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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 15:28:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-309294</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309294</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-309294</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309294</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-44334</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44334</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.139 to before version 4.6.32, CVE-2026-40287&amp;#39;s fix gated tools.py auto-import behind PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS=true in two files (tool_resolver.py, api/call.py). A third import sink in praisonai/templates/tool_override.py was missed and remains unguarded. It is reached by the recipe runner on every recipe execution and is remotely triggerable through POST /v1/recipes/run with a recipe value pointing at any local absolute path or any GitHub repo (because SecurityConfig.allow_any_github defaults to True). The attacker drops a tools.py next to TEMPLATE.yaml; the server exec_module()s it. No auth required by default, no environment opt-in required. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.32.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.139 to before version 4.6.32, CVE-2026-40287&amp;#39;s fix gated tools.py auto-import behind PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS=true in two files (tool_resolver.py, api/call.py). A third import sink in praisonai/templates/tool_override.py was missed and remains unguarded. It is reached by the recipe runner on every recipe execution and is remotely triggerable through POST /v1/recipes/run with a recipe value pointing at any local absolute path or any GitHub repo (because SecurityConfig.allow_any_github defaults to True). The attacker drops a tools.py next to TEMPLATE.yaml; the server exec_module()s it. No auth required by default, no environment opt-in required. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.32.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44334</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj — PraisonAI has unauthenticated RCE via `tool_override.py` (CVE-2026-40287 patch bypass)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xcmw-grxf-wjhj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## TL;DR&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2026-40287&amp;#39;s fix gated `tools.py` auto-import behind `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS=true` in **two** files (`tool_resolver.py`, `api/call.py`). A **third** import sink in `praisonai/templates/tool_override.py` was missed and remains unguarded. It is reached by the recipe runner on every recipe execution and is **remotely** triggerable through `POST /v1/recipes/run` with a `recipe` value pointing at any local absolute path *or* any GitHub repo (because `SecurityConfig.allow_any_github` defaults to `True`). The attacker drops a `tools.py` next to `TEMPLATE.yaml`; the server `exec_module()`s it. No auth required by default, no environment opt-in required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Patch coverage gap&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2026-40287 was fixed in v4.5.139 by adding an env-var gate at:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| File | Line | Gate |
|---|---|---|
| `praisonai/tool_resolver.py` | 77 | `if os.environ.get(&amp;#34;PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;&amp;#34;).lower() != &amp;#34;true&amp;#34;:` |
| `praisonai/api/call.py` | 80 | same |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But the equivalent sinks in `praisonai/templates/tool_override.py` were **not** patched:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# tool_override.py - create_tool_registry_with_overrides()
332    cwd_tools_py = Path.cwd() / &amp;#34;tools.py&amp;#34;
333    if cwd_tools_py.exists():
334        try:
335            tools = loader.load_from_file(str(cwd_tools_py))   # &amp;lt;-- exec_module
336            registry.update(tools)
337        except Exception:
338            pass
339
341    # 4. Template-local tools.py
342    if template_dir:
343        tools_py = Path(template_dir) / &amp;#34;tools.py&amp;#34;…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## TL;DR&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2026-40287&amp;#39;s fix gated `tools.py` auto-import behind `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS=true` in **two** files (`tool_resolver.py`, `api/call.py`). A **third** import sink in `praisonai/templates/tool_override.py` was missed and remains unguarded. It is reached by the recipe runner on every recipe execution and is **remotely** triggerable through `POST /v1/recipes/run` with a `recipe` value pointing at any local absolute path *or* any GitHub repo (because `SecurityConfig.allow_any_github` defaults to `True`). The attacker drops a `tools.py` next to `TEMPLATE.yaml`; the server `exec_module()`s it. No auth required by default, no environment opt-in required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Patch coverage gap&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2026-40287 was fixed in v4.5.139 by adding an env-var gate at:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| File | Line | Gate |
