<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 01:46:32 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-318020</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318020</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-318020</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318020</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-43929</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-43929</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ssrfcheck is a library that checks if a string contains a potential SSRF attack. In 1.3.0 and earlier, ssrfcheck fails to block Server-Side Request Forgery attacks when the target private IP address is encoded as an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address (e.g. http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/). The WHATWG URL parser built into Node.js silently normalizes the IPv4 notation inside the brackets to compressed hex form ([::ffff:7f00:1]) before the library&amp;#39;s private-IP regex ever runs. The regex was written to match dot-notation only and therefore never matches any real input — all seven IANA private IPv4 ranges, including the AWS/GCP/Azure metadata address 169.254.169.254, are bypassed. Any application using isSSRFSafeURL() to guard HTTP requests made with user-supplied URLs is fully exposed to SSRF.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ssrfcheck is a library that checks if a string contains a potential SSRF attack. In 1.3.0 and earlier, ssrfcheck fails to block Server-Side Request Forgery attacks when the target private IP address is encoded as an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address (e.g. http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/). The WHATWG URL parser built into Node.js silently normalizes the IPv4 notation inside the brackets to compressed hex form ([::ffff:7f00:1]) before the library&amp;#39;s private-IP regex ever runs. The regex was written to match dot-notation only and therefore never matches any real input — all seven IANA private IPv4 ranges, including the AWS/GCP/Azure metadata address 169.254.169.254, are bypassed. Any application using isSSRFSafeURL() to guard HTTP requests made with user-supplied URLs is fully exposed to SSRF.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-43929</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-j4rj-2jr5-m439 — ssrfcheck Vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j4rj-2jr5-m439</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: ssrfcheck&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ssrfcheck` v1.3.0 (latest) fails to block Server-Side Request Forgery attacks when the target private IP address is encoded as an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address (e.g. `http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/`). The WHATWG URL parser built into Node.js silently normalizes the IPv4 notation inside the brackets to compressed hex form (`[::ffff:7f00:1]`) before the library&amp;#39;s private-IP regex ever runs. The regex was written to match dot-notation only and therefore never matches any real input — all seven IANA private IPv4 ranges, including the AWS/GCP/Azure metadata address `169.254.169.254`, are bypassed. Any application using `isSSRFSafeURL()` to guard HTTP requests made with user-supplied URLs is fully exposed to SSRF.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable file:** `src/is-private-ip.js`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The library detects IPv6 private addresses using the `privIp6()` function. The relevant portion:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
// src/is-private-ip.js  (lines ~40-60 of the published source)
function privIp6 (ip) {
  return /^::$/.test(ip) ||
    /^::1$/.test(ip) ||
    /^::f{4}:([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})$/.test(ip) ||
    /^::f{4}:0.([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})$/.test(ip) ||
    /^64:ff9b::([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})$/.test(ip) ||
    // ... more patterns, all expect dot-notation ...
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The third line is the IPv4-mapped IPv6 check. It expects input in the form `::ffff:127.0.0.1` (dots). However, the IP is extracted from the URL using `url.ho…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: ssrfcheck&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ssrfcheck` v1.3.0 (latest) fails to block Server-Side Request Forgery attacks when the target private IP address is encoded as an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address (e.g. `http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/`). The WHATWG URL parser built into Node.js silently normalizes the IPv4 notation inside the brackets to compressed hex form (`[::ffff:7f00:1]`) before the library&amp;#39;s private-IP regex ever runs. The regex was written to match dot-notation only and therefore never matches any real input — all seven IANA private IPv4 ranges, including the AWS/GCP/Azure metadata address `169.254.169.254`, are bypassed. Any application using `isSSRFSafeURL()` to guard HTTP requests made with user-supplied URLs is fully exposed to SSRF.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable file:** `src/is-private-ip.js`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The library detects IPv6 private addresses using the `privIp6()` function. The relevant portion:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
// src/is-private-ip.js  (lines ~40-60 of the published source)
function privIp6 (ip) {
  return /^::$/.test(ip) ||
    /^::1$/.test(ip) ||
    /^::f{4}:([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})$/.test(ip) ||
    /^::f{4}:0.([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})$/.test(ip) ||
    /^64:ff9b::([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})$/.test(ip) ||
    // ... more patterns, all expect dot-notation ...
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The third line is the IPv4-mapped IPv6 check. It expects input in the form `::ffff:127.0.0.1` (dots). However, the IP is extracted from the URL using `url.ho…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j4rj-2jr5-m439</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
