<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 10:43:22 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-322414</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322414</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-322414</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322414</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-44837</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44837</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;view_component is a framework for building reusable, testable, and encapsulated view components in Ruby on Rails. From 3.0.0 to 4.9.0, the system test entrypoint canonicalizes a user-controlled file path with File.realpath, then checks whether the resolved path starts with the temp directory path. This is not a safe containment check because sibling directories can share the same string prefix. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;view_component is a framework for building reusable, testable, and encapsulated view components in Ruby on Rails. From 3.0.0 to 4.9.0, the system test entrypoint canonicalizes a user-controlled file path with File.realpath, then checks whether the resolved path starts with the temp directory path. This is not a safe containment check because sibling directories can share the same string prefix. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44837</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hg3h-g7xc-f7vp — view_component: System Test Entry Point Path Check Allows Sibling Directory Escape</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hg3h-g7xc-f7vp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: view_component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The system test entrypoint canonicalizes a user-controlled file path with `File.realpath`, then checks whether the resolved path starts with the temp directory path. This is not a safe containment check because sibling directories can share the same string prefix.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Severity: Medium; test-route scoped.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Example:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
Allowed base:  /app/tmp/view_components
Outside path:  /app/tmp/view_components_evil/secret.html.erb
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The outside path is not inside the base directory, but it passes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
@path.start_with?(base_path)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Relevant Code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`app/controllers/view_components_system_test_controller.rb`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
base_path = ::File.realpath(self.class.temp_dir)
@path = ::File.realpath(params.permit(:file)[:file], base_path)
raise ViewComponent::SystemTestControllerNefariousPathError unless @path.start_with?(base_path)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The route then renders the resolved file:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
render file: @path
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Exploit Flow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Example request:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
GET /_system_test_entrypoint?file=../view_components_evil/secret.html.erb
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Flow:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `base_path` resolves to `.../tmp/view_components`.
2. The payload resolves to `.../tmp/view_components_evil/secret.html.erb`.
3. That path is outside the intended temp directory.
4. The string prefix check still passes.
5. Rails renders the sibling file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The route is mounted only in `Rails.env.test?`, which is why Medium is more appropriate than P1. The issue matters if test routes are reachable in shared CI, staging, review apps, or…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: view_component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The system test entrypoint canonicalizes a user-controlled file path with `File.realpath`, then checks whether the resolved path starts with the temp directory path. This is not a safe containment check because sibling directories can share the same string prefix.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Severity: Medium; test-route scoped.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Example:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
Allowed base:  /app/tmp/view_components
Outside path:  /app/tmp/view_components_evil/secret.html.erb
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The outside path is not inside the base directory, but it passes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
@path.start_with?(base_path)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Relevant Code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`app/controllers/view_components_system_test_controller.rb`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
base_path = ::File.realpath(self.class.temp_dir)
@path = ::File.realpath(params.permit(:file)[:file], base_path)
raise ViewComponent::SystemTestControllerNefariousPathError unless @path.start_with?(base_path)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The route then renders the resolved file:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
render file: @path
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Exploit Flow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Example request:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
GET /_system_test_entrypoint?file=../view_components_evil/secret.html.erb
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Flow:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `base_path` resolves to `.../tmp/view_components`.
2. The payload resolves to `.../tmp/view_components_evil/secret.html.erb`.
3. That path is outside the intended temp directory.
4. The string prefix check still passes.
5. Rails renders the sibling file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The route is mounted only in `Rails.env.test?`, which is why Medium is more appropriate than P1. The issue matters if test routes are reachable in shared CI, staging, review apps, or…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hg3h-g7xc-f7vp</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-44837</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-44837</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: ruby-view-component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;view_component is a framework for building reusable, testable, and encapsulated view components in Ruby on Rails. From 3.0.0 to 4.9.0, the system test entrypoint canonicalizes a user-controlled file path with File.realpath, then checks whether the resolved path starts with the temp directory path. This is not a safe containment check because sibling directories can share the same string prefix. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: ruby-view-component&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;view_component is a framework for building reusable, testable, and encapsulated view components in Ruby on Rails. From 3.0.0 to 4.9.0, the system test entrypoint canonicalizes a user-controlled file path with File.realpath, then checks whether the resolved path starts with the temp directory path. This is not a safe containment check because sibling directories can share the same string prefix. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-44837</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
