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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 11:37:35 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>cnvd-2026-37846</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cnvd-2026-37846</link>
      <description>cnvd-2026-37846</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cnvd-2026-37846</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-322213</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322213</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-322213</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-322213</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-44325</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44325</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC&amp;#39;s NRF root SBI endpoint POST /oauth2/token contains a parser-level type-confusion bug family. The handler in NFs/nrf/internal/sbi/api_accesstoken.go reflects over models.NrfAccessTokenAccessTokenReq, special-cases only plain string and NrfNfManagementNfType fields, and treats every other field as if it were a single models.PlmnId. The parsed *models.PlmnId is then assigned with reflect.Value.Set() to whichever field name the attacker put in the form body, which panics whenever the destination field&amp;#39;s real type is incompatible (slice, different struct, primitive). Gin recovery converts each panic into HTTP 500, but the endpoint remains remotely panicable from a single unauthenticated form-encoded request and is repeatedly triggerable. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC&amp;#39;s NRF root SBI endpoint POST /oauth2/token contains a parser-level type-confusion bug family. The handler in NFs/nrf/internal/sbi/api_accesstoken.go reflects over models.NrfAccessTokenAccessTokenReq, special-cases only plain string and NrfNfManagementNfType fields, and treats every other field as if it were a single models.PlmnId. The parsed *models.PlmnId is then assigned with reflect.Value.Set() to whichever field name the attacker put in the form body, which panics whenever the destination field&amp;#39;s real type is incompatible (slice, different struct, primitive). Gin recovery converts each panic into HTTP 500, but the endpoint remains remotely panicable from a single unauthenticated form-encoded request and is repeatedly triggerable. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44325</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-f8qv-7x5w-qr48 — free5GC NRF: type-confusion panic in POST /oauth2/token structured-form parser via Reflect.Set on incompatible types</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f8qv-7x5w-qr48</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/free5gc/nrf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
free5GC&amp;#39;s NRF root SBI endpoint `POST /oauth2/token` contains a parser-level type-confusion bug family. The handler in `NFs/nrf/internal/sbi/api_accesstoken.go` reflects over `models.NrfAccessTokenAccessTokenReq`, special-cases only plain `string` and `NrfNfManagementNfType` fields, and treats every other field as if it were a single `models.PlmnId`. The parsed `*models.PlmnId` is then assigned with `reflect.Value.Set()` to whichever field name the attacker put in the form body, which panics whenever the destination field&amp;#39;s real type is incompatible (slice, different struct, primitive). Gin recovery converts each panic into `HTTP 500`, but the endpoint remains remotely panicable from a single unauthenticated form-encoded request and is repeatedly triggerable across at least 6 confirmed crashing fields.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note: `/oauth2/token` is unauthenticated by design (it is the OAuth2 token-issuance endpoint). So this is NOT framed as an auth-bypass finding -- it is a parser bug on an intentionally unauthenticated SBI endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
Validated against the NRF container in the official Docker compose lab.
- Source repo tag: `v4.2.1`
- Running Docker image: `free5gc/nrf:v4.2.1`
- Docker validation date: 2026-03-22
- NRF endpoint: `http://10.100.200.3:8000`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Root cause is in the access-token request parser:
- `NFs/nrf/internal/sbi/api_accesstoken.go:52`
- `NFs/nrf/internal/sbi/api_accesstoken.go:87`
- `NFs/nrf/internal/sbi/api_accesstoken.go:98`
- `NFs/nrf/internal/sbi/api…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/free5gc/nrf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
free5GC&amp;#39;s NRF root SBI endpoint `POST /oauth2/token` contains a parser-level type-confusion bug family. The handler in `NFs/nrf/internal/sbi/api_accesstoken.go` reflects over `models.NrfAccessTokenAccessTokenReq`, special-cases only plain `string` and `NrfNfManagementNfType` fields, and treats every other field as if it were a single `models.PlmnId`. The parsed `*models.PlmnId` is then assigned with `reflect.Value.Set()` to whichever field name the attacker put in the form body, which panics whenever the destination field&amp;#39;s real type is incompatible (slice, different struct, primitive). Gin recovery converts each panic into `HTTP 500`, but the endpoint remains remotely panicable from a single unauthenticated form-encoded request and is repeatedly triggerable across at least 6 confirmed crashing fields.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note: `/oauth2/token` is unauthenticated by design (it is the OAuth2 token-issuance endpoint). So this is NOT framed as an auth-bypass finding -- it is a parser bug on an intentionally unauthenticated SBI endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
Validated against the NRF container in the official Docker compose lab.
- Source repo tag: `v4.2.1`
- Running Docker image: `free5gc/nrf:v4.2.1`
- Docker validation date: 2026-03-22
- NRF endpoint: `http://10.100.200.3:8000`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Root cause is in the access-token request parser:
- `NFs/nrf/internal/sbi/api_accesstoken.go:52`
- `NFs/nrf/internal/sbi/api_accesstoken.go:87`
- `NFs/nrf/internal/sbi/api_accesstoken.go:98`
- `NFs/nrf/internal/sbi/api…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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