https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 12 Oct 2026 08:45:17 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309191 EUVD-2026-309191 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309191 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44499 <p>ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to version 4.4.0, a composite denial-of-service vulnerability in Zebra&#39;s block discovery pipeline allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to permanently halt all new block discovery on a targeted node. The attack exploits three independent weaknesses in the gossip, syncer, and download subsystems — all exercisable from a single TCP connection — to create a monotonically growing block deficit that never self-heals. This issue has been patched in version 4.4.0.</p> <p>ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to version 4.4.0, a composite denial-of-service vulnerability in Zebra&#39;s block discovery pipeline allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to permanently halt all new block discovery on a targeted node. The attack exploits three independent weaknesses in the gossip, syncer, and download subsystems — all exercisable from a single TCP connection — to create a monotonically growing block deficit that never self-heals. This issue has been patched in version 4.4.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44499 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h9hm-m2xj-4rq9 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: zebrad</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>A composite denial-of-service vulnerability in Zebra&#39;s block discovery pipeline allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to permanently halt all new block discovery on a targeted node. The attack exploits three independent weaknesses in the gossip, syncer, and download subsystems — all exercisable from a single TCP connection — to create a monotonically growing block deficit that never self-heals.</p> <p>## Severity</p> <p>**Critical** — This is a Denial of Service vulnerability that requires no authentication, no special privileges, and only a single peer connection. The halt is permanent: the node will never recover without operator intervention.</p> <p>## Affected Versions</p> <p>All Zebra versions prior to 4.4.0.</p> <p>## Description</p> <p>Zebra discovers new blocks through two complementary paths: a gossip path (peers announce blocks via `inv` messages, triggering individual block downloads) and a syncer path (Zebra periodically queries peers with `FindBlocks`/`FindHeaders` to discover chains of missing blocks). Both paths must function for normal operation.</p> <p>The gossip path was vulnerable because there was no per-connection rate limit on `inv` messages. A single connection could send enough sequential `inv` messages with fake block hashes to fill the entire gossip download queue in under a millisecond. The `FullQueue` return value was silently ignored, so legitimate block announcements from honest peers were dropped with no warning.</p> <p>The syncer backup path could be degraded by responding w…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: zebrad</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>A composite denial-of-service vulnerability in Zebra&#39;s block discovery pipeline allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to permanently halt all new block discovery on a targeted node. The attack exploits three independent weaknesses in the gossip, syncer, and download subsystems — all exercisable from a single TCP connection — to create a monotonically growing block deficit that never self-heals.</p> <p>## Severity</p> <p>**Critical** — This is a Denial of Service vulnerability that requires no authentication, no special privileges, and only a single peer connection. The halt is permanent: the node will never recover without operator intervention.</p> <p>## Affected Versions</p> <p>All Zebra versions prior to 4.4.0.</p> <p>## Description</p> <p>Zebra discovers new blocks through two complementary paths: a gossip path (peers announce blocks via `inv` messages, triggering individual block downloads) and a syncer path (Zebra periodically queries peers with `FindBlocks`/`FindHeaders` to discover chains of missing blocks). Both paths must function for normal operation.</p> <p>The gossip path was vulnerable because there was no per-connection rate limit on `inv` messages. A single connection could send enough sequential `inv` messages with fake block hashes to fill the entire gossip download queue in under a millisecond. The `FullQueue` return value was silently ignored, so legitimate block announcements from honest peers were dropped with no warning.</p> <p>The syncer backup path could be degraded by responding w…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h9hm-m2xj-4rq9