<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 17:58:19 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-309117</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309117</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-309117</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309117</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-43940</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-43940</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;electerm is an open-sourced terminal/ssh/sftp/telnet/serialport/RDP/VNC/Spice/ftp client. Prior to version 3.7.16, the runWidget function in src/app/widgets/load-widget.js constructs a file path by directly concatenating user‑supplied widget identifiers without any sanitisation. Because runWidget is exposed to the renderer process via an asynchronous IPC handler with no input validation, an attacker who achieves JavaScript execution inside the renderer (for example, through a malicious plugin or a cross‑site scripting flaw in the built‑in webview) can abuse a path traversal (../) to load and execute an arbitrary JavaScript file anywhere on the victim’s filesystem. This gives the attacker local code execution with the full privileges of the electerm process, leading to complete system compromise. This issue has been patched in version 3.7.16.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;electerm is an open-sourced terminal/ssh/sftp/telnet/serialport/RDP/VNC/Spice/ftp client. Prior to version 3.7.16, the runWidget function in src/app/widgets/load-widget.js constructs a file path by directly concatenating user‑supplied widget identifiers without any sanitisation. Because runWidget is exposed to the renderer process via an asynchronous IPC handler with no input validation, an attacker who achieves JavaScript execution inside the renderer (for example, through a malicious plugin or a cross‑site scripting flaw in the built‑in webview) can abuse a path traversal (../) to load and execute an arbitrary JavaScript file anywhere on the victim’s filesystem. This gives the attacker local code execution with the full privileges of the electerm process, leading to complete system compromise. This issue has been patched in version 3.7.16.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-43940</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-f77v-9vpc-6pjm — Electerm runWidget has a path traversal that leads to arbitrary code execution</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f77v-9vpc-6pjm</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: electerm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
The `runWidget` function in `src/app/widgets/load-widget.js` constructs a file path by directly concatenating user‑supplied widget identifiers without any sanitisation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```javascript
const file = `widget-${widgetId}.js`
const widget = require(path.join(__dirname, file))
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because `runWidget` is exposed to the renderer process via an asynchronous IPC handler with no input validation, an attacker who achieves JavaScript execution inside the renderer (for example, through a malicious plugin or a cross‑site scripting flaw in the built‑in webview) can abuse a **path traversal** (`../`) to load and execute an arbitrary JavaScript file anywhere on the victim’s filesystem. This gives the attacker local code execution with the full privileges of the electerm process, leading to complete system compromise.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in version &amp;gt;= 3.7.16&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
Until a patch is released:
- Do not install or run untrusted plugins.
- Avoid loading arbitrary web content inside electerm’s embedded webview (for example, disable any features that fetch and display remote HTML).
- Run electerm in a sandboxed environment (e.g., with `bubblewrap` on Linux, AppArmor/SELinux profiles, or Windows sandboxed app execution) to limit the impact of any code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Resources
- [electerm GitHub Repository](https://github.com/electerm/electerm)
- [electerm Security Policy](https://github.com/electerm/electerm/security)
- Vulnerability details originally reported by external rese…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: electerm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
The `runWidget` function in `src/app/widgets/load-widget.js` constructs a file path by directly concatenating user‑supplied widget identifiers without any sanitisation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```javascript
const file = `widget-${widgetId}.js`
const widget = require(path.join(__dirname, file))
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because `runWidget` is exposed to the renderer process via an asynchronous IPC handler with no input validation, an attacker who achieves JavaScript execution inside the renderer (for example, through a malicious plugin or a cross‑site scripting flaw in the built‑in webview) can abuse a **path traversal** (`../`) to load and execute an arbitrary JavaScript file anywhere on the victim’s filesystem. This gives the attacker local code execution with the full privileges of the electerm process, leading to complete system compromise.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in version &amp;gt;= 3.7.16&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
Until a patch is released:
- Do not install or run untrusted plugins.
- Avoid loading arbitrary web content inside electerm’s embedded webview (for example, disable any features that fetch and display remote HTML).
- Run electerm in a sandboxed environment (e.g., with `bubblewrap` on Linux, AppArmor/SELinux profiles, or Windows sandboxed app execution) to limit the impact of any code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Resources
- [electerm GitHub Repository](https://github.com/electerm/electerm)
- [electerm Security Policy](https://github.com/electerm/electerm/security)
- Vulnerability details originally reported by external rese…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f77v-9vpc-6pjm</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