|---|---|---|
| `praisonai/tool_resolver.py` | 77 | `if os.environ.get(&amp;#34;PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;&amp;#34;).lower() != &amp;#34;true&amp;#34;:` |
| `praisonai/api/call.py` | 80 | same |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But the equivalent sinks in `praisonai/templates/tool_override.py` were **not** patched:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# tool_override.py - create_tool_registry_with_overrides()
332    cwd_tools_py = Path.cwd() / &amp;#34;tools.py&amp;#34;
333    if cwd_tools_py.exists():
334        try:
335            tools = loader.load_from_file(str(cwd_tools_py))   # &amp;lt;-- exec_module
336            registry.update(tools)
337        except Exception:
338            pass
339
341    # 4. Template-local tools.py
342    if template_dir:
343        tools_py = Path(template_dir) / &amp;#34;tools.py&amp;#34;…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xcmw-grxf-wjhj</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2926 — PraisonAI has unauthenticated RCE via `tool_override.py` (CVE-2026-40287 patch bypass)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2926</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## TL;DR&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2026-40287&amp;#39;s fix gated `tools.py` auto-import behind `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS=true` in **two** files (`tool_resolver.py`, `api/call.py`). A **third** import sink in `praisonai/templates/tool_override.py` was missed and remains unguarded. It is reached by the recipe runner on every recipe execution and is **remotely** triggerable through `POST /v1/recipes/run` with a `recipe` value pointing at any local absolute path *or* any GitHub repo (because `SecurityConfig.allow_any_github` defaults to `True`). The attacker drops a `tools.py` next to `TEMPLATE.yaml`; the server `exec_module()`s it. No auth required by default, no environment opt-in required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Patch coverage gap&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2026-40287 was fixed in v4.5.139 by adding an env-var gate at:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| File | Line | Gate |
|---|---|---|
| `praisonai/tool_resolver.py` | 77 | `if os.environ.get(&amp;#34;PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;&amp;#34;).lower() != &amp;#34;true&amp;#34;:` |
| `praisonai/api/call.py` | 80 | same |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But the equivalent sinks in `praisonai/templates/tool_override.py` were **not** patched:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# tool_override.py - create_tool_registry_with_overrides()
332    cwd_tools_py = Path.cwd() / &amp;#34;tools.py&amp;#34;
333    if cwd_tools_py.exists():
334        try:
335            tools = loader.load_from_file(str(cwd_tools_py))   # &amp;lt;-- exec_module
336            registry.update(tools)
337        except Exception:
338            pass
339
341    # 4. Template-local tools.py
342    if template_dir:
343        tools_py = Path(template_dir) / &amp;#34;tools.py&amp;#34;…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## TL;DR&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2026-40287&amp;#39;s fix gated `tools.py` auto-import behind `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS=true` in **two** files (`tool_resolver.py`, `api/call.py`). A **third** import sink in `praisonai/templates/tool_override.py` was missed and remains unguarded. It is reached by the recipe runner on every recipe execution and is **remotely** triggerable through `POST /v1/recipes/run` with a `recipe` value pointing at any local absolute path *or* any GitHub repo (because `SecurityConfig.allow_any_github` defaults to `True`). The attacker drops a `tools.py` next to `TEMPLATE.yaml`; the server `exec_module()`s it. No auth required by default, no environment opt-in required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Patch coverage gap&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2026-40287 was fixed in v4.5.139 by adding an env-var gate at:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| File | Line | Gate |
|---|---|---|
| `praisonai/tool_resolver.py` | 77 | `if os.environ.get(&amp;#34;PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;&amp;#34;).lower() != &amp;#34;true&amp;#34;:` |
| `praisonai/api/call.py` | 80 | same |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But the equivalent sinks in `praisonai/templates/tool_override.py` were **not** patched:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# tool_override.py - create_tool_registry_with_overrides()
332    cwd_tools_py = Path.cwd() / &amp;#34;tools.py&amp;#34;
333    if cwd_tools_py.exists():
334        try:
335            tools = loader.load_from_file(str(cwd_tools_py))   # &amp;lt;-- exec_module
336            registry.update(tools)
337        except Exception:
338            pass
339
341    # 4. Template-local tools.py
342    if template_dir:
343        tools_py = Path(template_dir) / &amp;#34;tools.py&amp;#34;…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2926</guid>
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