https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 07 Oct 2026 13:18:43 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318688 EUVD-2026-318688 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318688 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44498 <p>ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to version 4.4.0, Zebra&#39;s block validator undercounts transparent signature operations against the 20000-sigop block limit (MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS), allowing it to accept blocks that zcashd rejects with bad-blk-sigops. A miner who produces such a block can split the network: Zebra nodes follow the offending chain while zcashd nodes do not. This issue has been patched in version 4.4.0.</p> <p>ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to version 4.4.0, Zebra&#39;s block validator undercounts transparent signature operations against the 20000-sigop block limit (MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS), allowing it to accept blocks that zcashd rejects with bad-blk-sigops. A miner who produces such a block can split the network: Zebra nodes follow the offending chain while zcashd nodes do not. This issue has been patched in version 4.4.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44498 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jv4h-j224-23cc <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: zebrad</p> <p>Zebra&#39;s block validator undercounts transparent signature operations against the 20000-sigop block limit (`MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS`), allowing it to accept blocks that `zcashd` rejects with `bad-blk-sigops`. A miner who produces such a block can split the network: Zebra nodes follow the offending chain while `zcashd` nodes do not.</p> <p>Two distinct undercounts:</p> <p>#### A: Coinbase Hidden Legacy Sigops</p> <p>`zcashd`&#39;s `GetLegacySigOpCount()` includes the coinbase input&#39;s `scriptSig`. Zebra&#39;s `Sigops` impl skipped the coinbase input entirely, so up to ~98 sigops (the 100-byte coinbase script length cap, less the height prefix) could be hidden inside the coinbase `scriptSig` without being charged against the block limit.</p> <p>#### B: Aggregate P2SH Sigops.</p> <p>`zcashd`&#39;s `GetP2SHSigOpCount()` parses each P2SH input&#39;s redeem script with `accurate=true` and sums those sigops into the block-wide total via `ConnectBlock`. The check is per-block, not per-transaction, and the limit applies regardless of who mines the offending block — a miner just needs to include enough P2SH-spending transactions whose redeem scripts together exceed 20000 sigops. Zebra computed P2SH sigops only on the mempool-acceptance path (used for ZIP-317 weighting) and never accumulated them during block validation. A block whose aggregate redeem-script sigops exceed 20000 (e.g. 1334 P2SH spends × 15 sigops = 20010) would be accepted by Zebra and rejected by `zcashd`.</p> <p>### Patches</p> <p>Fixed in this release: https://github.com/ZcashFound…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: zebrad</p> <p>Zebra&#39;s block validator undercounts transparent signature operations against the 20000-sigop block limit (`MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS`), allowing it to accept blocks that `zcashd` rejects with `bad-blk-sigops`. A miner who produces such a block can split the network: Zebra nodes follow the offending chain while `zcashd` nodes do not.</p> <p>Two distinct undercounts:</p> <p>#### A: Coinbase Hidden Legacy Sigops</p> <p>`zcashd`&#39;s `GetLegacySigOpCount()` includes the coinbase input&#39;s `scriptSig`. Zebra&#39;s `Sigops` impl skipped the coinbase input entirely, so up to ~98 sigops (the 100-byte coinbase script length cap, less the height prefix) could be hidden inside the coinbase `scriptSig` without being charged against the block limit.</p> <p>#### B: Aggregate P2SH Sigops.</p> <p>`zcashd`&#39;s `GetP2SHSigOpCount()` parses each P2SH input&#39;s redeem script with `accurate=true` and sums those sigops into the block-wide total via `ConnectBlock`. The check is per-block, not per-transaction, and the limit applies regardless of who mines the offending block — a miner just needs to include enough P2SH-spending transactions whose redeem scripts together exceed 20000 sigops. Zebra computed P2SH sigops only on the mempool-acceptance path (used for ZIP-317 weighting) and never accumulated them during block validation. A block whose aggregate redeem-script sigops exceed 20000 (e.g. 1334 P2SH spends × 15 sigops = 20010) would be accepted by Zebra and rejected by `zcashd`.</p> <p>### Patches</p> <p>Fixed in this release: https://github.com/ZcashFound…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jv4h-j224-23cc