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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 23:15:52 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-318027</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318027</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-318027</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318027</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-43901</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-43901</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Wireshark MCP is an MCP Server that turns tshark into a structured analysis interface, then layers in optional Wireshark suite utilities. In 1.1.5 and earlier, wireshark-mcp exposes a wireshark_export_objects MCP tool that accepts an attacker-controlled dest_dir parameter and passes it to tshark&amp;#39;s --export-objects flag with no mandatory path restriction. The path sandbox (_allowed_dirs) is None by default and only activates when the environment variable WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS is explicitly set. In a default installation, any directory on the filesystem can be used as the export destination.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Wireshark MCP is an MCP Server that turns tshark into a structured analysis interface, then layers in optional Wireshark suite utilities. In 1.1.5 and earlier, wireshark-mcp exposes a wireshark_export_objects MCP tool that accepts an attacker-controlled dest_dir parameter and passes it to tshark&amp;#39;s --export-objects flag with no mandatory path restriction. The path sandbox (_allowed_dirs) is None by default and only activates when the environment variable WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS is explicitly set. In a default installation, any directory on the filesystem can be used as the export destination.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-43901</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3r68-x3xc-rxpg — wireshark-mcp vulnerable to arbitrary file write via export_objects when WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS is not configured</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3r68-x3xc-rxpg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: wireshark-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`wireshark-mcp` exposes a `wireshark_export_objects` MCP tool that accepts an attacker-controlled `dest_dir` parameter and passes it to tshark&amp;#39;s `--export-objects` flag with **no mandatory path restriction**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The path sandbox (`_allowed_dirs`) is `None` by default and only activates when the environment variable `WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS` is explicitly set. In a default installation, any directory on the filesystem can be used as the export destination.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected code** (`src/wireshark_mcp/tshark/client.py:531-543`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;output_validation = self._validate_output_path(dest_dir)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# _validate_output_path only enforces the sandbox when _allowed_dirs is set.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Default: _allowed_dirs = None → no restriction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;os.makedirs(dest_dir, exist_ok=True)   # creates arbitrary directories&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cmd = [..., &amp;#34;--export-objects&amp;#34;, f&amp;#34;{protocol},{dest_dir}&amp;#34;]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Attack Scenario&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker embeds a crafted HTTP response in a pcap file (e.g. `Content-Disposition: filename=authorized_keys`). Via prompt injection in the pcap payload, an AI model using this MCP server is manipulated into calling `wireshark_export_objects` with:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dest_dir=/home/user/.ssh/&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`tshark` then extracts and writes the HTTP object to that path, granting the attacker SSH access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same technique can target:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `/etc/cron.d/`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Writable web roots&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Other sensitive filesystem locations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Additional Affected Operations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same missing sandbox affects:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `merge_pca…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: wireshark-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`wireshark-mcp` exposes a `wireshark_export_objects` MCP tool that accepts an attacker-controlled `dest_dir` parameter and passes it to tshark&amp;#39;s `--export-objects` flag with **no mandatory path restriction**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The path sandbox (`_allowed_dirs`) is `None` by default and only activates when the environment variable `WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS` is explicitly set. In a default installation, any directory on the filesystem can be used as the export destination.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected code** (`src/wireshark_mcp/tshark/client.py:531-543`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;output_validation = self._validate_output_path(dest_dir)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# _validate_output_path only enforces the sandbox when _allowed_dirs is set.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Default: _allowed_dirs = None → no restriction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;os.makedirs(dest_dir, exist_ok=True)   # creates arbitrary directories&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cmd = [..., &amp;#34;--export-objects&amp;#34;, f&amp;#34;{protocol},{dest_dir}&amp;#34;]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Attack Scenario&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker embeds a crafted HTTP response in a pcap file (e.g. `Content-Disposition: filename=authorized_keys`). Via prompt injection in the pcap payload, an AI model using this MCP server is manipulated into calling `wireshark_export_objects` with:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dest_dir=/home/user/.ssh/&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`tshark` then extracts and writes the HTTP object to that path, granting the attacker SSH access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same technique can target:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `/etc/cron.d/`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Writable web roots&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Other sensitive filesystem locations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Additional Affected Operations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same missing sandbox affects:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `merge_pca…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3r68-x3xc-rxpg</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-3426 — wireshark-mcp vulnerable to arbitrary file write via export_objects when WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS is not configured</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3426</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: wireshark-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`wireshark-mcp` exposes a `wireshark_export_objects` MCP tool that accepts an attacker-controlled `dest_dir` parameter and passes it to tshark&amp;#39;s `--export-objects` flag with **no mandatory path restriction**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The path sandbox (`_allowed_dirs`) is `None` by default and only activates when the environment variable `WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS` is explicitly set. In a default installation, any directory on the filesystem can be used as the export destination.