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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-317286</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-317286</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-317286</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-317286</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-43884</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-43884</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 29.0, two endpoints (plugin/AI/receiveAsync.json.php and objects/EpgParser.php) in AVideo call isSSRFSafeURL() to validate user-supplied URLs, then fetch them using bare file_get_contents() without disabling PHP&amp;#39;s automatic redirect following. An attacker can supply a URL pointing to a server they control that returns a 302 redirect to an internal/cloud-metadata address (e.g., http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/). Since isSSRFSafeURL() only validates the initial URL, the redirect target bypasses all SSRF protections. Commit 603e7bf77a835584387327e35560262feb075db3 contains an updated fix.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 29.0, two endpoints (plugin/AI/receiveAsync.json.php and objects/EpgParser.php) in AVideo call isSSRFSafeURL() to validate user-supplied URLs, then fetch them using bare file_get_contents() without disabling PHP&amp;#39;s automatic redirect following. An attacker can supply a URL pointing to a server they control that returns a 302 redirect to an internal/cloud-metadata address (e.g., http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/). Since isSSRFSafeURL() only validates the initial URL, the redirect target bypasses all SSRF protections. Commit 603e7bf77a835584387327e35560262feb075db3 contains an updated fix.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-43884</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-2hch-c97c-g99x — AVideo has SSRF Protection Bypass via HTTP Redirect and DNS Rebinding in isSSRFSafeURL()</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2hch-c97c-g99x</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two endpoints in AVideo call `isSSRFSafeURL()` to validate user-supplied URLs, then fetch them using bare `file_get_contents()` **without disabling PHP&amp;#39;s automatic redirect following**. An attacker can supply a URL pointing to a server they control that returns a 302 redirect to an internal/cloud-metadata address (e.g., `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`). Since `isSSRFSafeURL()` only validates the *initial* URL, the redirect target bypasses all SSRF protections.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A secondary finding is that 6+ callers of `isSSRFSafeURL()` discard the `$resolvedIP` out-parameter meant for DNS pinning, leaving them vulnerable to DNS rebinding TOCTOU attacks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Severity:** High — CVSS 3.1: 7.7 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Finding 1: Redirect-Based SSRF Bypass&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable code — `plugin/AI/receiveAsync.json.php` (line ~162–165):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// SSRF Protection: Validate URL before fetching
if (!isSSRFSafeURL($imageUrl)) {
    // blocked
} else {
    $imageContent = file_get_contents($imageUrl);  // ← FOLLOWS REDIRECTS!
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable code — `objects/EpgParser.php` (line ~358–362):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
if (!isSSRFSafeURL($this-&amp;gt;url)) {
    throw new \RuntimeException(&amp;#39;URL blocked by SSRF protection&amp;#39;);
}
$this-&amp;gt;content = @file_get_contents($this-&amp;gt;url);  // ← FOLLOWS REDIRECTS!
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Safe code for comparison — `objects/functions.php`, `url_get_contents()`:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$opts = [&amp;#39;http&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; [&amp;#39;follow_location&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; 0]];  // Disable auto-redirect
$context = stream…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two endpoints in AVideo call `isSSRFSafeURL()` to validate user-supplied URLs, then fetch them using bare `file_get_contents()` **without disabling PHP&amp;#39;s automatic redirect following**. An attacker can supply a URL pointing to a server they control that returns a 302 redirect to an internal/cloud-metadata address (e.g., `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`). Since `isSSRFSafeURL()` only validates the *initial* URL, the redirect target bypasses all SSRF protections.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A secondary finding is that 6+ callers of `isSSRFSafeURL()` discard the `$resolvedIP` out-parameter meant for DNS pinning, leaving them vulnerable to DNS rebinding TOCTOU attacks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Severity:** High — CVSS 3.1: 7.7 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Finding 1: Redirect-Based SSRF Bypass&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable code — `plugin/AI/receiveAsync.json.php` (line ~162–165):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// SSRF Protection: Validate URL before fetching
if (!isSSRFSafeURL($imageUrl)) {
    // blocked
} else {
    $imageContent = file_get_contents($imageUrl);  // ← FOLLOWS REDIRECTS!
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable code — `objects/EpgParser.php` (line ~358–362):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
if (!isSSRFSafeURL($this-&amp;gt;url)) {
    throw new \RuntimeException(&amp;#39;URL blocked by SSRF protection&amp;#39;);
}
$this-&amp;gt;content = @file_get_contents($this-&amp;gt;url);  // ← FOLLOWS REDIRECTS!
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Safe code for comparison — `objects/functions.php`, `url_get_contents()`:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$opts = [&amp;#39;http&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; [&amp;#39;follow_location&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; 0]];  // Disable auto-redirect
$context = stream…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2hch-c97c-g99x</guid>
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