<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 11:50:28 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-323357</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-323357</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-323357</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-323357</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-44287</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44287</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;FastGPT is an AI Agent building platform. Prior to 4.15.0-beta1, the JavaScript sandbox worker at projects/code-sandbox/src/pool/worker.ts:356 blocks dynamic import() with the regex /\bimport\s*\(/.test(code). JavaScript syntax accepts a block comment between import and (; the regex matches only ASCII whitespace, and the bytes /, *, *, / are not in the \s character class. The payload import/**/(&amp;#34;child_process&amp;#34;) parses as a syntactically valid dynamic import that the regex does not detect. Because import() is not wrapped by the safeRequire Proxy (which only proxies require), the attacker loads child_process and calls execSync - arbitrary command execution as uid=100(sandbox) inside the sandbox container. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.15.0-beta1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;FastGPT is an AI Agent building platform. Prior to 4.15.0-beta1, the JavaScript sandbox worker at projects/code-sandbox/src/pool/worker.ts:356 blocks dynamic import() with the regex /\bimport\s*\(/.test(code). JavaScript syntax accepts a block comment between import and (; the regex matches only ASCII whitespace, and the bytes /, *, *, / are not in the \s character class. The payload import/**/(&amp;#34;child_process&amp;#34;) parses as a syntactically valid dynamic import that the regex does not detect. Because import() is not wrapped by the safeRequire Proxy (which only proxies require), the attacker loads child_process and calls execSync - arbitrary command execution as uid=100(sandbox) inside the sandbox container. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.15.0-beta1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44287</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