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected code** (`src/wireshark_mcp/tshark/client.py:531-543`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;output_validation = self._validate_output_path(dest_dir)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# _validate_output_path only enforces the sandbox when _allowed_dirs is set.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Default: _allowed_dirs = None → no restriction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;os.makedirs(dest_dir, exist_ok=True)   # creates arbitrary directories&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cmd = [..., &amp;#34;--export-objects&amp;#34;, f&amp;#34;{protocol},{dest_dir}&amp;#34;]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Attack Scenario&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker embeds a crafted HTTP response in a pcap file (e.g. `Content-Disposition: filename=authorized_keys`). Via prompt injection in the pcap payload, an AI model using this MCP server is manipulated into calling `wireshark_export_objects` with:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dest_dir=/home/user/.ssh/&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`tshark` then extracts and writes the HTTP object to that path, granting the attacker SSH access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same technique can target:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `/etc/cron.d/`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Writable web roots&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Other sensitive filesystem locations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Additional Affected Operations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same missing sandbox affects:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `merge_pca…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: wireshark-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`wireshark-mcp` exposes a `wireshark_export_objects` MCP tool that accepts an attacker-controlled `dest_dir` parameter and passes it to tshark&amp;#39;s `--export-objects` flag with **no mandatory path restriction**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The path sandbox (`_allowed_dirs`) is `None` by default and only activates when the environment variable `WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS` is explicitly set. In a default installation, any directory on the filesystem can be used as the export destination.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected code** (`src/wireshark_mcp/tshark/client.py:531-543`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;output_validation = self._validate_output_path(dest_dir)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# _validate_output_path only enforces the sandbox when _allowed_dirs is set.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Default: _allowed_dirs = None → no restriction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;os.makedirs(dest_dir, exist_ok=True)   # creates arbitrary directories&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cmd = [..., &amp;#34;--export-objects&amp;#34;, f&amp;#34;{protocol},{dest_dir}&amp;#34;]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Attack Scenario&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker embeds a crafted HTTP response in a pcap file (e.g. `Content-Disposition: filename=authorized_keys`). Via prompt injection in the pcap payload, an AI model using this MCP server is manipulated into calling `wireshark_export_objects` with:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;dest_dir=/home/user/.ssh/&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`tshark` then extracts and writes the HTTP object to that path, granting the attacker SSH access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same technique can target:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `/etc/cron.d/`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Writable web roots&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Other sensitive filesystem locations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Additional Affected Operations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same missing sandbox affects:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `merge_pca…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3426</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-43901</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-43901</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: wireshark, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: wireshark, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: wireshark, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: wireshark, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: wireshark, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: wireshark, Ubuntu:25.10: wireshark, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: wireshark&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Wireshark MCP is an MCP Server that turns tshark into a structured analysis interface, then layers in optional Wireshark suite utilities. In 1.1.5 and earlier, wireshark-mcp exposes a wireshark_export_objects MCP tool that accepts an attacker-controlled dest_dir parameter and passes it to tshark&amp;#39;s --export-objects flag with no mandatory path restriction. The path sandbox (_allowed_dirs) is None by default and only activates when the environment variable WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS is explicitly set. In a default installation, any directory on the filesystem can be used as the export destination.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: wireshark, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: wireshark, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: wireshark, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: wireshark, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: wireshark, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: wireshark, Ubuntu:25.10: wireshark, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: wireshark&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Wireshark MCP is an MCP Server that turns tshark into a structured analysis interface, then layers in optional Wireshark suite utilities. In 1.1.5 and earlier, wireshark-mcp exposes a wireshark_export_objects MCP tool that accepts an attacker-controlled dest_dir parameter and passes it to tshark&amp;#39;s --export-objects flag with no mandatory path restriction. The path sandbox (_allowed_dirs) is None by default and only activates when the environment variable WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS is explicitly set. In a default installation, any directory on the filesystem can be used as the export destination.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-43901</guid>
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