39;s session, launches the attacker-supplied Intent from within the Datadog process (reaching otherwise non-exported components), and turns on the screen while dismissing the keyguard.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, OnCallNotificationActivity is declared exported with no permission guard. A co-installed application can launch it with attacker-controlled Intent extras, including a full-screen lock-screen message, an arbitrary on-call page ID, and an arbitrary Intent to run inside the Datadog process.&#13;
This requires:&#13;
A malicious application co-installed on the victim&amp;#39;s device.&#13;
An active Datadog session in the Android app.&#13;
Impact: After a single tap on the Acknowledge button, the app sends a forged on-call acknowledgement to the backend under the victim&amp;#39;s session, launches the attacker-supplied Intent from within the Datadog process (reaching otherwise non-exported components), and turns on the screen while dismissing the keyguard.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44964</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-jcqx-89jm-9vxr</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jcqx-89jm-9vxr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The OnCallNotificationActivity in the Datadog Android application is declared android:exported=&amp;#34;true&amp;#34; in AndroidManifest.xml with no permission guard. Any co-installed application on the same device can launch it with attacker-controlled Intent extras: on_call_page_content (rendered as full-screen lock-screen text), page_id (used to enqueue an on-call Acknowledge worker), and on_call_page_intent, a Parcelable Intent that is passed through to startActivity from inside the Datadog process after a single user tap on the Acknowledge button.
The activity enables lock-screen display (setShowWhenLocked) and wakes the device (setTurnScreenOn) on launch. After one user tap, three effects follow: (1) a forged Acknowledge request is sent to the Datadog backend for the attacker-chosen page_id using the victim&amp;#39;s authenticated session; (2) the attacker-controlled Intent is launched from the Datadog process via startActivity, providing reach into non-exported components of com.datadog.app (confused-deputy pattern); (3) the keyguard is dismissed and the screen turned on, usable as a social-engineering or annoyance vector. Preconditions: a malicious application co-installed on the victim device and an active Datadog session in the Android app.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The OnCallNotificationActivity in the Datadog Android application is declared android:exported=&amp;#34;true&amp;#34; in AndroidManifest.xml with no permission guard. Any co-installed application on the same device can launch it with attacker-controlled Intent extras: on_call_page_content (rendered as full-screen lock-screen text), page_id (used to enqueue an on-call Acknowledge worker), and on_call_page_intent, a Parcelable Intent that is passed through to startActivity from inside the Datadog process after a single user tap on the Acknowledge button.
The activity enables lock-screen display (setShowWhenLocked) and wakes the device (setTurnScreenOn) on launch. After one user tap, three effects follow: (1) a forged Acknowledge request is sent to the Datadog backend for the attacker-chosen page_id using the victim&amp;#39;s authenticated session; (2) the attacker-controlled Intent is launched from the Datadog process via startActivity, providing reach into non-exported components of com.datadog.app (confused-deputy pattern); (3) the keyguard is dismissed and the screen turned on, usable as a social-engineering or annoyance vector. Preconditions: a malicious application co-installed on the victim device and an active Datadog session in the Android app.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jcqx-89jm-9vxr</guid>
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